Oakes v. Merritt

• Court: District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
• Decided: November 6, 2023
• Docket: 6:23-cv-00334
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA RANDALL WAYNE OAKES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 23-CV-334-RAW ) KEVIN MERRITT, et al., ) ) Defendant. ) OPINION AND ORDER On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff Randall Wayne Oakes, a pretrial detainee in the LeFlore County Detention Center in Poteau, Oklahoma, filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 1). He is complaining that the “Natives” are separated from other races, and race is a consideration in sentencing, in violation of constitutional due process and equal protection, as well as federal statutes. The practice also allegedly is a form of judicial bias. His request for relief is that all people of Oklahoma be sentenced under the same guidelines without consideration of race, age or gender.1 He has named three defendants: the LeFlore County Courts, the State of Oklahoma, and District Attorney Kevin Merritt. Because these defendants are improper for this action, the complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1 To the extent Plaintiff may be complaining about his sentencing, those claims must be brought in a proper petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to

relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the

burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can 2 reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Immunity from Suit The Eleventh Amendment prevents Plaintiff from suing the State of Oklahoma without its

unequivocal consent, and this prohibition encompasses suits against state agencies. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 2012) ( “Although a state may waive the sovereign immunity granted to it under the Eleventh Amendment, we require a showing of unequivocal intent to do so.”); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment’s protection encompasses States and state agencies). “Oklahoma has not waived sovereign immunity against § 1983 claims in federal district court.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 152.1. The Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity also bars actions for damages

state agencies and its officials acting in their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–167, n. 14 (1985); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F .2d 992, 994 (10th Cir.1993) (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to agencies that act as arms of state). See also Entrup v. 3 Colorado, 127 F.3d 1109, 1997 WL 639322, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1997) (suit against Boulder County District Court barred under Eleventh Amendment). Furthermore, prosecutors, such as Defendant Merritt, possess prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages which

are predicated on his performance of functions “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993). Therefore, the Conclusion Because all of the defendants in this action are immune from liability, this action is dismissed

without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal shall count as a “strike” or “prior occasion” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). ACCORDINGLY, this action is dismissed without prejudice. Dated this 6th day of November 2023.

___________________________________ HONORABLE RONALD A. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE