1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 O. M. G., No. 1:26-cv-00657-DJC-JDP 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN, Golden State Annex, 15 Detention Facility, et al. 16 Respondents. 17 Petitioner, a noncitizen proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 18 Corpus on January 26, 2026, challenging his detention by immigration authorities.1 19
20 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed under his initials rather than his full name. (Pet. ¶ 1 n.1.) The Court grants Petitioner’s request to use his initials. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real 21 names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 22 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is 23 common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced 24 Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the 25 party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity”). Petitioner has sufficiently alleged the sensitive and highly personal 26 nature of his request and Respondents do not oppose Petitioner’s request. Finally, the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings is not meaningfully impaired as Petitioner does not seek to seal records or 27 take other action beyond using initials for his name. The Court finds that good cause is met as the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity. Accordingly, 28 Petitioner’s request to proceed under his initials is GRANTED. 1 The Court construed the Petition as a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 2 directed Respondents to file an Opposition. After Respondents failed to comply, the 3 Court issued an Order to Show Cause. On February 2, 2026, Respondents filed both 4 a Response to the Order to Show Cause and their Opposition. Because Respondents 5 oppose the issuance of both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 6 injunction, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court converts Petitioner’s filing to a 7 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and GRANTS the Motion. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Petitioner alleges he has been in the United States for 31 years. (Pet. ¶ 23.) He 10 is married to a U.S. citizen and has four children who are U.S. citizens. (Id.) He alleges 11 that he has a pending I-130 application and has requested asylum. (Id. ¶ 18.) He 12 contends that he was released on bond from Adelanto Detention Center in 2018 after 13 spending 9 months in the facility. (Id. ¶ 23.) He alleges that he does not have any 14 “new charges o[r] convictions” and that his family is suffering economically and 15 depends on him. (Id.) Petitioner was re-detained on September 26, 2025, without any 16 due process and remains in ICE custody at Golden State Annex in McFarland, 17 California. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 34.) 18 Respondents contend that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” who is 19 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that he is not 20 entitled to a bond hearing. (Opp’n (ECF No. 9) at 2.) Accordingly, Respondents 21 request this Court deny the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or 22 Preliminary Injunction. 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 25 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 26 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 27 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 28 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 1 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 2 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 3 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 4 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 5 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 6 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 7 DISCUSSION 8 This case is similar to Doe v. Becerra, in which this Court ruled that the 9 petitioner, who was seeking asylum, had a protected liberty interest after being 10 previously released on bond and was thus entitled to due process. 787 F. Supp. 3d 11 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2025). For the reasons stated in Doe, Petitioner in this case is similarly 12 entitled to the protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 13 I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 14 Petitioner is likely to be successful on his claim that he is entitled to due 15 process. Petitioner asserts his re-detention was enacted without notice or an 16 opportunity to be heard and that since re-detention, no neutral decisionmaker has 17 determined that he is a danger or flight risk. (See generally Pet.) Respondents 18 contend that, because of Petitioner’s classification as an “applicant for admission” 19 subject to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), he is not entitled 20 to a bond hearing. The Court disagrees. 21 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release, see Zadvydas v. 22 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), notwithstanding his asylum claim and the mandatory 23 detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). As explained in Doe, the Ninth Circuit 24 has expressed “grave doubts” about the constitutionality of any statute that allows for 25 arbitrary prolonged detention without process. 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1091 (quoting 26 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018)). Other district courts have 27 found that individuals previously released on bond have due process liberty interests 28 in freedom from confinement particularly where there is an absence of public safety 1 concerns or flight risk. See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2 2019); Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp 3d 1163, 1172–74 (W.D. 3 Wash. 2023). Here, Respondents have not identified any material concerns to warrant 4 re-detention.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 O. M. G., No. 1:26-cv-00657-DJC-JDP 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN, Golden State Annex, 15 Detention Facility, et al. 16 Respondents. 17 Petitioner, a noncitizen proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 18 Corpus on January 26, 2026, challenging his detention by immigration authorities.1 19
20 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed under his initials rather than his full name. (Pet. ¶ 1 n.1.) The Court grants Petitioner’s request to use his initials. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real 21 names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 22 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is 23 common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced 24 Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the 25 party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity”). Petitioner has sufficiently alleged the sensitive and highly personal 26 nature of his request and Respondents do not oppose Petitioner’s request. Finally, the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings is not meaningfully impaired as Petitioner does not seek to seal records or 27 take other action beyond using initials for his name. The Court finds that good cause is met as the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity. Accordingly, 28 Petitioner’s request to proceed under his initials is GRANTED. 1 The Court construed the Petition as a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 2 directed Respondents to file an Opposition. After Respondents failed to comply, the 3 Court issued an Order to Show Cause. On February 2, 2026, Respondents filed both 4 a Response to the Order to Show Cause and their Opposition. Because Respondents 5 oppose the issuance of both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 6 injunction, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court converts Petitioner’s filing to a 7 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and GRANTS the Motion. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Petitioner alleges he has been in the United States for 31 years. (Pet. ¶ 23.) He 10 is married to a U.S. citizen and has four children who are U.S. citizens. (Id.) He alleges 11 that he has a pending I-130 application and has requested asylum. (Id. ¶ 18.) He 12 contends that he was released on bond from Adelanto Detention Center in 2018 after 13 spending 9 months in the facility. (Id. ¶ 23.) He alleges that he does not have any 14 “new charges o[r] convictions” and that his family is suffering economically and 15 depends on him. (Id.) Petitioner was re-detained on September 26, 2025, without any 16 due process and remains in ICE custody at Golden State Annex in McFarland, 17 California. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 34.) 