OPINION BY PANELLA, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Elizabeth O’Donnell, appeals from the decision of the Honorable Joseph I. Papalini, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which transferred venue of her personal injury action to Delaware County. After a careful review, we reverse.
¶2 On July 11, 2001,1 Appellee, Eva McDonough, a resident of Villanova, Montgomery County, was driving a vehicle owned by Appellee, Fraternal & Charitable Consultants, Inc. (“F & CC”), a Pennsylvania Corporation.2 While McDonough was traveling on Sproul Road in Delaware County, she struck from behind a vehicle being driven by O’Donnell.
¶ 3 On June 30, 2003, O’Donnell filed a personal injury complaint against Eva Mc-Donough and F & CC. Thereafter, on August 20, 2003, both McDonough and F & CC filed preliminary objections to O’Donnell’s Complaint, seeking to transfer venue to Montgomery County. Subsequent thereto, O’Donnell requested that a business representative of F & CC be deposed to explore the issue of venue. In response, Eva McDonough was made available for deposition on October 30, 2003. On November 12, 2003, the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein sustained the preliminary objections and transferred the case to Montgomery County. O’Donnell appealed the decision, and on September 30, 2004, this Court vacated the trial court’s order, as Judge Bernstein had erroneously found that the accident occurred in Montgomery County, when it had in fact occurred in Delaware County.
¶ 4 Following remand, on December 8, 2004, both McDonough and F & CC filed new Preliminary Objections, requesting that the case be transferred to Delaware [47]*47County. On December 14, 2004, the trial court again sustained McDonough’s and F & CC’s initial preliminary objections, and transferred the case to Delaware County. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 5 On appeal, O’Donnell raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in revisiting the issue of whether venue in Philadelphia is proper when that issue was fully briefed and argues to the Superior Court and resulted in a remand of the case back to Philadelphia?
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that there is no venue in Philadelphia and transferring the case to Delaware County?
3. Whether the trial court erred by finding, as stated in its opinion, that the Plaintiff resides in Montgomery County when the record clearly indicates that the Plaintiff resides in Delaware County?
Appellant’s Brief, at 2.3
¶ 6 We begin by addressing O’Donnell’s first issue on appeal wherein she argues that this Court’s previous decision foreclosed the trial court from revisiting the initial preliminary objections. In this regard, it is important to note that we vacated the trial court’s original decision, and remanded it for further proceedings “not inconsistent with this opinion.” O’Donnell v. McDonough, 863 A.2d 1239 (Pa.Super.2004) (unpublished memorandum). Accordingly, the appropriate interpretation of our decision would be that anything consistent with the opinion was allowed. Our memorandum was focused entirely on the error the trial court had made in determining the proper venue where the accident occurred. As such, the trial court was free, on remand, to sustain the preliminary objections with the understanding that the accident occurred in Delaware County, if the evidence of record supported such a ruling. We therefore conclude that O’Donnell’s first issue on appeal warrants no relief.
¶7 In her second issue on appeal, O’Donnell argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no venue in Philadelphia. Our standard of review on this issue is one of abuse of discretion. Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 525 Pa. 237, 242-243, 579 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1990). Our review is fact intensive. Id If there is any proper basis supporting the trial court’s decision to transfer venue, we must affirm. Kubik v. Route 252, Inc., 762 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Pa.Super.2000). However, a plaintiff must be allowed the right to choose any appropriate forum: “The applicant bears the burden of proving that a change of venue is necessary, while a plaintiff generally is given the choice of forum so long as the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are satisfied.” Purcell, 525 Pa. at 243, 579 A.2d at 1284 (1990). “A plaintiffs choice of forum is given great weight and a defendant has the burden in asserting a challenge to the plaintiffs choice of venue.” Masel v. Glassman, 456 Pa.Super. 41, 689 A.2d 314, 316 (1997), quoting Shears v. Rigley, 424 Pa.Super. 559, 623 A.2d 821, 824 (1993).
¶ 8 In the present case, the trial court found that O’Donnell had failed to establish that venue was proper in Philadelphia. As an initial matter, we must address the separate issue of improper service, as this issue is referenced in many [48]*48of the parties’ arguments. Defective service of process must be raised by way of preliminary objections or the issue is waived. Cox v. Hott, 246 Pa.Super. 445, 371 A.2d 921, 923 (1977).
