Ochser v. Funk

240 P.3d 1246, 225 Ariz. 484, 592 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 16, 2010 Ariz. App. LEXIS 156

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona
• Decided: September 28, 2010
• Docket: 1 CA-CV 09-0141
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

OROZCO, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant-Plaintiff Clifford J. Ochser (Ochser) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees-Defendants Funk, et al. (collectively, Defendants). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 When reviewing motions for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Mousa v. Saba, 222 Ariz. 581, 585, ¶ 15, 218 P.3d 1038, 1042 (App.2009).

¶ 3 On May 5, 2004, the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) conducted “Operation Mother’s Day 2004,” an operation to arrest parents with outstanding child support warrants. MCSO obtained a list of active child support arrest warrants from the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS). Each of the warrants included in the “Operation Mother’s Day 2004” list was checked for validity prior to inclusion on the list. Och-ser’s name was included on MCSO’s active warrant list because he had an arrest warrant issued on January 3, 2003, as a result of unpaid child support. The arrest warrant, however, had been previously quashed in a March 2003 minute entry. Despite being quashed, Ochser’s warrant remained in active status with MCSO, and his name was included on the May 4, 2004 list.¹ Pursuant to MCSO warrant procedure, Defendants confirmed the validity of Oehser’s warrant with the MCSO OIC prior to executing the warrant.

¶ 4 On May 5, 2004, Defendants arrived at Ochser’s workplace in Flagstaff, Arizona and informed him that he was under arrest in connection with an outstanding child support arrest warrant. Ochser protested his arrest, explaining the warrant had been quashed. He told Defendants he had a certified copy of the minute entry on his office desk that would confirm the warrant had been quashed. Defendants conferred and agreed to make an inquiry regarding the validity of the warrant. One Defendant officer alleges to have made a phone call to inquire about the validity of the warrant to both OIC and the chambers of the judge who issued the warrant.² Despite Ochser’s protests, Defendants arrested Oehser pursuant to the warrant.

¶ 5 Oehser was released the following day after it was determined that the warrant had been quashed. Oehser filed a complaint, alleging among other wrongs, violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Oehser failed to comply with Arizona’s notice of claim statute; (2) Defendants arrested Oehser on a facially valid arrest warrant; and (3) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. After reviewing Ochser’s response, Defendants’ reply and hearing oral argument, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and explained:

U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority provide that a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer makes an arrest on a facially valid warrant. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 [99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433] (1979); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971 (9th Cir.1985) cert. denied 475 U.S. 1010 [106 S.Ct. 1183, 89 L.Ed.2d 300] (1986). Plaintiff does not challenge that the warrant was valid on its face. In essence, Plaintiff argues that these Defendants were required to investigate Plaintiff’s claim that the warrant had been quashed. Baker is to the contrary. As a result, Defendants’ failure to investigate did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 [102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396] (1982).

¶ 6 Oehser filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The trial court signed a final judgment in favor of Defendants pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) and dismissed the action with prejudice.

¶ 7 Oehser timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1 and - 2101.B (2003).

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the facts produced in support of the claim ... have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, “we determine de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the superior court properly applied the law.” Mousa, 222 Ariz. at 585, ¶ 15, 218 P.3d at 1042.

¶ 9 Oehser raises two issues on appeal. First, whether “an arrest is unlawful if the arresting officer’s reliance on an apparently valid warrant is unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances.” Second, whether as of the date of the arrest in this ease, “was the law clearly established that an officer could not rely on an apparently valid warrant when it would be unreasonable to do so in light of the relevant circumstances'?”

¶ 10 Oehser contends that the question befixre us is whether, as of the date of his arrest, “it was clearly established that where an officer is put on notice that objective evidence is readily at hand that would show the invalidity of an arrest warrant, that the officer was required to examine this objective evidence prior to effecting an arrest.” He argues that the trial court’s ruling conflicts with federal court decisions in various cases including Berg v. Allegheny County, 219 F.3d 261 (3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072, 121 S.Ct. 762,148 L.Ed.2d 664 (2001), Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224 (1st Cir.1990) and Pena-Borrero v. Estremeda, 365 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.2004). Oehser explains that “[t]o the extent that the trial court held that this right exists but was not clearly established, the federal court cases all pre-existed Mr. Ochser’s arrest ... and, in fact, hold that qualified immunity was not available to the Defendant officers.”

