ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction
This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a special assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), upon the following Motions:
1. A Motion by the Plaintiff to Amend his Complaint to allege a conspiracy.
2. A Motion by the Defendant Cheryl Tallberg (“Tallberg”) to Dismiss.
3. A Motion by the Defendant Dennis Lamkin (“Lamkin”) to Dismiss.
4. A Motion by the Defendant William Lannon (“Lannon”) and the Defendant Steven LaTour (“LaTour”) to Dismiss.
5. A Motion by the Defendants to Compel the Plaintiff to execute authorizations with which the Defendants may review his record of prior incarcerations and his past medical records.
6. A Motion by the Plaintiff to compel an independent psychological examination of Tallberg.
Hearings on the Motions were held on January 28, and on May 6, 1993, at which the Plaintiff appeared pro se; Tallberg appeared by Douglas E. Nepp and Steven W. Schneider, Esqs.; Lamkin appeared by Raymond L. Tahnk-Johnson, Esq.; and, Lannon and LaTour appeared by M. Alison Lutterman, Esq.
For reasons which follow, we deny the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend his Complaint, and we recommend that the Defendants’ Motions for Dismissal or for Summary Judgment be granted.1
[616]*616II. Factual and Procedural Background
By his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges the jurisdictional bases of his action in the following terms:
This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1988 and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Sections of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota, and under the provision of Minnesota Statutes which prohibit the aforesaid conduct.
The jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on 28 U.S.C. Sections 1343(3) and (4) and 1331 and the pendent jurisdiction of the United States Courts.
In support of these claims, the Plaintiff alleges that, on May 22, 1991, Tallberg overheard the Plaintiff making a telephone call to the Federal Communications Commission from a public pay phone which was located in the lobby of the Ordean Building, where Tail-berg’s place of employment, with the Program for Aid to Victims of Sexual Assault, was located in a second floor office.
As alleged by the Plaintiff:
Without cause or justification and with intent to deprive plaintiff of his federal and state constitutional rights and in violation of Minnesota state law, defendant Tallberg called the police department and complained to the department about plaintiffs use of said public telephone and intentionally misrepresented to the police the tone and content of the plaintiffs telephone call. Defendant Tallberg called the police on the direction of defendant Lamkin, who had instructed Tallberg to call the police if plaintiff used the public phone in the public area of the building, or even if he is in the building.
In response to Tallberg’s telephone call, Lannon and LaTour, who are officers with the City of Duluth Police Department, arrived at the Ordean Building. Again, in the Plaintiffs words:
Defendants Lannon and LaTour responded to the call and arrested plaintiff for disorderly conduct. The police officers then handcuffed and searched plaintiff. They then escorted plaintiff to the door of the building. Once outside the building, defendant Lannon again searched plaintiff. At that point, defendant LaTour stated, “Don’t you think we should search him once more just for practice?” Defendant LaTour then proceeded to do another full search of plaintiff. * * * As the officers were placing plaintiff in the back seat of the police car, plaintiff asked the officers if they were not going to read him his Miranda rights. Defendant Lannon replied that plaintiff did not need them and that he had been watching too much TV. He then said, “Occhino, you are a nut. You are not from this planet.” Plaintiff replied, ‘You are paranoid; you did not even know enough to read me my Miranda rights when I was arrested.” Officer Lannon responded, “We will see who the nut is. There are homosexuals in jail who are just looking for fresh blood like you.”
Thereafter, the Plaintiff was taken to the St. Louis County Jail, where he was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes Section 609.72.2 The Plaintiff [617]*617was held in the custody of the County Jail for a period of 20 hours.
Prior to the time of his trial, the City Attorney dropped the statutory charge and recharged the Plaintiff with two misdemean- or counts of disorderly conduct under the Duluth City Ordinance, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing an officer. Following a trial before the Honorable Robert V. Campbell in the State District Court for the County of St. Louis, Minnesota, the Plaintiff was acquitted of the disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charges, but he was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer in violation of Section 34-4(a) of the Duluth City Code.3 A violation of Section 34-4(a) carries a fine, but no incarceration and, following the finding of guilt, the State District Court imposed a fine of $200.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff moved the Court for a Judgment of Acquittal, for a New Trial, or for sentencing credit on account of the time that he had spent in the St. Louis County Jail. The State Court denied the Motions for Acquittal and for a New Trial, but granted the sentence credit and stayed the imposition of the fine of $200. An appeal was taken by the Plaintiff to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed his finding of Guilt. Thereafter, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs Petition for further review. See, City of Duluth v. Occhino, 1992 WL 122591 (Minn.App.1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. August 4, 1992) (unpublished opinion).
