Nummer v. Department of Treasury

533 N.W.2d 250, 448 Mich. 534

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: May 2, 1995
• Docket: 97343, (Calendar No. 16)
• Status: Published

Opinions

Riley, J.

In this case, we decide whether a formal and final decision by the Civil Service Commission rejecting a discrimination claim precludes relitigation of that issue in a subsequently filed action in circuit court. We hold that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of this claim. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

i

Plaintiff David Nummer is a white male who was hired as an auditor by the Treasury Department in 1970 and transferred to the intelligence unit of the Tax Fraud Division in 1978. Plaintiff remained in the Tax Fraud Division until 1987, when all Tax Fraud Division auditors were transferred to the newly formed Discovery Division within the Department of Treasury. Plaintiff objected to the transfer and filed a grievance with the Department of Civil Service. His grievance alleged two theories of recovery: first, that the Department of Treasury breached a contractual promise that he would remain within the Tax Fraud Division and, second, that the transfer constituted discrimination on the basis of race and gender in violation of the civil service provisions set forth in art 11, § 5, of the Michigan Constitution.¹

On June 17, 1988, the civil service hearing officer denied recovery on both theories. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Employment Relations Board, which denied leave.² The Civil Service Commission subsequently reviewed and approved the Employment Relations Board’s decision. Plaintiff then appealed the final determination of the commission to the circuit court, which affirmed the commission’s determination.

While plaintiff’s appeal was pending in circuit court, and before that court issued its opinion affirming the decision of the commission, plaintiff filed a new action in circuit court. The second case, also based on plaintiff’s transfer to the Discovery Division, alleged breach of contract and race and sex discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act. MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.

Defendant responded to the second action by alleging that the commission’s determination that the transfer did not breach any contractual obligation and that the transfer was not for discriminatory reasons collaterally estopped redetermination of these issues in the circuit court. The circuit court agreed that plaintiff was collaterally es-topped from bringing either the contract issue or the discrimination issue and dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the contract issue was collaterally estopped,³ but that collateral estoppel did not apply to the civil rights claim. The Court of Appeals refused to apply collateral estoppel to the discrimination issue because it believed that the Legislature, in the civil rights arena, "chose to set aside the principles of collateral estoppel in civil rights cases and to countenance a multiplicity of litigation.” 200 Mich App 695, 700; 504 NW2d 724 (1993). Defendant appealed, and we granted leave.⁴

ii

The preclusion doctrines serve an important function in resolving disputes by imposing a state of finality to litigation where the same parties have previously had a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372; 429 NW2d 169 (1988). By putting an end to litigation, the preclusion doctrines eliminate costly repetition, conserve judicial resources, and ease fears of prolonged litigation. Whether the determination is made by an agency or court is inapposite; the interest in avoiding costly and repetitive litigation, as well as preserving judicial resources, still remains. Univ of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 798; 106 S Ct 3220; 92 L Ed 2d 635 (1986).

At issue in this case is the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Generally, "[f]or collateral estoppel to apply, a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment. In addition, the same parties must have had a full opportunity to litigate the issue, and there must be mutuality of estoppel.” Storey, supra at 373, n 3.

However, because defendant is seeking to preclude relitigation on the basis of an administrative decision, three additional requirements must be satisfied. The administrative determination must have been adjudicatory in nature and provide a right to appeal, and the Legislature must have intended to make the decision final absent an appeal. Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass’n v Detroit, 399 Mich 449, 457-458; 249 NW2d 121 (1976); Roman Cleanser Co v Murphy, 386 Mich 698, 703-704; 194 NW2d 704 (1972). See also Storey, supra at 373.

It is not seriously contested that the general requirements of collateral estoppel are met and that at least the first two requirements for administrative estoppel are satisfied. In the Civil Service Commission, plaintiff alleged that the Department of Treasury violated Civil Service Commission Rule 1-2.1.⁵ This claim between the same parties involved a similar factual issue as that which was actually litigated and decided in the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, plaintiff was represented by counsel before the agency; had the opportunity to, and did in fact, call witnesses; and had a full hearing on the merits of his claim.⁶ In addition, he appealed this decision to the Employment Relations Board and then to the Civil Service Commission.