¶ 11 Defendants counter that because the warrant was facially valid, they "were not obligated to further investigate [Ochser’s] protestations of innocence,” and whether they checked the warrant’s status or not “is irrelevant here and is not a genuine issue of material fact.” Defendants are essentially arguing that the trial court correctly held qualified immunity precluded any liability on the part of Defendants. Specifically, Defendants contend summary judgment was proper because the officers could have reasonably believed, as a matter of law, that Ochser’s arrest was lawful, in light of the clearly established principles governing arrests pursuant to facially valid warrants.

Qualified immunity

¶ 12 Qualified immunity as to a 42 U.S.C. section 1988 claim is a question of federal law. State v. Superior Court, 185 Ariz. 47, 49, 912 P.2d 51, 53 (App.1996). Therefore, “we follow federal court decisions on the subject.” Id. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability if a reasonable government official could have believed his actions to be lawful, in the light of clearly established law and the information he possessed at the time of the action. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). It is a doctrine that protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Officials are entitled to the protections of qualified immunity, unless “the law clearly proscribed the actions” that were taken. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

¶ 13 In this case, we consider qualified immunity using the two-step test set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).³ The first step is to determine whether a constitutional right was violated. Id. If so, the second step is to determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Id. The determination as to whether a right is “clearly established” depends specifically on its context in the instant case. Id. In order for a right to be “clearly established ... the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Stated in other terms, a government official is protected by qualified immunity if he can “demonstrate that he was performing a discretionary function and that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have believed that, at the time he acted, his actions were within the bounds of the law.” Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). When determining claims of qualified immunity, “courts are sensitive to ‘[t]he broad range of reasonable professional judgment accorded’ law enforcement officials in the § 1983 context.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 272 (quoting Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1107 (6th Cir.1996)).

¶ 14 Oar inquiry in the present case is whether Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right which was clearly established law; and if so, did Defendants nevertheless reasonably believe that their conduct was lawful in light of the information they possessed at the time of Ochser’s arrest?

Whether a constitutional right was violated

¶ 15 There is no doubt that Ochser has a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, here an arrest, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.⁴ The Supreme Coui’t, however, has recognized that when viewing constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, that right is “clearly established” when any action violates the right, “no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. The Court further explained that “if the test of ‘clearly established law⁵ were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of [the Harlow decision].”⁵ Id. The Court also held that the right allegedly violated must be articulated and “clearly established” in a more particularized way. Id. at 640. Specifically, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right.” Id. In other words, “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the action in question] must be apparent.” Id.

Whether the right was “clearly established ”

¶ 16 Whether the law is “clearly established” and whether a government official could have reasonably believed his conduct was lawful in light of the surrounding circumstances are questions of law. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. “[E]ven if a defendant’s conduct actually violates a plaintiffs Constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.” Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir.1992) (quotation omitted).

¶ 17 While Oehser indeed has a broad constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not necessarily follow that the unlawfulness of Ochser’s arrest was readily apparent to Defendants in light of a facially valid arrest warrant and the surrounding circumstances. It is not clearly established that an arresting officer acting pursuant to a facially valid warrant has the obligation to investigate documentary evidence. We conclude that in light of a facially valid arrest warrant, the unlawfulness of Oehser’s arrest was not readily apparent to Defendants.

¶ 18 Next we must determine whether an officer of reasonable competence could disagree whether further investigation of the warrant was required in light of Oehser’s statements that he had documentary support evidencing the warrant had been quashed. Whether a reasonable officer could have believed his actions were lawful is a question of law and not one of fact. Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir.1991). In this case, Defendants relied on a facially valid arrest warrant for Oehser. Oehser asserts he informed Defendants that he had a certified copy of a minute entry quashing his warrant, however, “[u]nless a warrant is facially invalid an officer has no constitutional duty to independently determine its validity.” Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir.1984).

¶ 19 In this ease, it is undisputed that Ochser’s warrant was facially valid. Defendants had no knowledge or information, prior to Oehser’s assertions the day of his arrest, that the warrant had been previously quashed. The warrant itself had been officially and validly issued in connection with Ochser’s prior failure to pay child support. Pursuant to MCSO procedures, the warrant’s validity was verified after inclusion on the “Operation Mother’s Day 2004” list and was also verified on the very day it was served. Government officials are permitted and trained to rely upon the validity of officially issued documents verified through official channels. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 579-80 (4th Cir.1989) (holding an arrest based on a facially valid warrant did not violate arrestee’s due process rights where the sheriffs office had not received notice that the warrant had been cancelled as the arrestee had claimed).