Based upon the foregoing allegations, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendants have denied him his First Amendment right to freedom of expression, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure of his person, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law, including the right to be free from unjustified and excessive force utilized by police and intentional harassment by the police, and false arrest, malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process without probable cause. In addition, under the “supplemental jurisdiction” of the Federal Courts, the Plaintiff alleges causes of action under the laws of the State of Minnesota for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, prima facie tort, conspiracy tort, negligence, and gross negligence. See, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a).
Although we are mindful of our obligation to construe the allegations of a pro se Complaint indulgently, there are limits to such a liberalized interpretation, and we feel that this case unmistakably breaches those limits. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); Holt v. Caspari, 961 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 190, 121 L.Ed.2d 134 (1992); Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir.1988). Ordinarily, when considering dis-positive Motions, we would take the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint as true, and we would construe the Complaint, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, most favorably to the Plaintiff. See, St. Paul Ramsey County Medical Center v. Pennington County, 857 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir.1988), quoting Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986). To do so here, however, would impardonably traverse Congress’ intent, as expressed in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, that “[a] federal court must give to a state court judgment the same [618]*618preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738.4 Each of the Defendants in this action was called to testify in the State Court proceeding that resulted in the Plaintiffs conviction, and the facts which underlie that conviction have been carefully weighed by the State Courts of Minnesota in rendering its final judgment which, we believe, is adverse to the claims that the Plaintiff raises here. We are not at liberty to trivialize those State Court proceedings and we address their impact as it becomes relevant to the remainder of this Report.5
Among other Findings, the State District Court determined that, since January of 1991 to the date of the Plaintiffs arrest, Tallberg had observed the Plaintiff using the telephone involved here from 2 to 3 times a week. The State Court found that the Plaintiff “was often loud, abusive and threatening on the phone.” Tallberg was scared by the Plaintiffs actions and she was concerned for the clients of her office who, having been victims of sexual assaults, were “emotionally fragile.” During a meeting of the tenants’ at the Ordean Building, Tallberg had previously complained to Lamkin, who was a representative of the managers of the Building, about the Plaintiffs “loud and abusive language on the phone.”6 Lamkin instructed Tallberg that she was authorized to contact his office or the Duluth Police to have the Plaintiff removed from the building if he was again engaged in disturbing conduct.
The State Court described Tallberg’s involvement in this matter in the following Finding of Fact:
On May 22, 1991, Ms. Tallberg heard the [Plaintiff] on the phone as she came down the stairs to the first floor. She said he was “incredibly loud, practically screaming.” She went outside, had a cigarette and returned five minutes later. She again listened to the [Plaintiff]. He was loud and threatening bodily harm over the phone. She heard him say things about: “the Posse Comitatus,” “the Jews running the banks,” “tax protesters” and he was screaming about “lawyers.”
Ms. Tallberg went up the stairs and tried unsuccessfully to call Lamkin and then called 911 and reported that there was a verbally abusive man using the public phone in the lobby of the Ordean building and she wanted him removed. She said she was tired of listening to him making death threats and wanted protection for herself and the clients.
The State Court further found that Lannon and LaTour were dispatched to the Ordean Building because of a “person disturbing.” [619]*619When they arrived at the building, LaTour heard a person “yelling and screaming on the phone,” and Lannon described the Plaintiff as “loud and argumentative” on the phone, and as one who was “disturbing to others.” LaTour proceeded to the second floor to speak with Tallberg who advised that the Plaintiff was “a continuing problem, that he was argumentative and abusive, and she was very afraid of him.” She also advised that a tenants’ meeting had been held and that she was given authority by Lamkin to have the Plaintiff removed. Tallberg stated that “all we want is for him to leave the building.”