This proceeding, therefore, clearly was not summary in nature. See Storey, supra. Furthermore, it is disingenuous to argue that plaintiff did not have a full opportunity to present his claim or that the adjudicatory nature of the proceeding is not sufficiently akin to a judicial proceeding.⁷ Indeed, neither party suggests that the proofs required in the agency determination differ from a Civil Rights Act claim in circuit court.

In terms of the right to appeal, plaintiff certainly was afforded numerous opportunities. In addition to the two intra-agency appeals, he obtained review in the circuit court. Thus, plaintiff had the opportunity to appeal, did in fact appeal, and, hence, satisfies the second part of administrative estoppel.

The point of contention in this case centers on the third element of administrative estoppel, i.e., that the Legislature intended the decision to be final absent an appeal. Plaintiff and Justice Mallett rely on MCL 37.2606(1); MSA 3.548(606)(1), which provides the standard of review on appeal from the Civil Rights Commission: "An appeal before the circuit court shall be reviewed de novo.” Even assuming that a Civil Service Commission determination should be akin to a Civil Rights Commission determination, a plaintiff whose claim is fully adjudicated by a formal hearing is only afforded the opportunity to appeal the decision and receive a de novo review, but is not afforded the right to file a complaint anew raising the same claim. In this case, plaintiff appealed to the circuit court and received a review under a competent, material, and substantial evidence standard.⁸ Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Service, 386 Mich 375, 392; 192 NW2d 449 (1971). While this appeal was pending, plaintiff decided to file a new, original action in the same court. This new action was assigned to a different judge who had to decide issues on the basis of the same factual setting. There is absolutely no legislative intent for this multiplicity of litigation.

hi

Preclusion doctrines are judicial creations, developed and extended from the common law. Accordingly, the Legislature is free to modify its strict application in any given statutory scheme. 2 Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law (3d ed), § 13.3, p 256. However, the Civil Rights Act is devoid of any statement that traditional preclusion rules do not apply to this statutory scheme. Hence, the difficulty lies in determining whether an intent can be inferred from the statutory scheme. Davis & Pierce, supra. In doing so, it must be remembered that the Legislature is deemed to legislate with an understanding of common-law adjudicatory principles. Garwols v Bankers Trust Co, 251 Mich 420, 424-425; 232 NW 239 (1930); Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 107-108; 111 S Ct 2166; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991).

A

To date, the closest this Court has come to making such a determination was in Storey, supra. We considered whether a determination by the Michigan Employment Security Commission precluded relitigation of the same issue regarding dismissal in a subsequent civil suit for wrongful discharge and breach of employment contract. In terms of legislative intent to modify traditional preclusion principles, we found MCL 421.11(b)(1); MSA 17.511(b)(1) controlling. It provides:

Except as provided in this act, such information and determinations shall not be used in any action or proceeding before any court or administrative tribunal unless the commission is a party to or a complainant in the action or proceeding, or unless used for the prosecution of fraud, civil proceeding, or other legal proceeding pursuant to subdivision (2).

Accordingly, this Court held "that § 11(b)(1) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the use of mesc information and determinations in subsequent civil proceedings unless the mesc is a party or complainant in the action.” Storey, supra at 376.⁹

Federal cases have reached similar conclusions, but under slightly less explicit direction from Congress. For example, in Solimino, supra, the Court held that an age discrimination claim¹⁰ is not precluded by a judicially unreviewed finding by a state administrative agency. The Court refused to rely on any negative intent, i.e., that Congress did not make a clear statement abrogating common-law preclusion and thus preclusion applied, but instead considered whether there was any intent to be inferred from the statutory scheme.¹¹ Looking to the filing requirements of the statute, which required exhaustion of remedies with state authorities before filing in federal court, the Court held that there was congressional intent to abrogate preclusion principles. 501 US 111. The Court reasoned that the filing requirements "plainly assume the possibility of federal consideration after state agencies have finished theirs.” Id._

B

Reviewing the Civil Rights Act, there is nothing remotely similar to the provisions found dispositive of legislative intent in either Storey or Solimino. Section 606 merely provides: "An appeal before the circuit court shall be reviewed de novo.” Clearly, the express intent presented by the provision in Storey is far from the instant provision providing that an appeal from the Civil Rights Commission "shall be reviewed de novo.” The latter says nothing about use in later proceedings. The plain language simply contemplates an appeal from the Civil Rights Commission, but does not, by any stretch of the imagination, contemplate a new, original action in circuit court.