¶ 20 If “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (stating that qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). We find that “officers of reasonable competence could disagree” as to whether they were required to investigate further the warrant’s validity in light of Oehser’s claims he had a certified copy of the minute entry quashing the warrant. Because reasonable officers could disagree as to whether further investigation was required, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Id.

¶21 Ochser cites numerous cases for the proposition that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. We find them distinguishable. In Torres Ramirez, the court determined there was evidence from which a jury could determine the defendant officer had sent out a warrant he already knew had been vacated. 898 F.2d at 226. Qualified immunity was not given because it was not objectively reasonable for a government official to process an arrest warrant he knew or should have known had already been vacated. Id. at 228. In Peña-Borrero, officers arrested a man after he had shown them a physical copy of an executed warrant, particularly, the exact warrant they were purporting to execute. 365 F.3d at 10. Qualified immunity was not extended to defendant officers because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the arrestee indicated the officers ignored unambiguous evidence that the warrant was unenforceable as it had already been served. Id. at 14. In Beier v. City of Lewiston, officers arrested Beier for violating an order of protection relying solely on his ex-wife’s statements and without actually looking at the order itself. 354 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir.2004). The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in that case because arresting Beier without reading the terms of the order was not something a reasonably competent officer would do under the same circumstances. Id. at 1072.

¶22 Ochser also cites Berg v. Alleghany County, 219 F.3d 261 for the proposition that a facially valid warrant does not provide the officer qualified immunity if “reliance on it is unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to, other information that the officer possesses or to which he has reasonable access, and whether failing to make an immediate arrest creates a public threat or danger of flight.” Id. at 273.

¶ 23 In Berg, an arrest warrant was mistakenly issued for the plaintiff. Id. at 266-67. The warrant was executed by a constable who earned a fee for each person arrested. Id. at 267. The plaintiff offered to produce documents that indicated he was no longer on parole, however, the constable refused to look at the documents. Id.

¶ 24 Berg is distinguishable from this case, because in Berg, the constable unreasonably relied on an arrest warrant that was erroneously issued for the wrong person and thus not supported by probable cause. In this case, as previously stated, Defendants reasonably relied on official information regarding the validity of Oehser’s warrant and relied on a facially valid warrant. Defendants checked the validity of the warrant prior to executing it. Defendants had no information prior to Ochser’s protests that the warrant was invalid. In the face of official confirmation that the warrant was valid, Defendants were not required to investigate protests by Ochser as to his innocence.

¶ 25 Citing cases from United States Circuit Courts for the First and Third Circuit, the dissent concludes that, as of the date of Ochser’s arrest, it was “clearly established” that “an arresting officer may not disregard documentary evidence offered by a person named on an arrest warrant that proves that the warrant was invalid.” Infra ¶ 45. As of the date of Ochser’s arrest, however, neither our supreme court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held it unlawful to arrest a person pursuant to a facially valid warrant without first examining documentary evidence offered by the person who is subject to an arrest warrant. As indicated above, we have explained why the cases relied upon by the dissent are distinguishable. As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not err and affirm the order dismissing this ease.

CONCURRING: JON W. THOMPSON, Judge.

1 . Julie Ahlquist, Sheriff's Records Specialist Supervisor, testified that in her opinion, MCSO was most likely not contacted by the court to quash the warrant. Alan Quackenbush, a Sheriff’s Records Lead for the Operation Information Center (OIC) for the MCSO warrants division, verified the OIC maintains a quash log for all verbal notices it receives to quash warrants. Additionally, Quackenbush indicated OIC maintains copies of all documents it receives from a court indicating a warrant has been quashed. Quack-enbush further noted that OIC had received no notice that Ochser’s warrant had been quashed during the time period of March 13, 2003 through the end of September 2003.

2 . Ochser claims this is "implausible” because if done, Defendants would have found the warrant was quashed. On summary judgment, taking as true Ochser’s assertion that Defendants did not call either OIC or the issuing judge’s chamber, it is undisputed that MCSO’s records, which Defendants checked prior to executing the warrant, reflected Ochser’s warrant was active.

3 . We note the Supreme Court recently revisited the two-step Saucier test and concluded while the sequential Saucier analysis may be helpful in qualified immunity cases, "it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

4 . The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be "secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures” by government officials. U.S. Const, amend. IV.

5 . In Harlow, the Supreme Court defined the limits of qualified immunity to "objective terms.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).