During the time that LaTour was speaking with Tallberg, Lannon stood and listened to the Plaintiff. As found by the State Court:
[Lannon] described the [Plaintiffs] talk as loud and abusive but he did not hear any threats or profanity. He observed that other people coming and going were disturbed. Lannon waited for his partner and listened. He wanted some basis upon which to remove the [Plaintiff]. Officer LaTour and Ms. Tallberg came down the elevator; she I.D.’d the [Plaintiff] and said he does this all the time. The officers reasonably believed that Ms. Tallberg had authority to order the [Plaintiff] out of the building and thus the owners wanted him out.
According to the factual findings of the State Court, Lannon asked the Plaintiff to put the telephone down, but the Plaintiff responded, “I won’t do what you say” and then proceeded to talk even louder and with more agitation. A second request for the phone was refused, after which Lannon took the phone, verified with the operator that the Plaintiff had not threatened her, and then hung up the phone.
When Lannon asked the Plaintiff to leave the building, the Plaintiff refused and questioned the basis for the request. Lannon responded that the owners of the building wanted him removed, to which the Plaintiff commented that they had no right to ask him to leave and he would only leave if the owners themselves made the request. During this exchange, the Plaintiff “got louder and louder.” Again, quoting from the State Court’s factual findings:
Lannon put his hand on [Plaintiffs] arm to escort him out. [Plaintiff] physically raised his hand and put it out toward the police. Both officers believed he pushed Lannon two times. Another eyewitness, Jo Ellen Cox, said the motion of [Plaintiffs] upraised hand was as if to “shoo them away.” The [Plaintiff] then put his hands in his pockets. The officers told him to remove them; he refused. They repeated the request and he took one hand out but kept the other in his pocket and said, “why?” The officers said, “we don’t know if you have a knife in your pocket.” They believed he had a weapon. The [Plaintiff] said, “I am not going to take my hand out.” The [Plaintiff] stepped back and assumed a defiant threatening stance. The officers then took him by the arms. One reached into the pocket from which he refused to remove his hand and retrieved a pocket knife. When closed the knife was 3 inches long. When open, it [was] &h inches long.
The State Court went on to find that the officers took the Plaintiff by the arms, cuffed him, and led him out of the building, and that the “situation required the police officers to do something and the only reasonable couse [sic] of conduct was to remove the [Plaintiff] from the building.”
Based upon these facts, the State Court found “by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [Plaintiff] did intentionally obstruct and interfered with, both verbally and physically, police officers Lannon and LaTour in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of their office contrary to Section 34-4(a) of the Duluth City Code 1959 as amended.” It was the State Court’s determination that the Plaintiff had acted intentionally and that he had physically obstructed or interfered with the officers in the- performance of their duties.
On appeal to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff contested the adequacy of the record to support his conviction. In rejecting that challenge, the Court of Appeals held:
The police officers were investigating appellant’s behavior which they reasonably believed constituted the crime of disorder[620]*620ly conduct. They were in the process of apprehending and transporting appellant. Therefore, when he refused the police officers’ request to hang up the telephone and leave the building, became defiant and raised his hand toward them, appellant interfered with the officers’ attempts to discharge their official duties.
Appellant’s argument that only the building’s owner, not the police officers, had the authority to ask him to leave is unpersuasive. One of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041 (1980). The owner of the building hired a manager who authorized the tenants to call either himself or call the police to have appellant removed if he bothered them again. Therefore the complaining tenant had authority to act in the owner’s place, and the Duluth police officers justitifiably [sic] relied upon that authority in removing appellant from the premises.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Plaintiff appeared to have intended his acts for “he should have reasonably expected that refusing to hang up the phone, refusing to leave the building, becoming defiant and raising his hand toward the officers would interfere with their attempts to discharge their duties.”
As noted, by Order dated August 4, 1992, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs Petition for further review. No appeal was taken from that denial, and this action was commenced on September 1,1992.
III. Discussion
We may commence our analysis with a winnowing of those claims which are clearly without merit, reserving our analysis of the Plaintiffs Section 1983 and his State Law claims to the last. Accordingly, our analysis begins with the Plaintiffs claims under the provisions of Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3).