Moreover, fact-specific holdings in federal decisions like Solimino are inapposite because the federal system requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before review in the courts. Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp, 456 US 461, 469; 102 S Ct 1883; 72 L Ed 2d 262 (1982). Where exhaustion is required, granting preclusive effect to an agency decision would undermine the role of the courts in the enforcement of laws prohibiting discriminatory treatment. Michigan law, on the other hand, clearly does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing in circuit court.¹² See, e.g., Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537, 558-560; 189 NW2d 243 (1971);¹³ Marsh v Dep’t of Civil Service, 142 Mich App 557, 562-563; 370 NW2d 613 (1985).

The statutory provision at issue in Solimino confirms this difference. It mandates that a plaintiff first proceed in the state agency before filing in the courts. Accordingly, it creates a reasonable inference that preclusion rules should not apply. The same cannot be said with respect to the Michigan statute, however. It merely provides that appeals from the Civil Rights Commission should be reviewed de novo. In other words, it provides guidance on direct appeal in circuit court and says nothing about filing a new, original action in circuit court after receiving full review in an administrative agency, with a subsequent appeal and review in circuit court.

The dissents would break new ground in Michigan law by countenancing a greater multiplicity of litigation¹⁴ than was ever arguably intended by the Legislature.¹⁵ However, the statutes at issue in both Storey and Solimino do not support such an inferred intent analysis as is employed by Justice Mallett. Even if we were considering an action first begun in the Civil Rights Commission, it would be unreasonable to infer such intent from a statutory provision stating the standard of review on appeal. Indeed, without question a plaintiff beginning in the Civil Rights Commission and appealing to the circuit court, where he receives an adverse decision, would not be entitled to file a new, original action in circuit court. Preclusion would certainly bar the action because there would be no legislative intent for this multiplicity of litigation and waste of judicial resources. The same should be true for claims beginning in the Civil Service Commission.¹⁶

c

The dissents cite briefly MCL 37.2803; MSA 3.548(803) and Const 1963, art 5, § 29, for support in finding that preclusion does not apply. Both the statute and the constitutional provisions employ the same language which, in effect, states that nothing in the constitution or the Civil Rights Act ”shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.”

What the dissents fail to do is provide an analysis of the meaning of this clause. However, in Pompey, supra, this Court engaged in extensive analysis of its meaning and concluded that the clear intent of this provision was to permit claimants to seek relief in the courts without first exhausting administrative remedies. Id. at 558-560, n 19.¹⁷ In other words, the Civil Rights Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination claims, but instead has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts. See also Marsh, supra.

Assuming this provision applies to the Civil Service Commission, imposing preclusion would not offend this clause or even implicate its prohibitions in this case.¹⁸ The Civil Rights Commission, the Civil Service Commission, and the circuit court still have concurrent jurisdiction over discrimination claims. Marsh, supra. Plaintiff elected to adjudicate his claim to conclusion in the Civil Service Commission and lost. Once a tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction has rendered a decision on the merits, § 606 mandates that any subsequent relief would be in the form of appellate review.¹⁹

Hence, § 606, not § 803, answers the question whether "it is clear that the Legislature intended to make the determination final in the absence of an appeal.” Storey, supra at 373. Reading § 803 in light of § 606, it is clear that the Legislature intended to make the Civil Rights Commission findings final in the absence of an appeal and, accordingly, also must have intended to make Civil Service Commission determinations final in the absence of an appeal. Regardless of whether an appeal is taken, the Legislature has provided only one remedy from an adverse determination, i.e., direct appeal in the circuit court. An appeal by its very nature contemplates the possibility of reversal, but it certainly does not contemplate a new, original action. If the Legislature intended anything else, it would have said so more directly.

