Obed Nyarenchi v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED

this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 09 2018, 6:27 am

regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court

court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jeffrey A. Baldwin Stephen R. Creason Tyler D. Helmond Chief Counsel for Appeals and Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin Deputy Attorney General & Webb F. Aaron Negangard Indianapolis, Indiana Chief Deputy Attorney General Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Obed Nyarenchi, October 9, 2018 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-409

v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge Appellee-Respondent Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1501-PC-2906

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

[1] Obed Nyarenchi appeals the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief that he filed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder and burglary for Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-409 | October 9, 2018 Page 1 of 2 breaking into a house in Speedway and attacking another man with a hatchet and a hammer. His trial attorneys asserted but then withdrew a defense of mental disease or defect. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (“A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.”). Nyarenchi contends that the attorneys should have done more to develop that defense and then presented it at trial, and he asserts that their failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Nyarenchi had to show not only that the failure to develop and present a mental-disease-or-defect defense amounted to “deficient performance” but also that he was prejudiced by that failure, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found him not guilty if his attorneys had developed and presented the defense. See Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. On appeal, Nyarenchi states that he “has met this burden.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. But that is the extent of his argument. He does not direct us to a single piece of evidence that would have supported a mental-disease-or-defect defense. In fact, his three-sentence argument on this issue does not include any citations to the record, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“Each contention must be supported by citations to . . . the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]”). As such, he has not shown that the trial court erred by denying his petition.

[2] Affirmed. Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-409 | October 9, 2018 Page 2 of 2