OPINION
MONTEMURO, Justice.
Appellant, David Allen Occhibone, appeals from an order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County dismissing Appellant’s statutory appeal. This case raises a question of first impression, whether a motorist charged with a violation of the Implied Consent Law must receive the request to submit to chemical testing from a police officer.
[590] On September 20, 1992 at approximately 2:10 a.m., Appellant was driving north on Route 18, a four lane undivided highway. Pennsylvania State Troopers Moore and Hov, observing that Appellant’s front and rear left tires were in the left lane while the rest of his car was in the right lane, stopped his vehicle.
Trooper Moore approached Appellant, while Trooper Hov confronted the male occupant in the front passenger seat. Moore observed that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from the vehicle. Appellant staggered when emerging from his car, and failed all of the field sobriety tests which Trooper Moore administered.
Appellant was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. He was handcuffed, placed in a patrol vehicle, and advised by Trooper Moore that he would be transported to St. Francis Hospital for a blood test. Moore did not read Miranda warnings to Appellant.1
After arriving at the hospital, Trooper Moore read the implied consent warning, which consisted of a verbatim recitation of the relevant language of Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code,2 and Appellant indicated that he understood the warn[591] ing. At this point, a lab technician entered the room, and in Trooper Moore’s presence asked Appellant to submit to a blood test. Appellant declined, giving no reason for his refusal.
On October 23, 1992, a notice of suspension was sent to Appellant, who filed an appeal of the suspension with the trial court. After a de novo hearing, the court issued an order and opinion dismissing the appeal. Appellant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. In an en banc decision, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order, and directed that the one year suspension of Appellant’s driving privilege be reinstated. The Commonwealth Court held that:
Where a police officer has informed the licensee of the Implied Consent Law, a person authorized to take a sample of the licensee’s breath, blood or urine may request that the licensee submit to chemical testing if the request is made in the presence of a police officer.
Occhibone v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 165 Pa.Commw. 268, 277, 645 A.2d 327, 331 (1994).
Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), every motorist who operates a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania is deemed to have given his or her consent to the submission of a chemical test of that person’s breath, blood or urine. Under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1), the motorist has a statutory right to refuse to submit to a requested chemical test. However, if the motorist refuses to submit to the chemical test, his or her operating privileges will be suspended for twelve months.
[592] Section 1547 does not specify who must request that the motorist submit to chemical testing. Appellant asserts that only a police officer may make the chemical testing request. Since the act does not specify the source of the request, the rules of statutory construction must be applied to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) provides:
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
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OPINION
MONTEMURO, Justice.
Appellant, David Allen Occhibone, appeals from an order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County dismissing Appellant’s statutory appeal. This case raises a question of first impression, whether a motorist charged with a violation of the Implied Consent Law must receive the request to submit to chemical testing from a police officer.
[590] On September 20, 1992 at approximately 2:10 a.m., Appellant was driving north on Route 18, a four lane undivided highway. Pennsylvania State Troopers Moore and Hov, observing that Appellant’s front and rear left tires were in the left lane while the rest of his car was in the right lane, stopped his vehicle.
Trooper Moore approached Appellant, while Trooper Hov confronted the male occupant in the front passenger seat. Moore observed that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from the vehicle. Appellant staggered when emerging from his car, and failed all of the field sobriety tests which Trooper Moore administered.
Appellant was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. He was handcuffed, placed in a patrol vehicle, and advised by Trooper Moore that he would be transported to St. Francis Hospital for a blood test. Moore did not read Miranda warnings to Appellant.1
After arriving at the hospital, Trooper Moore read the implied consent warning, which consisted of a verbatim recitation of the relevant language of Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code,2 and Appellant indicated that he understood the warn[591] ing. At this point, a lab technician entered the room, and in Trooper Moore’s presence asked Appellant to submit to a blood test. Appellant declined, giving no reason for his refusal.
On October 23, 1992, a notice of suspension was sent to Appellant, who filed an appeal of the suspension with the trial court. After a de novo hearing, the court issued an order and opinion dismissing the appeal. Appellant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. In an en banc decision, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order, and directed that the one year suspension of Appellant’s driving privilege be reinstated. The Commonwealth Court held that:
Where a police officer has informed the licensee of the Implied Consent Law, a person authorized to take a sample of the licensee’s breath, blood or urine may request that the licensee submit to chemical testing if the request is made in the presence of a police officer.
Occhibone v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 165 Pa.Commw. 268, 277, 645 A.2d 327, 331 (1994).
Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), every motorist who operates a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania is deemed to have given his or her consent to the submission of a chemical test of that person’s breath, blood or urine. Under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1), the motorist has a statutory right to refuse to submit to a requested chemical test. However, if the motorist refuses to submit to the chemical test, his or her operating privileges will be suspended for twelve months.
[592] Section 1547 does not specify who must request that the motorist submit to chemical testing. Appellant asserts that only a police officer may make the chemical testing request. Since the act does not specify the source of the request, the rules of statutory construction must be applied to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) provides:
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
When applying the considerations of the Statutory Construction Act to the Implied Consent Law, it is apparent that the legislature’s intent is best served by allowing an individual other than a police officer to make a chemical testing request. The object of the Implied Consent Statute is to reduce the number of motorists driving under the influence,3 as the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the dangers posed by drunk drivers. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308 (1992). The Implied Consent Law remains one of the Commonwealth’s most effective tools against drunk driving, providing an effective means of quickly denying intoxicat[593] ed motorists the use of the Commonwealth’s highways. Kostyk v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 131 Pa.Commw. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Hando v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa.Commw. 63, 478 A.2d 932 (1984); Commonwealth v. Charles, 270 Pa.Super. 280, 411 A.2d 527 (1979). It also helps facilitate the acquisition of chemical analyses and permits this information to be utilized in legal proceedings. Commonwealth v. Tylwalk, 258 Pa.Super. 506, 393 A.2d 473 (1978). Appellant’s interpretation of the Implied Consent Law would unnecessarily hamper this effective weapon against drunk driving, since under Appellant’s reading of Section 1547, a licensee could refuse a chemical test with impunity, and thereby frustrate any criminal prosecution, based solely upon who requests the test. An otherwise valid request should not be invalidated by the identity of the person who actually uttered the words.4 If Appellant’s argument were extended to its logical conclusion, this Court would be called upon to hold that the police officer must not only seek consent to the testing procedure, but must also draw the blood. The Legislature did not intend for such impractical or absurd results.
Accordingly, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
NIX, C.J., joins in this majority opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a concurring opinion in which Nix, C.J., and FLAHERTY and CAPPY, JJ., join.
MONTEMURO, J., participates by designation as a senior judge as provided by Rule of Judicial Administration 701(f).