IV

Additionally, we reject the notion that 2 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 83, pp 266-267, contemplates an abrogation of preclusion under the instant statutory scheme. In discussing the scope of the provision, the commentary indicates that this section would not apply "when a determination of an administrative tribunal is being subjected to direct judicial review.” Comment a, p 268. This is a logical conclusion given that "such a review is a continuation of the original administrative litigation and the final outcome is still in contest. The rules of res judicata do not foreclose the appellate contest, just, as they do not prevent an appellate court from reversing a lower judicial tribunal.” Id.

Certainly, the instant case technically fits within the scope of § 83 because it is not on direct appeal. However, relying on a provision addressing a direct appeal to support the finding of legislative intent to abrogate preclusion principles seems counterintuitive. Section 83 simply does not support such a finding. It is illogical to believe that a provision that would displace the situation from the scope of the rule could be used as the basis for finding a new, original action permissible.

The § 83 commentary²⁰ and its accompanying illustration confirm that § 83 is not controlling in this case. The example contemplates a statute which provides " 'the remedies provided under this statute are in addition to all other remedies available to an affected employee or prospective employee.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the operable provision provides that an appeal shall be reviewed de novo. Obviously, explicit cumulative remedies, as presented in the example, and de novo review on appeal, as is presented in this case, are not remotely similar. Accordingly, the legislative intent envisioned by § 83 is not satisfied in this case.

v

The dissents appear to confuse the question directly presented to this Court. The question is not whether the standard of review on direct appeal should be de novo on the record instead of competent, material, and substantial evidence.²¹ Viculin, supra. The question is whether the Legislature intended to abrogate well-established preclusion doctrines when a plaintiff files a new, original action after adverse agency and circuit court decisions. Specifically, the point of contention centers on whether the Legislature intended a Civil Service Commission determination to be final in the absence of an appeal.²² To this question, the answer is undoubtedly yes, the Legislature intended it to be final.

There are numerous laws regarding discrimination, the most obvious of which is the constitution.²³ There, the framers saw fit to provide the Civil Service Commission with the authority to resolve discrimination claims occurring in state employment.²⁴ Desiring to extend this protection to private employment, the framers then created Const 1963, art 5, §29, which created the Civil Rights .Commission. In light of these provisions, it becomes clear that the delegates contemplated that two constitutionally created administrative bodies would hear similar discrimination claims. Against this backdrop, however, the delegates only provided de novo review for claims originating in the Civil Rights Commission.²⁵

When the Legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act pursuant to the requirements set forth in Const 1963, art 1, § 2²⁶ and art 5, § 29,²⁷ it simply followed the procedures already existing under the constitution. Both the constitution and the Legislature provided that appeals from the Civil Rights Commission would be de novo, while also providing that parties have a direct and immediate right to remedies in the courts. Without changing the substance of that already provided as a constitutional right,²⁸ it must be presumed that the Legislature adopted the intent of the framers.²⁹ Reviewing the convention debate and the plain language of these provisions, the intent is simply as follows: Appeals from the Civil Rights Commission shall be de novo and parties need not exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to circuit court.³⁰

vi

Finally, we do not share the dissents’ fears regarding the consequences preclusion could have on the Civil Service Commission. The dissents contend that preclusion would discourage claimants from filing before the Civil Service Commission in fear of losing the right to a remedy in the courts. In addition, Justice Mallett maintains that preclusion would create a greater incentive for the government to actively contest this claim, thereby "undermining the advantages of informality, cost, and speed in the resolution of such disputes in the administrative forum.” Post at 567.

The dissents appear to forget that a claimant has three forums to pursue a discrimination claim: the Civil Service Commission, the Civil Rights Commission, and the circuit court. Moreover, plaintiff has not asked this Court to alter the standard of review for discrimination claims arising in the Civil Service Commission.³¹ In any event, unlike Storey, in which we considered preclusion in the context of the mesc proceeding on unemployment benefits, the Civil Service Commission is not such a limited body. In fact, it is the constitutionally created agency designed to deal with all facets of state employment. If this creates the alleged consequences espoused by the dissents, the Legislature is the appropriate body to remedy this problem.

VII

We find that plaintiff is estopped from relitigating this discrimination claim in circuit court. With all the requirements of administrative estoppel being satisfied, including the intent to make the decision final in the absence of an appeal, we refuse to sanction a greater multiplicity of litigation than anything currently provided by statute or unnecessarily waste judicial resources. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Brickley, C.J., and Boyle and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.

