O'Connor v. Egan

274 S.W.2d 334, 1955 Mo. App. LEXIS 19
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 3, 1955
DocketNo. 7324
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 274 S.W.2d 334 (O'Connor v. Egan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Connor v. Egan, 274 S.W.2d 334, 1955 Mo. App. LEXIS 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).

Opinion

McDOWELL, Presiding Judge.

This- appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Pulaski County in favor of plaintiffs in an action on account.

The petition is in usual form. It alleges that plaintiffs, in the years 1946 and 1947, at the special instance and request of defendant, sold and delivered to defendant-four orders of enamel and paint of the reasonable value of $302.60; that demand was made on defendant for payment and payment refused; that there is now due and unpaid on the account $302.60 plus interest from demand. ■

The answer is a general denial.

The only evidence offered was that of plaintiff, J. T. O’Connor. He testified: That he and Margaret Mary O’Connor are partners engaged in selling paint under [336]*336the name “Con-Cor Paint Company”, main office in Kansas City, but, at the time of the sales mentioned, the main office was in St. Louis.

Plaintiff stated he first met defendant in Waynesville, in 1944, before defendant moved to Neosho; that they had on former occasions sold to defendant merchandise which defendant paid for; that the last four orders, containing merchandise described in the petition, defendant failed to pay for; that plaintiff, J. T. O’Connor, called on defendant at his place of business in Néosho and took' the orders included in this suit; that this plaintiff filled the orders and shipped them by Campbell & Powell Bros. Truck Lines, to defendant in Neosho on the dates alleged in the petition. Plaintiff stated that at the time the orders were made defendant was- told the prices charged for said merchandise and agreed to them.

Plaintiff gave this testimony:

“Q: Did you ask Mr. Egan for payment of this ? A. Oh, a number -of times.
“Q. When did you do that; do you remember? A. I have done it in Neosho, and I done it here at Waynesville, and I was informed by Mr. Egan at one time the reason he wasn’t paying up this account, ‘he was buying property at tax sales.’ * *
“Q. Did you send statements and invoices to him? A. Absolutely;' until this suit was brought, * * *
“Q. How often did you'send them? A. Every month. He received the invoices at the time of the delivery of the material, and the statements were sent every month.”

Plaintiff testified that the value of each item contained in each of the orders described in his petition was reasonable. He testified as to purchase dates, the date and manner of shipment of the goods to the defendant, and the amount still due. At the time this testimony was offered defendant made no objection to the fact that the trial- court permitted plaintiff to.refresh his recollection as to the goods sold, prices and the reasonableness of the charges made. The record does not show what the document was that the court permitted plaintiff to refresh his recollection from, but, under the law, such matters are usually left to the discretion of the court. We think there is nothing before the court as to the admissibility of this testimony.

Defendant offered no testimony but relied upon his motion for a directed verdict at the clo-se of plaintiffs’ case. This motion was in the form of an instruction which reads as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury, at the close of the evidence offered by plaintiffs, that under the law and the evidence your verdict must be for'the defendant.”

The trial court overruled the motion.

In our opinion we will refer to appellant as defendant and respondents as plaintiffs.

The cause was tried by jury and, on appeal, it becomes the duty of the court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the jury. If there were the court is bound by such verdict-. . Only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does reversible error appear. Union Service Company v. Lyons, Mo.App., 240 S.W.2d 153, 158; Winters v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 606, 252 S.W.2d 380, 384; Johnson v. Thompson, Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 1; Ford v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 355 Mo. 362, 196 S.W.2d 163, 167; R. J. Hurley Lumber Co., v. Cummings, Mo.App., 264 S.W.2d 379, 386.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict we take as true the evidence offered by plaintiff and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and such parts of the evidence offered by defendant as supports plaintiff’s case. R. J. Hurley Lumber Co., v. Cummings, supra, 264 S.W.2d at page 386; Bartch v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, Mo.App., 264 S.W.2d 937.

Defendant’s first contention is that the trial court erred in not sustaining his motion for a directed verdict at the close of [337]*337plaintiff’s evidence because of the insufficiency of the evidence to make a case.

It is the contention of defendant that the account sued on must be proved by original book entries made contemporaneously with the sale transactions shown to have been correctly made.

To support this contention defendant cites Kliethermes Motor Co. v. Cole Motor Service, Mo.App., 102 S.W.2d 819.

This was an action on open account. The respondent offered record evidence to prove the account. The exhibits offered were copies of invoices which were not shown to be original entries. There was no proof that they were made contemporaneously with the transactions nor that the record books were correctly kept. The court held when proof of an account is by records, the proof must show original book entries made contemporaneously with the transactions and kept correctly.

Bedwell v. Capitol Mutual Ass’n, Mo.App., 66 S.W.2d 155. This was an action on a certificate of life insurance. The c'ourt held that the trial court erred in permitting introduction in evidence of time card; that such record was taken from some memorandum made by the punch clock with information turned in by numerous timekeepers. It is held that such testimony was inadmissible unless the person who made the memorandum' is called to prove the transactions, is dead or his absence explained.

Welch-Sandler Cement Co., Inc., v. Mullins, Mo.App., 31 S.W.2d 86. This was an action on account. The court held that contemporaneous entries in book accounts made in usual course of business are admissible as constituting part of res gestae of principal transaction.

Conkling v. Henry Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co., Mo.App., 20 S.W.2d 564. This was an action on account. The court held that all that was required in proving an account stated was to prove a definite amount as amount agreed upon" between the parties. That the defendant at no time ■objected to the correctness of the account rendered by plaintiff, but expressly promised to pay the amount stated.

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274 S.W.2d 334, 1955 Mo. App. LEXIS 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oconnor-v-egan-moctapp-1955.