A. Title A2 U.S.C. § 1981.
1. Standard of Review. Section 1981 was enacted “to protect identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2028, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987), reh’g. denied, 483 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 3244, 97 L.Ed.2d 749 (1987). At a minimum, Section 1981 reaches discrimination against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of Homo sapiens. Id. Although a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for Section 1981 protection, intentional discrimination on a racial basis is. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 314, 50 L.Ed.2d 286 (1976); Boddorff v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (E.D.Penn.1980); cf., Edwards v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir.1988); Netterville v. State of Missouri, 800 F.2d 798, 801 (8th Cir.1986). Consequently, in order to state a cause of action under Section 1981, a plaintiff must allege that the violative acts had racially discriminatory purposes. Vance v. Bordenkircher, 533 F.Supp. 429 (N.D.W.Va.1982). Mere conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient, Davis v. Frapolly, 717 F.Supp. 614, 616 (N.D.Ill.1989), and, where a complaint wholly fails to allege discrimination based upon race, it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 575 (2d Cir.1989); Doe v. Thomas, 604 F.Supp. 1508 (N.D.Ill.1985).
2. Legal Analysis. The Plaintiffs Complaint is devoid of any intimation, let alone an express reference, to a denial of the Plaintiffs rights on the basis of intentional, racial discrimination. Consequently, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, under the provisions of Section 1981, upon which relief can be granted against any of the Defendants. The Section 1981 claim should be dismissed.7
[621]*621B. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
1. Standard of Review. Title 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) provides a federal remedy for a conspiracy to violate a person’s right to the equal protection of the laws, or to equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). To establish a violation of Section 1985(3), the Plaintiff must allege and prove four elements:
1) a conspiracy;
2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities of the laws;
3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property, or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3356, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983), citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971).
Section 1985(3) was not intended to apply to all interferences with the rights of others, for it addresses only interferences which are founded upon some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798; Coleman v. Garber, 800 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.1986); Maida v. Andros, 710 F.Supp. 524 (D.N.J.1988). Whether the shield of Section 1985(3) extends to protect “any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes” remains an open question. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, supra 463 U.S. at 836, 103 S.Ct. at 3360.
2. Legal Analysis. We need not, and expressly do not, enter the debate upon the potential breadth of Section 1985(3). See, Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.1990), as withdrawn and replaced by Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1250, 122 L.Ed.2d 649 (1993); New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom., 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Blank v. Heineman, 771 F.Supp. 1013, 1017 n. 3 (D.Neb.1991). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Plaintiffs Complaint does not allege that he is a member of any class against whom the Defendants bore an invidiously discriminatory animus. In the absence of any factual assertion that there was an unlawful meeting of the minds amongst the Defendants to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3) should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Norbeck v. Davenport Community School District, 545 F.2d 63, 70 n. 6 (8th Cir.1976); Powell v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.1964); O’Dell v. McSpadden, 780 F.Supp. 639, 645 (E.D.Mo.1991); Schweitzer v. Univ. of Texas Health Center at Tyler, 688 F.Supp. 278 (E.D.Tex.1988); Weyandt v. Mason’s Stores, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 283 (W.D.Pa.1968). We, therefore, recommend that the Plaintiffs Section 1985(3) claim also be dismissed.8
[622]*622C. Tüh U.S.C. § 1988.
1. Standard of Review. The essential elements of a Section 1983 claim include the following:
1) that Defendants performed acts or actions under color of federal law;
2) which resulted in the deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed or preserved by the Constitution; and
3) resultant damage.
See, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir.1965).
Proof that a defendant’s action directly caused a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or other Federal law, is thus an essential element of a Section 1983 action. See, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
2. Legal Analysis. For convenience, we address the Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims in two categories: 1) Those that relate to Tall-berg and Lamkin, as private citizens; and, 2) Those that relate to Lannon and LaTour as police officers who, at the time of the alleged infractions, were acting in the course and scope of their employment with the City of Duluth.9
a. The Claims Against Tallberg and Lamkin.
