Nunez-Palomarez v. Verizon Communication Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 26, 2025
Docket3:23-cv-04524
StatusUnknown

This text of Nunez-Palomarez v. Verizon Communication Inc. (Nunez-Palomarez v. Verizon Communication Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nunez-Palomarez v. Verizon Communication Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MARTIN NUNEZ-PALOMAREZ, Case No. 23-cv-04524-WHO

7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 8 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 VERIZON COMMUNICATION INC., et al., Dkt. No. 64 10 Defendants.

11 12 Plaintiff Martin Nunez-Palomarez (hereafter “Nunez”) worked for defendant Cellco 13 Partnership (d/b/a/ Verizon Wireless, hereafter “Cellco”) for seven years before he resigned in 14 2022. Then he filed this suit against Cellco and its parent company, defendant Verizon 15 Communications, Inc., alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of his race or 16 national origin (Nunez is Hispanic) when he was assigned to a less-favorable branch location and 17 when he was passed over for a Managing Partner position. He also claimed that the defendants 18 subjected him to retaliation after he lodged an internal complaint about unfair business practices 19 within the company and potential discrimination with respect to territory assignment decisions. 20 Defendants move for summary judgment on both claims. 21 Nunez has submitted very little evidence in support of his claims, and the evidence he does 22 submit does not create a material disputed fact that would defeat summary judgment. The record 23 (as opposed to what he alleged in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. 20)), shows that 24 the decisions Cellco made concerning Nunez’s territory assignments and his advancement at the 25 company were based on Nunez’s poor performance or his own expressed preferences; they were 26 not motivated by racial animus or discrimination. Nunez also has not rebutted Cellco’s proffered 27 legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions: his well-documented, 1 retaliation claim because the record does not show a causal link between his complaints and any 2 adverse employment action taken against him. And the record does not support a finding of 3 constructive discharge because there is no evidence that Nunez was subjected to intolerable 4 working conditions at any point during his seven years at the company. Summary judgment is 5 GRANTED in the defendants’ favor and this action is dismissed in its entirety. 6 BACKGROUND 7 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 8 Nunez filed the underlying action on September 1, 2023. Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint). When I 9 granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend in November 2023, I indicated how 10 Nunez might clarify his claims, referred him to the Court’s Legal Help Center for unrepresented 11 parties, and suggested that he review the Pro Se Handbook and Pro Se Templates and Forms on 12 the Court’s website. Dkt. No. 19 (Order Granting First Motion to Dismiss). His FAC stated 13 plausible claims and defendants answered it in January 2024. Dkt. No. 22. 14 In the run up to summary judgment, I addressed numerous concerns that Nunez had 15 regarding discovery. The central theme in each of the four (4) discovery disputes that the parties 16 submitted, either individually or together1, was Nunez’s belief that the defendants had more 17 information than they were producing. 18 In the first discovery dispute, filed on May 17, 2024, Nunez asserted that the defendants 19 had failed to comply with General Order 71, because the defendants stated that they had 20 “exchanged their Initial Disclosures pursuant to General Order No. 71, subject to additional 21 supplementation.” Dkt. No. 43 (Discovery Order, quoting defendants’ Case Management 22 Statement and Rule 26(f) report). I directed the parties to provide the complete General Order 71 23 Initial Discovery to one another within 15 days; I explained that the Initial Discovery should 24

25 1 Nunez filed all of his discovery letters as stand-alone documents. This did not comply with my standing order requiring parties to file joint discovery disputes. Given Nunez’s status as a pro se 26 plaintiff, I did not require him to refile the documents the first two times, particularly given that the defendants filed prompt responses to his individually submitted letters. The third time Nunez 27 submitted an individual discovery dispute, I ordered the parties to meet and confer and then 1 encompass most, if not all, of the important documents that would exist in this case. I then 2 directed Nunez to review all documents that the defendants had produced (or shortly would 3 produce) in compliance with General Order 71 and then draft specific discovery seeking additional 4 documents and information if needed. Id. 5 In a statement filed with the court prior to an October 29, 2024, Case Management 6 Conference (“CMC”), Nunez once again raised his concerns that the defendants were not 7 complying with General Order 71; he claimed that defendant Verizon was refusing to produce 8 documents relevant to Nunez’s employment. See Dkt. No. 47 (Nunez CMC Statement). 9 Verizon’s position remained that it lacked such responsive documents because it had never 10 employed Nunez, only Cellco had. At the CMC, I ordered Verizon to file a declaration under oath 11 describing its relationship with Cellco and provide Nunez with the documents upon which it based 12 that description, and upon which it would base its motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 48 13 (Minute Order). 14 Verizon filed two declarations to that end. Karen Shipman, the Senior Manager for the 15 Verizon Corporate Governance Group and Assistant Secretary of Cellco, filed a declaration 16 explaining the relationship between Verizon and Cellco. According to her sworn declaration, 17 Cellco is “indirectly, wholly owned by Verizon Communications Inc.,” and “[a]t no point during 18 [Nunez’s] employment did Verizon Communications Inc. employ [Nunez].” Declaration of K. 19 Shipman (“Shipman Decl.”) [Dkt. No.49] ¶¶ 6-8. Verizon “does not exercise day-to-day control 20 over the daily operations of [Cellco],” and during Nunez’s employment, Verizon “did not exercise 21 control over the working conditions or wages of [Cellco’s] employees,” nor was it involved in 22 “any of [Cellco’s] hiring or termination decisions” or “personnel decisions.” Id. ¶ 11. Michelle 23 DiMascio, the Global Payroll Associate Director at Cellco, filed a consistent declaration 24 explaining that “[a]t no point during [Nunez’s] employment did Verizon Communications Inc. 25 employ [Nunez].” Declaration of M. DiMascio (“DiMascio Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 50] ¶ 5. She 26 explained that she reached this conclusion by reviewing W-2 Forms and wage statements for 27 Nunez, available through Cellco’s payroll system. Id. ¶¶ 6-8; see also id., Exs. 1-2. 1 documents from Verizon. Dkt. No. 51. I noted that the Shipman and DiMascio declarations 2 indicated that Verizon had no involvement in this matter; however, to ensure that Nunez had 3 received all the documents that were relevant to his claims to which he is entitled, I scheduled a 4 status conference for January 7, 2025, where I would ask counsel for the defense if they had fully 5 complied with their General Order 71 obligations, and whether they were aware of any Verizon- 6 related entities that possessed documents that would be responsive to General Order 71 if those 7 entities had been named in the case. Dkt. No. 52 (Order Concerning Discovery and Scheduling 8 Status Hearing). I also ordered the parties to meet and confer about additional discovery issues 9 Nunez raised. Id. 10 At the January 7, 2025, status conference, the defendants represented that they had fully 11 complied with their disclosure obligations and that they were not aware of any Verizon-related 12 entities that possess documents that would be responsive to the mandates of General Order 71 had 13 they been named in the case. See Dkt. No. 57 (Minute Order for January 7 Status Conference).

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Nunez-Palomarez v. Verizon Communication Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nunez-palomarez-v-verizon-communication-inc-cand-2025.