¶ 9 In the case sub judice, O’Donnell never effectuated actual service on F & CC. When service was attempted at the registered address for the corporation, it was discovered that another, totally unrelated business was operating there. However, after O’Donnell filed her complaint in the trial court, Attorney Kevin R. McNulty entered his appearance “on behalf of the Defendants in the above captioned matter.” Entry of Appearance, filed 8/15/2003. As only two defendants are named in the caption, it must be deduced from the use of the plural “Defendants” that Attorney McNulty entered his appearance on behalf of both McDonough and F & CC. Attorney McNulty has never filed a document that would contradict this interpretation.
¶ 10 In the preliminary objections filed by Attorney McNulty, the only issue raised was that of improper venue. Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Complaint, filed 8/20/2003. The preliminary objections indicated that F & CC was “only ever located in Villanova, Pennsylvania.” Id. However, it is clear from the information O’Donnell obtained from the Department of State, as well as McDon-ough’s deposition testimony, that F & CC was, at some point in time, located in Philadelphia. See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Answers to Preliminary Objections of Defendants; N.T., 10/30/2003, at 8.
¶ 11 The preliminary objections also averred that F & CC was no longer in existence. However, this averment is irrelevant to the resolution of the instant dispute, as the record reveals no dispute that F & CC was in existence at the time of the accident. Accordingly, F & CC is, at this point in the proceedings, a proper defendant, as liability may be apportioned to it, and it may still have assets in the form of insurance coverage for the accident at issue.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION BY PANELLA, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Elizabeth O’Donnell, appeals from the decision of the Honorable Joseph I. Papalini, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which transferred venue of her personal injury action to Delaware County. After a careful review, we reverse.
¶2 On July 11, 2001,1 Appellee, Eva McDonough, a resident of Villanova, Montgomery County, was driving a vehicle owned by Appellee, Fraternal & Charitable Consultants, Inc. (“F & CC”), a Pennsylvania Corporation.2 While McDonough was traveling on Sproul Road in Delaware County, she struck from behind a vehicle being driven by O’Donnell.
¶ 3 On June 30, 2003, O’Donnell filed a personal injury complaint against Eva Mc-Donough and F & CC. Thereafter, on August 20, 2003, both McDonough and F & CC filed preliminary objections to O’Donnell’s Complaint, seeking to transfer venue to Montgomery County. Subsequent thereto, O’Donnell requested that a business representative of F & CC be deposed to explore the issue of venue. In response, Eva McDonough was made available for deposition on October 30, 2003. On November 12, 2003, the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein sustained the preliminary objections and transferred the case to Montgomery County. O’Donnell appealed the decision, and on September 30, 2004, this Court vacated the trial court’s order, as Judge Bernstein had erroneously found that the accident occurred in Montgomery County, when it had in fact occurred in Delaware County.
¶ 4 Following remand, on December 8, 2004, both McDonough and F & CC filed new Preliminary Objections, requesting that the case be transferred to Delaware [47]*47County. On December 14, 2004, the trial court again sustained McDonough’s and F & CC’s initial preliminary objections, and transferred the case to Delaware County. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 5 On appeal, O’Donnell raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in revisiting the issue of whether venue in Philadelphia is proper when that issue was fully briefed and argues to the Superior Court and resulted in a remand of the case back to Philadelphia?
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that there is no venue in Philadelphia and transferring the case to Delaware County?
3. Whether the trial court erred by finding, as stated in its opinion, that the Plaintiff resides in Montgomery County when the record clearly indicates that the Plaintiff resides in Delaware County?
Appellant’s Brief, at 2.3
¶ 6 We begin by addressing O’Donnell’s first issue on appeal wherein she argues that this Court’s previous decision foreclosed the trial court from revisiting the initial preliminary objections. In this regard, it is important to note that we vacated the trial court’s original decision, and remanded it for further proceedings “not inconsistent with this opinion.” O’Donnell v. McDonough, 863 A.2d 1239 (Pa.Super.2004) (unpublished memorandum). Accordingly, the appropriate interpretation of our decision would be that anything consistent with the opinion was allowed. Our memorandum was focused entirely on the error the trial court had made in determining the proper venue where the accident occurred. As such, the trial court was free, on remand, to sustain the preliminary objections with the understanding that the accident occurred in Delaware County, if the evidence of record supported such a ruling. We therefore conclude that O’Donnell’s first issue on appeal warrants no relief.
¶7 In her second issue on appeal, O’Donnell argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no venue in Philadelphia. Our standard of review on this issue is one of abuse of discretion. Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 525 Pa. 237, 242-243, 579 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1990). Our review is fact intensive. Id If there is any proper basis supporting the trial court’s decision to transfer venue, we must affirm. Kubik v. Route 252, Inc., 762 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Pa.Super.2000). However, a plaintiff must be allowed the right to choose any appropriate forum: “The applicant bears the burden of proving that a change of venue is necessary, while a plaintiff generally is given the choice of forum so long as the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are satisfied.” Purcell, 525 Pa. at 243, 579 A.2d at 1284 (1990). “A plaintiffs choice of forum is given great weight and a defendant has the burden in asserting a challenge to the plaintiffs choice of venue.” Masel v. Glassman, 456 Pa.Super. 41, 689 A.2d 314, 316 (1997), quoting Shears v. Rigley, 424 Pa.Super. 559, 623 A.2d 821, 824 (1993).
¶ 8 In the present case, the trial court found that O’Donnell had failed to establish that venue was proper in Philadelphia. As an initial matter, we must address the separate issue of improper service, as this issue is referenced in many [48]*48of the parties’ arguments. Defective service of process must be raised by way of preliminary objections or the issue is waived. Cox v. Hott, 246 Pa.Super. 445, 371 A.2d 921, 923 (1977).
¶ 9 In the case sub judice, O’Donnell never effectuated actual service on F & CC. When service was attempted at the registered address for the corporation, it was discovered that another, totally unrelated business was operating there. However, after O’Donnell filed her complaint in the trial court, Attorney Kevin R. McNulty entered his appearance “on behalf of the Defendants in the above captioned matter.” Entry of Appearance, filed 8/15/2003. As only two defendants are named in the caption, it must be deduced from the use of the plural “Defendants” that Attorney McNulty entered his appearance on behalf of both McDonough and F & CC. Attorney McNulty has never filed a document that would contradict this interpretation.
¶ 10 In the preliminary objections filed by Attorney McNulty, the only issue raised was that of improper venue. Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Complaint, filed 8/20/2003. The preliminary objections indicated that F & CC was “only ever located in Villanova, Pennsylvania.” Id. However, it is clear from the information O’Donnell obtained from the Department of State, as well as McDon-ough’s deposition testimony, that F & CC was, at some point in time, located in Philadelphia. See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Answers to Preliminary Objections of Defendants; N.T., 10/30/2003, at 8.
¶ 11 The preliminary objections also averred that F & CC was no longer in existence. However, this averment is irrelevant to the resolution of the instant dispute, as the record reveals no dispute that F & CC was in existence at the time of the accident. Accordingly, F & CC is, at this point in the proceedings, a proper defendant, as liability may be apportioned to it, and it may still have assets in the form of insurance coverage for the accident at issue. We make no pronouncement on whether O’Donnell has a viable claim against F & CC, as this issue has not been raised before us. Accordingly, as the issue of improper service was never presented in the preliminary objections, this issue is waived. Cox, 371 A.2d 921.
¶ 12 Returning to the issue of venue, our Rules of Civil Procedure provide that venue is proper in the county where the registered address of the corporation is located. Pa.R.C.P., Rule 2179(a)(1). In fact, the establishment of appropriate venue is one of the two intended purposes of the requirement of a registered address for corporations. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. AnN. § 1507, Committee Comment For purposes of establishing venue, it is irrelevant that the registered address is not the principal place of business for the corporation, or even an operating office. Id. This conclusion is reinforced by the wording of Rule 2179, as the disjunctive “or” is used in setting forth the counties where venue may be established: it may be established where the registered address is located, or where the principal place of business for the corporation is located, or where the corporation regularly conducts business. Pa.R.C.P., Rule 2179(a), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Rule 2179(a) states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, by Rule 1006(a.l) or by subdivision (b) of this rule, a personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in
(1) the county where its registered office or principal place of business is located;
(2) a county where it regularly conducts business;
[49]*49(3) the county where the cause of action arose;
(4) a county where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose, or
(5) a county where the property or a part of the property which is the subject matter of the action is located provided that equitable relief is sought with respect to the property.
Pa.R.C.P., Rule 2179(a), 42 Pa. CoNS. Stat. ANN. Accordingly, the fact that F & CC’s registered address was in Philadelphia established that venue was appropriate in Philadelphia County.4 We note that Ap-pellees have not raised the issue of forum non conveniens.5 As such, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was no basis for venue in Philadelphia County, and we reverse.
¶ 13 Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 14 Judge KLEIN files a dissenting opinion.