“In a Section 1983 claim against a private party, a plaintiff will be entitled to relief if he can prove that the private party was a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents’ which activity de[623]*623prived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.” Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 558-59 (8th Cir.1989), quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). It is universally recognized, however, that the mere furnishing of information to police officers does not constitute joint action under color of State law which renders a private citizen liable under Section 1983. Sarmiento v. Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, 939 F.2d 1242, 1246 n. 5 (5th Cir.1991); Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir.1988); Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Association, 778 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir.1985); Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir.1985); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1352 (7th Cir.1985); Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir.1983); Arnold v. International Business Machines, 637 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1981); Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir.1980); Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 326-27 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 53 (1979); Taliaferro v. Voth, 774 F.Supp. 1326, 1331 (D.Kan.1991); Young v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 721 F.Supp. 197, 198 (E.D.Ark.1989); Parker v. Hearn, 695 F.Supp. 1421, 1425 (E.D.N.Y.1988); Kraemer v. Padgett, 685 F.Supp. 1166, 1168 (D.Kan.1987); Holdeman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 649 F.Supp. 1188, 1196 (N.D.Ind.1986), aff'd., 840 F.2d 20 (7th Cir.1988). Without more, the mere elicitation of police assistance is not an exercise of official state authority. Id.
In apparent recognition of these authorities, the Plaintiff has moved the Court for leave to amend his Complaint in order to add the following provision:
The hereinabove described actions and omissions by the defendants Tallberg and Lamkin deprived the plaintiff of rights secured to him under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) and the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Minnesota in that they conspired with the defendants Lannon and LaTour to deprive the plaintiff of the rights secured to him by the above statutes and constitutions.
To be sure, a private party who conspires with a state actor may act under color of State law. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 183, 187, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 149-52, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604-1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1467 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987). Nonetheless, a conspiracy is not presumed from the mere fact that it is alleged. In this Circuit, allegations of a conspiracy must be pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest a meeting of the minds. Bey v. Bridgeton Police Department, 775 F.Supp. 1255, 1256 (E.D.Mo.1991), citing Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam). Allegations of a conspiracy, absent supporting facts, do not establish a claim upon which relief may be granted. Holbird v. Armstrong-Wright, 949 F.2d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir.1991); Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir.1988); Myers v. Morris, supra at 1467, citing Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710-11 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied and reh’g. denied, 479 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 107, 93 L.Ed.2d 56, 479 U.S. 1022, 107 S.Ct. 681, 93 L.Ed.2d 731 (1986); White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d 560, 561 (8th Cir.1981); Harley v. Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.1976).
Here, the Plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy are bald and conclusory. The only fact that the Plaintiff supplies which arguably supports an inference of a conspiracy is that Lamkin10 purportedly advised Tallberg to contact the police if she were [624]*624further bothered by the Plaintiffs use of the telephone at the Ordean Building. As we have noted, however, a private party does not conspire with a state official merely by invoking an exercise of the state official’s authority. Daniel v. Ferguson, supra at 1130; Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., supra at 1208. Moreover, the Plaintiff has had months to more definitively allege the factual basis for his conspiracy claim, given the fact that certain of the Defendants had opposed his Motion to Amend his Complaint on the specific grounds that the proposed amendment was not sufficiently specific. Accordingly, we deny the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend his Complaint as he has proposed, since such an amendment would be futile, and we recommend that Summary Judgment be entered in favor of Tallberg and Lamkin. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct. 227, 229-30, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).
b. The Claims Against Lannon and LaTour.
The thrust of the Plaintiffs claim against Lannon and LaTour is that neither officer had probable cause to arrest him on May 22, 1991, because he had been charged on that date with disorderly conduct and he was never convicted of that charge. Although true as an historical fact, the Plaintiffs argument miscasts the issues before the Court by isolating a single event—as if it were a slice of time—from a continuous flow of events. Unlike the pathologist, who must make his judgments on the basis of a microscopic examination of a paper-thin tissue section—which is equivalent to the Plaintiffs slice of time—our analysis is macroscopic in its examination of the course of events as a whole in order to determine if a cause for constitutional concern is present. This broader view persuades us that, despite the erroneously stated basis for his arrest on May 22, Lannon and LaTour had probable cause for arresting the Plaintiff and their actions have been adjudicated as reasonable by the State Courts of Minnesota.11 In our view, the Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from retrying those issues, which were decided in the State Court proceedings or were subsumed in that decision, in the garb of a Section 1983 action.
