Nystrom v. Khana Marine Ltd.
This text of Nystrom v. Khana Marine Ltd. (Nystrom v. Khana Marine Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIAS NYSTROM, No. 24-2553 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:20-cv-00098-JMK v. MEMORANDUM* KHANA MARINE LTD.; NOK CO. LTD. SA, in personam,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Joshua M. Kindred, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 13, 2025 Anchorage, Alaska
Before: GRABER, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Elias Nystrom slipped and injured his shoulder while moving frozen cargo
aboard a vessel in Dutch Harbor, Alaska. He brought this maritime negligence
action against the vessel’s owners (Defendants) under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The district court granted partial
summary judgment to Defendants on Nystrom’s turnover claim and, after a bench
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. trial, entered judgment for Defendants on his active control claim. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court correctly granted partial summary judgment to
Defendants on Nystrom’s turnover claim. “The turnover duty requires the ship
owner to turn over the vessel to the stevedores in a safe condition and to warn them
of any hidden hazards.” Christensen v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 812 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2002). The duty is temporally limited: it relates to the “condition of the ship
upon the commencement of stevedoring operations.” Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping
Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 98 (1994). The turnover duty ends (and the active control
duty begins) “once stevedoring operations have begun.” Id.
Assuming that there is a factual dispute about the condition of Defendants’
vessel when stevedoring operations began on the night of April 29, 2017, Nystrom
still failed to present evidence refuting Defendants’ showing that slippery conditions
are not an unreasonable impediment to professional longshoremen in Dutch Harbor.
See Bjaranson v. Botelho Shipping Corp., 873 F.2d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“[C]ertain dangers that may be hazardous to unskilled persons need not be remedied
if an expert and experienced stevedore could safely work around them.”). A
declaration from Andrew Murphy, the president of Nystrom’s employer, explained
that the company’s longshoremen “routinely work in icy and slippery conditions.”
Murphy also noted that the company’s longshoremen are “experienced in these
2 24-2553 conditions and trained to work safely around them.” Nystrom offered no expert
declaration or testimony establishing the standard of care, nor did he identify record
evidence casting doubt on this aspect of Murphy’s declaration and conclusions. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Defendants were therefore entitled to partial summary
judgment on Nystrom’s turnover claim. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fritz Cos.,
210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. The district court did not err in denying Nystrom’s active control claim.
The active control duty “provides that a shipowner must exercise reasonable care to
prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the ‘active control of the
vessel.’” Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98 (quoting Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De Los Santos,
451 U.S. 156, 167 (1981)). Nystrom argues that the vessel’s crew were negligent in
removing ice from the cargo deck which, in his view, was under the vessel’s active
control during stevedoring operations. The district court, however, found “that the
cargo deck in question was not covered in ice and there was no ice or slick condition
beyond the usual conditions reasonably expected by [the company’s] longshoremen
in an open freezer hold exposed to the elements.” Nystrom’s contrary testimony was
deemed not credible.
The district court’s factual findings are not “illogical, implausible, or without
support in inferences from the record.” Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15 F.4th 1236,
1241–42 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district
3 24-2553 court found more credible testimony from Joel Gumera, Nystrom’s supervisor, who
contradicted Nystrom’s allegation that the vessel’s crew were breaking ice on the
cargo deck at the time of the incident. See Kirola v. City & County of San Francisco,
860 F.3d 1164, 1182 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a district court’s credibility findings
receive “special deference”). And, in any event, the crew’s alleged actions were not
the kind of substantial “control of cargo operations” implicating the active control
duty. See Quevedo v. Trans-Pac. Shipping, Inc., 143 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir.
1998).
AFFIRMED.
4 24-2553
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