O'Brien v. Jeannette Borough

194 A. 314, 128 Pa. Super. 443, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 148
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 22, 1937
DocketAppeal, 133
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 194 A. 314 (O'Brien v. Jeannette Borough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Brien v. Jeannette Borough, 194 A. 314, 128 Pa. Super. 443, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 148 (Pa. Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

Opinion by

James, J.,

Plaintiff obtained a verdict in an action for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her while walking along a sidewalk, or footpath, on North Third Street in the Borough of Jeannette. Defendant’s motions for a new trial and judgment n. o. v. were refused and from the judgment entered on the verdict, the borough has appealed.

North Third Street, between Harrison Avenue and Mellon Avenue, is a well-traveled highway. In this block, it is 50 feet wide, 30 feet of which is enclosed within curbing with a hard-surface pavement. Houses are built on both sides; on the easterly side is an 8-feet walk, and on the westerly side is a well-defined dirt walk used by the public for many years, which varies in width from 6 to 8 feet from Harrison Avenue south, but narrows to 6 feet from a point about 60 feet north of where the accident occurred to Mellon Avenue.

On October 15,1909 the State Highway Commissioner (now known as the Secretary of Highways) approved an application and plan by the Township of Penn and the County of Westmoreland for the adoption, inter *446 alia, of North Third Street, then a part of Penn Township, as a State-aid highway. The plan showed North Third Street to be 50 feet in width, the width fixed in the plan, or plot, as laid out by the owners in 1889. On the same day that the plan was approved, the Commonwealth entered into a contract with Edward Brothers Company for the improvement of the highways described in the application and plan. In 1926 North Third Street was annexed to the Borough of Jeannette. On August 5, 1929 the' borough council adopted an ordinance directing the resurfacing and curbing of North Third Street, an ordinance establishing the grading and an ordinance awarding the contract to C. S. Graham Company. By an ordinance adopted May 7, 1930, with the consent of the contractor, the contract was cancelled except as to the construction of the curbing. Eor the cost of the curbing, the adjoining property owners were assessed. By the Act of June 1, 1933, I?. L. 1172-1333, Route No. 64216, which includes North Third Street, was adopted as a State highway to be constructed and maintained at the expense of the Commonwealth, under the provisions of present or future laws governing State highways in boroughs.

At about 7:45 P. M. on September 13, 1935, accompanied by her sister and her two children, plaintiff proceeded from Harrison Avenue and was walking south upon the westerly walk, about 2 feet from the curb, when she fell into a hole 5 feet wide and 3% feet deep, opposite a vacant lot. At this point, a 24-inch terra-cotta pipe, laid by the Highway Department, under the pavement, to carry water from the opposite side of the street, had become broken and escaping water had created a hole. The hole had existed for several years, and those who were familiar with it stepped from the walk onto the street and when they had passed, stepped back to the sidewalk. Several witnesses testified that the borough, during the year 1929, had done some work *447 along the road; that workmen in the employ of the borough had made some fills alongside of the street and had made repairs to the walk. It was shown that after the accident, employees of the borough erected a barrier fence about the hole. It was conceded that the hole was within the 50 feet width of the street.

Plaintiff testified that where she fell it was very dark and she was able to see ahead only about 1% feet; that she walked slowly with her head down looking where she was going; and that it appeared to her the hole was part of the sidewalk. Prior to the accident, she had not walked on this section of North Third Street for eight years. The only light which plaintiff had was from the lights of passing automobiles and a street light at Mellon Avenue 139 feet away. Plaintiff’s sister, who had stepped across the curbing onto the street a few steps before plaintiff fell into the hole, testified that it was very dark and she could not see the hole.

Briefly stated, the questions argued by appellant are: (1) Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence; and (2) was the borough responsible for the condition of the sidewalk.

On a motion for judgment n. o. v., the testimony should not only be read in the light most advantageous to plaintiff, all conflicts therein being resolved in her favor, but she must be given the benefit of every fact and inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence: Lessy v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 440, 183 A. 657.

Under the facts, the trial judge could not declare, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s acts or conduct contributed to her injuries. The question whether or not she was negligent was properly left to the decision of the jury: Johnson v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 182, 57 A. 363; McKelvey v. Juniata Boro., 265, Pa. 56, 108 A. *448 205. Having traveled for some distance upon the walk, and there being no warning of any character to indicate that she was undergoing any risk or danger, she had the right to proceed, using her faculties as best she could under the handicap of the darkness: Amey v. City of Scranton, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 243, 193 A. 278. Where the risk is not obvious, it becomes a question of fact for the determination of the jury whether there was contributory negligence: Musselman v. Hatfield Boro., 202 Pa. 489, 52 A. 15. While a pedestrian is required to look where he is walking, he is bound to use only ordinary care and to avoid such dangers as ordinary prudence would disclose: Duvall v. City of New Castle, 74 Pa. Superior Ct. 573; Hagen v. Standard Oil Co., 119 Pa. Superior Ct. 337, 181 A. 458. Whatever inconsistency or conflict appears in plaintiff’s testimony on direct and cross-examination is for the jury to decide: Ford v. Reinoehl, 120 Pa. Superior Ct. 285, 182 A. 120; Greene v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 389, 124 A. 134; O'Farrell v. Mawson, 320 Pa. 316, 182 A. 538.

Appellant argues the testimony, that borough employees made repairs upon the sidewalk, was not sufficient upon which an implied acceptance by the borough could be sustained. North Third Street was built upon a plan of lots recorded in 1889 and was recognized as a public highway fifty feet in width by the Township of Penn in 1909, when it applied for State aid and a contract was then let by the State for its improvement. From that time on until some years after its annexation in 1926 to the appellant borough, it was maintained as a State-aid highway. By the annexation to the borough, the highway passed from the control of the township and became part of the street system of the borough: Chambers v. Braddock Boro., 34 Pa. Superior Ct. 407. In addition, we find acts of the borough from which acceptance may be implied. See Gass v. City of Pittsburgh, 91 Pa. Superior Ct. 290. It adopted an *449 ordinance fixing the grade of the street and entered into a contract for its resurfacing and curbing, which later was cancelled except as to the curbing, for which liens were filed by the borough.

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Bluebook (online)
194 A. 314, 128 Pa. Super. 443, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/obrien-v-jeannette-borough-pasuperct-1937.