O'CONNOR v. GCC Beverages, Inc.

391 S.E.2d 379, 182 W. Va. 689, 1990 W. Va. LEXIS 29
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 23, 1990
Docket19086
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 391 S.E.2d 379 (O'CONNOR v. GCC Beverages, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'CONNOR v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 379, 182 W. Va. 689, 1990 W. Va. LEXIS 29 (W. Va. 1990).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This case is before this Court upon an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County dated November 1, 1988. In such final order, the circuit court granted the respondent’s motion to compel enforcement of a settlement agreement. The petitioner contends that he has been aggrieved by such order because no agreement was reached between the parties involved. We find that a settlement agreement was not reached and we therefore reverse the order of the circuit court.

Donald O’Connor filed suit in 1988 against his employer, GCC Beverages, Inc., and two of his supervisors, Mike Farley and Mark Anderson. The petitioner alleged in the underlying civil action that the defendants below had retaliated against him for filing a workers’ compensation claim. 1 Settlement discussions had been ongoing for at least a month prior to the meeting and discussions which occurred on October 23, 1986. Testimony taken at an evidentiary hearing held before Judge Ca-nady on February 23, 1987, and written communications exchanged between the parties, revealed the following: On the morning of October 23, 1986, Barbara Keefer, counsel for the petitioner, met with Cheryl Wolfe, counsel for respondent GCC Beverages, to discuss a possible settlement of this matter. The petitioner was also in the office premises, and Ms. Keefer would periodically consult with him to ascertain his opinion on the specifics of the negotiations. 2 Several monetary and non-monetary items were discussed at this meeting, among those being the dollar amount of the settlement, the ongoing Workers’ Compensation proceeding, pending grievances with petitioner’s union, confidentiality provisions of the settlement, and the sealing of petitioner’s employment file.

At the end of this meeting, no agreement had been reached. During the course of the day, counsel for both sides continued to negotiate by telephone. At the end of the day, Ms. Wolfe testified that Ms. Keefer called her and said “So, I guess you’ve got a deal.” Ms. Keefer testified she did not recall saying those exact words, but did not actually dispute that she said them. Counsel then discussed who would take responsibility for preparing the settlement agreement, and Ms. Keefer suggested that she prepare the necessary documents since her schedule at that time was not as hectic as Ms. Wolfe’s.

On the same day, Ms. Wolfe wrote a letter to Ms. Keefer in which she summarized what she believed the terms of the agreement to be. Ms. Wolfe concluded this letter by asking Ms. Keefer to contact her immediately if the letter was defective in its portrayal of the representation of their proposed agreement. On October 31, 1986, Ms. Keefer wrote to Ms. Wolfe and enclosed the settlement agreement that she believed represented the culmination of their negotiations. She included in this agreement two provisions that were not contained in Ms. Wolfe’s October 23 letter, due to the fact that she and the petitioner believed these provisions had been part of the earlier negotiations.

On November 7, 1986, Ms. Wolfe replied to the October 31 letter and included a revised copy of the settlement agreement. She informed Ms. Keefer that she had “revised” the agreement “somewhat”, and that she suggested a further “deletion” of another provision. On November 25, 1986, Ms. Wolfe wrote to Ms. Keefer again, informing her that the settlement agreement *691 enclosed was the one that they proposed to execute. She additionally informed Ms. Keefer that she would check with her early the following week, “to make sure that all outstanding issues have been settled ...”

On December 4, 1986, Ms. Wolfe wrote Ms. Keefer to inform her that Mike Parley and Mark Anderson had been inadvertently left out of the release, and that she was thus sending a revised release including them. Ms. Keefer wrote Ms. Wolfe on December 9, 1986, and enclosed another revised draft of the agreement and releases. These updated drafts reflected changes that were requested to be made by the petitioner. Ms. Wolfe replied to this latest development by informing Ms. Keefer in her letter dated January 5, 1987, that the petitioner could not “arbitrarily alter nor renege on” the agreement that presently existed between them. Ms. Wolfe said that “the fact that minor provisions of the settlement documents have not been agreed upon and that the settlement documents have not been executed does not mean that the settlement is one which is not enforceable in court.” She proceeded to list once again the provisions from her October 23, 1986 letter, standing on those provisions as an accurate representation of the agreement.

On November 14, 1987, Ms. Keefer informed Ms. Wolfe by letter that it was the petitioner’s “position that there was no agreement between the parties until all matters were reduced to writing, all language agreed upon by the parties and all parties had signed such document. The fact that numerous drafts have passed back and forth, with language changes being made by both sides, is evidence of this.”

On February 2, 1987, GCC Beverages filed a motion in the Kanawha County Circuit Court to compel enforcement of the settlement agreement. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Herman G. Canady, Jr. on February 23, 1987. Judge Canady granted GCC Beverages’ motion to enforce the settlement. In his June 17, 1988 memorandum of opinion, Judge Cana-dy set forth the reasons for granting the respondent’s motion. 3 A final order was entered by Judge Canady on November 7, 1988.

It is well-understood that “[s]ince a compromise and settlement is contractual in nature, a definite meeting of the minds of the parties is essential to a valid compromise, since a settlement cannot be predicated on equivocal actions of the parties.” 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 7(1) (1967). We find that a definite meeting of the minds between the parties was lacking in the case before us today.

When the proposed agreement was reached on the afternoon of October 23, 1986, the counsel in this case were conversing on the telephone. Each lawyer appears from the record to have believed that a settlement had been reached, and that the parties would produce a written agreement memorializing it. However, Ms. Wolfe’s letter of October 23 and Ms. Keefer’s written response of October 31 clearly reflect that their understandings of the “agreement” differed. The fact that Ms. Wolfe responded to the written settlement agreement sent by Ms. Keefer by revising it further and suggesting a further deletion would seem to reflect that the lawyers essentially embarked upon re-negotiations.

At the hearing below, the petitioner testified that it was his understanding that any agreement had to be in writing. Ms. Keefer shared this understanding according to her January 14,1987 letter, which informed Ms. Wolfe that it was her and her client’s understanding that no agreement existed *692 until a written agreement was reached that satisfied both sides. Ms. Wolfe also indicated this belief in her testimony at the evidentiary hearing before Judge Canady on February 23, 1988:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cathy McGee v. Amedisys West Virginia, LLC
West Virginia Supreme Court, 2018
Connie Tuttle v. State Farm Automobile Insurance
West Virginia Supreme Court, 2015
Messer v. Huntington Anesthesia Group, Inc.
664 S.E.2d 751 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2008)
Triad Energy Corp. of West Virginia, Inc. v. Renner
600 S.E.2d 285 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2004)
Sprout v. Board of Education
599 S.E.2d 764 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2004)
Sanson v. Brandywine Homes, Inc.
599 S.E.2d 730 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2004)
Burdette v. Burdette Realty Improvement, Inc.
590 S.E.2d 641 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2003)
Riner v. Newbraugh
563 S.E.2d 802 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2002)
State Ex Rel. Evans v. Robinson
475 S.E.2d 858 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1996)
Humphreys v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
399 S.E.2d 60 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
391 S.E.2d 379, 182 W. Va. 689, 1990 W. Va. LEXIS 29, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oconnor-v-gcc-beverages-inc-wva-1990.