In Devan v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 767 F.2d 423, 424 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct. 827, 88 L.Ed.2d 799 (1986), the Court addressed the role of collateral estoppel in a Federal civil rights action in the following terms:
“A court properly applies collateral estoppel to bar a party from relitigating an issue actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding based on the same or a different cause of action.” Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)). In a federal civil rights action involving an issue of collateral estoppel, a federal court gives the same preclusive effect to a prior state court decision as would the courts of the state in which the prior judgment was entered. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Smith v. Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354, 1362 (8th Cir.1984). Cf. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75 [80], 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).
Accordingly, we look to the law of Minnesota in order to determine the preclusive effect in this action of the Plaintiffs State Court criminal proceeding. Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d 462, 465 (8th Cir.1992).
Minnesota Courts follow the general rules of collateral estoppel that are almost univer[625]*625sally applicable. Glass v. IDS Financial Services, Inc., 798 F.Supp. 1411, 1415 (D.Minn.1992). Under Minnesota Law, the party that is invoking collateral estoppel must demonstrate:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication;
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and
(4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
Mandich v. Watters, supra at 465, quoting Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn.1984).
Here, the only element in contest is the identity of the issues in this action and those adjudicated in the Plaintiffs State Court criminal proceeding.
While not necessarily a misnomer, the term “identical” is certainly a gloss upon the required degree of similarity which must exist between the issues in two proceedings in order for collateral estoppel to apply. As noted in Sunrise Electric, Inc. v. Zachman Homes, 425 N.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Minn.App.1988):
Determining unity of claims is not an exact science. The traditional Minnesota test has been whether the same evidence will sustain both actions. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Club 167, Inc., 295 Minn. 573, 575, 204 N.W.2d 820, 821 (1973); Melady-Briggs Cattle Corp. v. Drovers State Bank, 213 Minn. 304, 309, 6 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1942). More recently, alternative tests have been advanced. In Johansen v. Production Credit Association of Marshall-Ivanhoe, 378 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), this court applied the test of “whether the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined are the same in each action.” And in Anderson v. Werner Continental, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 24, 1985), this court employed a transactional approach, focusing on whether the same operative nucleus of facts is alleged in support of both claims.
And see, Glass v. IDS Financial Services, Inc., supra at 1415-18. In this case, any of the three tests applied by the Minnesota Courts would support the invocation of collateral estoppel.
Reduced to its essentials, the final Judgment that was rendered by the State Courts of Minnesota determined that Lannon and LaTour had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff for the offense of obstructing a police officer since, beyond a reasonable doubt, he was found to have been guilty of that offense. As the rule is recognized in this Circuit, an arrestee’s conviction for the underlying offense is a complete defense to a civil rights claim that the arrest was without probable cause. Bey v. Bridgeton Police Department, supra at 1256, citing Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10 (8th Cir.1990).
In this respect, we are guided, if not controlled, by the Court’s holding in Grant v. Farnsworth, 869 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 898, 110 S.Ct. 252, 107 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989). There, the Court was confronted with a Section 1983 claim that was commenced by a political protestor whose disruptive conduct was sufficient to induce a police officer to attempt to arrest him. The protestor resisted the arrest, and the police officer enlisted the assistance of a bystander who helped to physically restrain the protestor. Following a trial in which the protestor was charged with “interfering with official acts,” a Jury returned a guilty verdict. Subsequently, the protestor instituted a Section 1983 action against the police officer and the private citizen who assisted in the protestor’s restraint. During the course of the Section 1983 trial, the Court admitted into evidence the protestor’s conviction and, later, directed verdicts against the Plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment claims on the grounds that those claims were collaterally estopped by the protestor’s prior conviction. In affirming the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Here Grant [i.e., the protestor] attempted to retry the validity of his arrest, for a crime of which he was convicted in state court. The state court jury decided be[626]*626yond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crime charged. This necessarily entails that the officers acted lawfully in removing Grant from the parade site, and that his interests in remaining at the parade and in exercising first amendment rights were terminated upon his arrest. Until Grant took a swing at Officer Knock, there had been no wrongful interference with his first amendment rights. After the swing there was no wrongful interference with these rights because he was lawfully arrested. Further, the district court properly determined that because the arrest was proper, any interference with Grant’s first amendment rights was not the proximate cause of his alleged injuries.