18 Respondents contend that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” who is 19 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that he is not 20 entitled to a bond hearing. (Opp’n (ECF No. 9) at 2.) Accordingly, Respondents 21 request this Court deny the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or 22 Preliminary Injunction. 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 25 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 26 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 27 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 28 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 1 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 2 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 3 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 4 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 5 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 6 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 7 DISCUSSION 8 This case is similar to Doe v. Becerra, in which this Court ruled that the 9 petitioner, who was seeking asylum, had a protected liberty interest after being 10 previously released on bond and was thus entitled to due process. 787 F. Supp. 3d 11 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2025). For the reasons stated in Doe, Petitioner in this case is similarly 12 entitled to the protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 13 I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 14 Petitioner is likely to be successful on his claim that he is entitled to due 15 process. Petitioner asserts his re-detention was enacted without notice or an 16 opportunity to be heard and that since re-detention, no neutral decisionmaker has 17 determined that he is a danger or flight risk. (See generally Pet.) Respondents 18 contend that, because of Petitioner’s classification as an “applicant for admission” 19 subject to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), he is not entitled 20 to a bond hearing. The Court disagrees. 21 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release, see Zadvydas v. 22 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), notwithstanding his asylum claim and the mandatory 23 detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). As explained in Doe, the Ninth Circuit 24 has expressed “grave doubts” about the constitutionality of any statute that allows for 25 arbitrary prolonged detention without process. 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1091 (quoting 26 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018)). Other district courts have 27 found that individuals previously released on bond have due process liberty interests 28 in freedom from confinement particularly where there is an absence of public safety 1 concerns or flight risk. See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2 2019); Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp 3d 1163, 1172–74 (W.D. 3 Wash. 2023). Here, Respondents have not identified any material concerns to warrant 4 re-detention. (See Opp’n.) Significantly, Petitioner has alleged that he was previously 5 released on bond in 2018, which reflects a federal determination that he was not a 6 danger to the community or a flight risk. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093 7 (“Governmental actions may create a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the 8 Due Process Clause.”) (surveying cases). To an even greater degree than the 9 petitioner in Doe, Petitioner has established ties to the community after 31 years in the 10 United States, 8 of those years following his release on bond. (Pet. ¶ 23.) 11 Accordingly, Petitioner has established a strong likelihood of success in showing he 12 has protected liberty interest in his continued release. 13 Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 14 (1976), the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining 15 his out-of-custody status, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is considerable, and 16 Respondents’ interest in detention is low as the effort and costs required to provide 17 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. 18 As to Petitioner’s substantial private interest, freedom from imprisonment is at 19 the core of the Due Process Clause. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Over 31 years, 20 Petitioner has built a life for himself and his family in the United States, who are 21 suffering in his absence. (Pet. ¶ 23.) The depth of his family and community 22 connections weigh in Petitioner’s favor and, moreover, he has successfully remained 23 out of custody on bond since 2018. (Id.) The risk of erroneous deprivation is 24 considerable as Petitioner has not received a bond hearing since he was re-detained 25 in September 2025, nor have Respondents asserted that Petitioner is a flight risk or a 26 danger to the community. Finally, the Government’s interest in detention is low. 27 Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 28 2017). The effort and cost to provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards is minimal 1 because he was previously provided with those safeguards. Any additional burden 2 does not outweigh Petitioner’s substantial liberty interests and the risk of erroneous 3 deprivation. 4 The Court concludes that Petitioner has established that he has a protected 5 liberty interest under the Due Process Clause and that he was owed some process 6 before his re-detention. 7 II. Irreparable Harm 8 Petitioner has also established irreparable harm based on the deprivation of 9 constitutional rights via immigration detention. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 10 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that irreparable harm 11 occurs in the “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities.” 12 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. On this point, Petitioner has alleged that he is being held 13 in “incarceration-like conditions.” (Pet. ¶ 33.) Thus, Petitioner has adequately 14 established irreparable harm. 15 III. Balance of the Harms & the Public Interest 16 The balance of the equities and public interest are merged as the Government is 17 the non-moving party, and these factors clearly weigh in Petitioner’s favor. See 18 Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002; Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The 19 government also cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 20 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” (internal citations and 21 quotation marks omitted)); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (“[T]he public has 22 a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and 23 the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention 24 are staggering.”). As discussed, Petitioner has established that he is suffering 25 irreparable harm nor are Respondents harmed by being prevented from inflicting 26 continuing constitutional violations. 27 28 1 IV. Bond 2 “The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order 3 only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay 4 the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 5 enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Court has “discretion as to the 6 amount of security required, if any,” and it “may dispense with the filing of a bond 7 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from 8 enjoining his or her conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 9 2003). Because the “the [Government] cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in 10 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations,” 11 Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court finds that no security 12 is required here. 13 CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, construed as a Motion for a 16 Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 1), is converted to a Motion for a 17 Preliminary Injunction and hereby GRANTED. 18 2. Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner O.M.G. from 19 custody. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, 20 unless that is determined to be necessary at a future pre- 21 deprivation/custody hearing. 22 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re- 23 detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, 24 which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice describing the change 25 of circumstances necessitating his arrest and detention, and a timely 26 hearing. At any such hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of 27 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a 28 1 danger to the community or a risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed 2 to have his counsel present. 3 4. This matter is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for all further 4 proceedings. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 | Dated: _February 5, 2026 “Dane A Cob bra tto— Hon. Daniel alabretta 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28