O'Diah v. Roberts

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 22, 2023
DocketCivil Action No. 2023-0653
StatusPublished

This text of O'Diah v. Roberts (O'Diah v. Roberts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Diah v. Roberts, (D.D.C. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AROR-ARK ARK O’DIAH,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-653 (RDM) v.

JOHN G. ROBERTS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of Plaintiff Aror-Ark Ark O’Diah’s pro se

civil complaint. For the reasons provided below, the Court will dismiss the complaint.

A pro se litigant’s pleadings are held to less stringent standards than the standard applied

to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even

pro se litigants, however, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the

Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

The purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the

claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense

and to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497,

498 (D.D.C. 1977). As drafted, Plaintiff’s pro se complaint fails to comply with the minimal pleading

standard set forth in Rule 8(a). Although the Court cannot discern precisely what Plaintiff

alleges, Plaintiff’s 80-page submission makes reference to a racially motivated conspiracy of

some kind involving the more than 90 Defendants, and it accuses Chief Justice John Roberts of

failing to prevent such conspiracy. Dkt. 1 at 13–14. It alleges that a great number of judges are

“liars” and that they took actions of some kind “without substantive due process” and suspended

the United States Constitution and that various businesses, including T-Mobile and Staples, Inc.,

in some way enforced the assertedly unconstitutional orders of the judges. See generally id. at

15–30. Plaintiff asserts 52 claims for relief under the Constitution as well as statutory and

common law and seeks $100,000,000 in damages from each Defendant. See id. at 31–80.

Although Plaintiff’s complaint is extensive, it offers no intelligible description of the

factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims. The conclusory and scattershot factual allegations the

complaint contains fail to demonstrate whether or why Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.

Even construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations leave the Court and Defendants in the dark

regarding the connection between what facts Plaintiff pleads and the numerous legal violations

Plaintiff alleges. Put simply, Plaintiff has not given Defendants or the Court adequate notice

regarding the claims Plaintiff intends to assert, because the complaint lacks “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Moreover, much of Plaintiff’s complaint appears to seek damages from Chief Justice

Roberts and dozens of other judges for issuing or failing to issue decisions in their judicial

capacities. The doctrine of judicial immunity bars such claims. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–

10 (1991) (describing a long line of Supreme Court precedents that have found “judge[s] . . .

immune from . . . suit for money damages”). This doctrine extends to “all actions taken in the

2 judge’s official capacity, unless the[] actions are taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction,” Sindra v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and thus bars many of

Plaintiff’s claims here.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. 1, is DISMISSED

without prejudice, except that all claims seeking damages against judges or justices for acts taken

in their judicial capacities are dismissed with prejudice. The clerk is directed to mail a copy of

this order to Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s address of record.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: May 22, 2023

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Jarrell v. Tisch
656 F. Supp. 237 (District of Columbia, 1987)
Brown v. Califano
75 F.R.D. 497 (District of Columbia, 1977)

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Bluebook (online)
O'Diah v. Roberts, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/odiah-v-roberts-dcd-2023.