Ocean Network Express PTE Limited v. By Rodocker LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 19, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01470
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ocean Network Express PTE Limited, No. CV-24-01470-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 By Rodocker LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Ocean Network Express PTE Limited agreed to transport goods for 16 defendant By Rodocker, LLC (“Rodocker”). After Rodocker failed to pay Ocean for its 17 services, Ocean filed this suit. Rodocker did not appear, its default was entered, and Ocean 18 now seeks default judgment. 19 The court must consider seven factors when deciding whether to enter default 20 judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The seven factors are: 21 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money 22 at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 23 policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 24 25 Id. 26 1. Possible Prejudice to Ocean 27 The first factor regarding the prejudice to Ocean weighs in favor of default judgment 28 because if “default judgment is not granted, [Ocean] will likely be without other recourse 1 for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. 2 Cal. 2002). 3 2. Merits of the Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint 4 The second and third factors involve the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of 5 the complaint. These factors “are often analyzed together and require courts to consider 6 whether a plaintiff has state[d] a claim on which [it] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party 7 v. Viet Tan - Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 8 According to Ocean, the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 because 9 this is a “civil case of . . . maritime jurisdiction”). That jurisdiction extends to disputes 10 involving “maritime contracts,” such as contracts with the “primary objective” of 11 “accomplish[ing] the transportation of goods by sea.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 12 14, 24 (2004). Ocean alleges it entered into a maritime contract with Rodocker where 13 Ocean agreed to “transport [Rodocker’s] goods via ocean freight.” (Doc. 1 at 2.) Ocean 14 transported those goods and Rodocker “fail[ed] to pay the costs of carriage of the ocean 15 freight.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) Ocean has established “the requisite elements of offer, acceptance, 16 and consideration” to establish a valid contract and has also alleged a breach of that 17 contract. Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013). 18 The allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, establish a meritorious claim for 19 breach of a maritime contract. The factors regarding the merits of the claim and the 20 sufficiency of the complaint support entry of default judgment. 21 3. Amount in Controversy 22 The fourth factor “requires that the court assess whether the recovery sought is 23 proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth 24 Enterprises, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Here, Ocean is seeking an 25 award of $49,998.95. (Doc. 12 at 6.) That is the exact amount reflected in Ocean’s 26 “statement of account” showing the services it provided. (Doc. 1 at 29-30.) The amount in 27 controversy is directly tied to the services provided and this factor supports entry of default 28 judgment. 1 4. Dispute Over Material Facts 2 The fifth factor is whether there are any disputes over material facts. Rodocker’s 3 failure to participate means there is no indication of any dispute regarding material facts. 4 This factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 5 5. Excusable Neglect 6 The sixth factor looks to whether Rodocker’s behavior might be due to excusable 7 neglect. Rodocker was properly served but never appeared.1 There is no reason to believe 8 Rodocker’s behavior is due to excusable neglect. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. 9 v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (defendants’ failure to respond to 10 complaint could not “be attributable to excusable neglect” because “[a]ll were properly 11 served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support 12 of the instant motion.”). This factor supports entry of default judgment. 13 6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 14 The seventh factor recognizes a preference for resolving matters on their merits. 15 This factor, as always, weighs against entry of default judgment. “However, the mere 16 existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not 17 dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 Rodocker’s failure to respond to the original complaint indicates it would be “impractical, 19 if not impossible,” to reach the merits. Id. Thus, this factor weighs against default 20 judgment, but it is not sufficient to preclude its entry. 21 7. Default Judgment is Merited 22 Almost all of the factors support entry of default judgment and default judgment is 23 appropriate. The only remaining issue is the amount of damages. 24 8. Damages 25 The burden is on Ocean to prove the amount of its damages. Blumenthal Distrib., 26 Inc. v. Comoch Inc., 652 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2023). Ocean filed a copy of 27 the bill of lading as well as a copy of the “statement of account” indicating the amount

28 1 Rodocker is a limited liability company and service was accomplished under A.R.S. § 29-3119(B)(3). 1 || owed by Rodocker for Ocean’s services. Ocean seeks only the amount reflected in that || paperwork. Ocean is entitled to the full amount. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED the Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. The || Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in the amount of $49,998.95 in favor of plaintiff and 6 || against defendant and close this case. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff may apply for an award of attorneys’ fees 8 || consistent with the timing and procedures of Local Rule 54.2. 9 Dated this 19th day of March, 2025. 10

Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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