Id. at 1151; and see, Schertz v. Nix, 975 F.2d 1382, 1384 (8th Cir.1992); Munz v. Parr, 972 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir.1992); Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823, 111 S.Ct. 74, 112 L.Ed.2d 48 (1990).
The very same may be said here.
The State District Court found that the only reasonable course of conduct that the Plaintiff presented to Lannon and La-Tour was to arrest him. The decision of the District Court was appealed on the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence, and the final Judgment of the State Courts necessarily upheld the propriety of the Plaintiffs arrest for obstructing a police officer. Of course, we are aware that the Plaintiff is convinced that he committed no crime on May 22,1991, and the record before us demonstrates the strength of his conviction—both in the sense of his heartfelt belief in his own innocence and, as a double entendre, in the sense of the final adjudication of guilt which mandates our deference, at least in the absence of any showing that the Plaintiff was denied a full and fair hearing in the State Courts. The Plaintiff makes no such showing here. He was represented by counsel and he appealed those aspects of his conviction as he felt warranted review. We find no basis to preclude the application of collateral estoppel, and we conclude that the Plaintiffs effort to retry his criminal conviction in this Court should be denied.12
Even if we were not persuaded by the holding in Grant v. Farnsworth, supra, our result would not be appreciably different, since the Affidavits of Lannon and LaTour provide an appropriate evidentiary basis in support of their expressed opinion that they had reasonable grounds to effectuate their arrest of the Plaintiff on May 22, 1991. Notably, the Plaintiff has not provided any countering Affidavits, and the averments of Lannon and LaTour have not been controverted in this record. Since the only evidence in this record defeats the Plaintiffs claim, Summary Judgment is appropriate. See, Davis v. City of Charleston, Missouri, 827 F.2d 317, 321-22 (8th Cir.1987), rev’d on other grounds, 917 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir.1990).13
[627]*627D. The State Law Claims.
As the foregoing reflects, in our judgment the Plaintiff has no Federal cause of action. As a consequence, this Court does not possess the supplemental jurisdiction to entertain those claims of the Plaintiff which are premised upon the Constitution and the Laws of the State of Minnesota. See, Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) and (c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Richmond v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, 957 F.2d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir.1992); Weseman v. Meeker County, 659 F.Supp. 1571, 1579 (D.Minn.1987); Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 469 (D.Minn.1985).14
Accordingly, we recommend that Summary Judgment be entered in favor of Lannon and LaTour.15
NOW, THEREFORE, It is—
ORDERED:
1. That the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend his Complaint [Docket No. 34] shall be, and hereby is, DENIED.
2. That the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories [Docket No. 37] shall be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.
3. That the Defendants’ Motion to Compel [Docket No. 48] the Plaintiff to execute authorizations with which the Defendants may review his record of prior incarcerations and his past medical records shall be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.
4. That the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel [Docket No. 52] an independent medical examination of the Defendant Tallberg shall be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.
5. That the Plaintiffs Motion to Quash “all irrelevant documents” [Docket No. 65] shall be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot.
AND, It is—
RECOMMENDED:
1. That the Defendant Tallberg’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 20] be granted.
2. That the Defendant Lamkin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 25] be granted.
3. That the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants [Docket No. 28] Lannon and LaTour be granted.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 6(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, D.Minn. LRl.l(f), and D.Minn. LR72.1(c)(2), any party may object to this Report and Recommendation by filing with the Clerk of Court, and by serving upon all parties by no later than June 1, 1993, a writing which specifically identifies those portions of the Report to which objections are made and the bases of those objections. Failure to comply with this procedure shall operate as a forfeiture of the objecting party’s right to seek review in the Court of Appeals.
If the consideration of the objections requires a review of a transcript of a Hearing, then the party making the objections shall timely order and file a complete transcript of that Hearing by no later than June 1, 1993, [628]*628unless all interested parties stipulate that the District Court is not required by Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 to review the transcript in order to resolve all of the objections made.