1 Const 1963, art 11, § 5, states that the Civil Service Commission shall have the power to “regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service,” and that "[n]o appointments, promotions, demotions or removals in the classified service shall be made for religious, racial or partisan considerations.” Pursuant to Const 1963, art 11, § 5, the Civil Service Commission has the authority to promulgate rules to effectuate the mandates of § 5. In addressing the plaintiff’s discrimination allegation, the commission assessed whether the Department of Treasury violated Civil Service Commission Rule 1-2.1, which in pertinent part states:

No person shall be discriminated against in seeking employment, in being appointed or promoted, or in any condition of employment, in the classified service, or any separation therefrom, because of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, handicap, partisan considerations, age or sex.

2 The board ”conclude[d] that no meritorious basis for an appeal of the Grievance Hearing Officer’s Decision has been shown by Appellant.”

3 The contract issue is not before us.

4 445 Mich 934 (1994).

5 See n 1.

6 Plaintiff does not seriously contend that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to develop and present his case before the Civil Service Commission.

7 We wish to make clear that the issue decided today only would affect agency decisions by formal hearing. See Strachan v Mutual Aid & Neighborhood Club, Inc, 407 Mich 928 (1979), in which we held that a Civil Rights Commission decision to dismiss for "insufficient evidence was not adjudicatory in nature and thus does not bar subsequent proceedings in circuit court.”

8 This standard of review is not "on the merits,” but it is the one provided by the people of the State of Michigan, and one that the Legislature has not seen fit to change. In any event, plaintiff does not contend that this standard of review'was inappropriate and that a de novo review should be imposed instead. Justice Levin’s opinion fails to acknowledge this part of the record. Post at 581-582.

9 The Court also found support in the inferred legislative policy that the unemployment system was designed to render quick results that presumably create a disincentive to fully litigate the issue. In other words, imposing preclusive effect would frustrate the legislative policy by "delaying the determination of benefit rights and burdening the unemployment compensation system.” Id. at 378.

10 29 use 621 et seq.

11 In other words, the dispositive question is "whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting [the statute].” Elliott, supra at 796. In Elliott, the Court found legislative intent indicating that preclusion should not apply in a racial discrimination claim under title VII. Initially, the Court reviewed 42 USC 2000e-5(b), which provided that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "must give 'substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment discrimination] law.’ ” Id. at 795. The Court explained that "it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court.” Id. The Court then turned to its decision in Chandler v Roudebush, 425 US 840, 848; 96 S Ct 1949; 48 L Ed 2d 416 (1976), where the Court explained:

"The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative proceedings] as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964.” [Elliott, supra at 795-796.]

Interestingly, the Age Act at issue in Solimino did not contain that provision. The Solimino Court explained this omission was immaterial because the "substantial weight” provision, like the filing requirements, both indicate and support the finding that preclusion should not apply. 501 US 112.

12 In defining the scope of powers entrusted to the Civil Rights Commission, the people provided:

Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state. [Const 1963, art 5, §29.]

13 Reviewing the constitutional convention records, id. at 559, n 19, it becomes abundantly clear that the people intended to give a plaintiff the right to proceed directly to court without exhausting administrative remedies. However, neither the convention notes nor this Court’s decision in Pompey give any indication that the preclusion doctrines would not apply. Hence, unlike the federal system where exhaustion rules apply, there is no intent, express or implied, that preclusion should not be employed.

14 Justice Levin’s opinion contends that granting preclusive effect to a Civil Service Commission decision might increase litigation because plaintiffs are likely to split their claims, whereas denying preclusive effect “might, in particular cases, actuadly conserve judicial resources.” Post at 575 and 579. The opinion, however, fails to grasp the important concept of mutuality of estoppel. Estoppel must work both ways. See Howell v Vito’s Trucking & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37, 43; 191 NW2d 313 (1971). Our position will conserve resources by permitting a plaintiff to offensively use a favorable Civil Service Commission decision in circuit court to obtain damages or remedies not available before the commission. Justice Levin’s view would require a plaintiff receiving a favorable ruling in the Civil Service Commission to relitigate the entire claim before reaching a damages or other remedy determination. Hence, our holding reduces the multiplicity of litigation, and Justice Levin’s opinion actually serves to increase it.

15 The dissents would also break new ground on an issue not raised in this Court by overruling Walker v Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586; 391 NW2d 296 (1986), and holding that a proceeding de novo either on direct appeal from the agency or in a new, original action is not limited to the record made before the agency. We elect not to express an opinion on an issue not before this Court.

16 Justice Levin’s opinion argues that we should limit our "holding to the facts of this case where grievances involving both a civil rights and a noncivil rights claim were filed.” Post at 576. Because this is the factual context in which this case is presented, we intimate only so far. We do not decide whether collateral estoppel could be applied under Justice Levin’s hypothetical example. We save for another day that discussion.

17 This amendment has been offered ... to give a basic right to any citizen to go to the courts of this state to try his own case. Any commission established could so set up their requirements that if they were drafted too loosely without basic thought behind them, I am afraid, the state would force an individual to go through such a commission before his rights could be firmly established. They might exhaust the individual trying to secure his rights by saying that he must first exhaust their legal remedy. I think it is most vital that any person who feels that he has been wronged and who feels he has a cause of action be entitled to have his case tried in a court of this state immediately if he is ready to go, that we would always have this basic'right of trial preserved to every citizen. [2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1946.]

18 Interestingly, Justice Levin relies on this Civil Rights Commission provision to support the proposition that a person receiving an adverse Civil Service Commission determination has a right to a new, jury determination of the issue in circuit court. Post at 578. Not only does the constitution not provide a similar provision for Civil Service Commission decisions, but the clear import of this section is only to allow for concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, Justice Levin’s position serves to overrule Walker, n 15 supra, an issue not before this Court, with no explanation or analysis.

19 Section 606 plainly provides that "appeal[s from] the [Civil Rights Commission] shall be reviewed de novo.” (Emphasis added.)

20 The relevant commentary states that "[t]he statutory scheme may contemplate that the [subsequent] tribunal is required to make its own determination of the issue in question, even though the issue has been previously litigated in another forum.” 2 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 83, comment h, p 280.

21 Indeed, it is not before this Court because plaintiff did not argue on appeal in the first circuit court action that a de novo standard applies, did not appeal that decision, and finally, did not make a similar contention in this Court. The dissents would provide this remedy despite the procedural posture of this case and despite the failure to directly present this question to this Court. In doing so, the dissents would sanction an additional remedy for a plaintiff coming from the Civil Service Commission.

22 It must be remembered that when searching for legislative intent, our judicial duty is simply "to construe the legislative will as we find it, without regard to our own views as to the wisdom or justice of the act.” McKibbin v Corp & Securities Comm, 369 Mich 69, 81; 119 NW2d 557 (1963).

23 The Legislature is presumed to legislate with "knowledge of and regard to existing laws upon the same subject . . . .” Lenawee Co Gas & Electric Co v City of Adrian, 209 Mich 52, 64; 176 NW 590 (1920).

24 Const 1963, art 11, § 5, expressly mandates that "[n]o appointments, promotions, demotions or removals . . . shall be made for religious, racial or partisan considerations.”

25 See Const 1963, art 5, § 29, which provides: "Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)

26 No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [Emphasis added.]

27 It shall be the duty of the commission in a manner which may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination. [Emphasis added.]

28 See § 606.

29 The intent that Justice Mallett says is present is, in reality, not an express or an implied intent to abrogate preclusion principle. Instead, the intent inferred from § 606 and § 803 was merely a restatement of the obvious, i.e., a recognition that the constitution already afforded these rights to discrimination claimants. In other words, even if the Legislature said nothing or, for that matter, said the opposite of that already provided in the constitution, it would have no effect on the right to de novo review or the right to direct and immediate relief in circuit court. These rights were previously provided in Const 1963, art 5, § 29, and the Legislature has no power to impede these constitutional rights. Civil Rights Comm v Clark, 390 Mich 717, 726; 212 NW2d 912 (1973).

30 As Justice Cooley explained long ago:

Where the statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts have nothing to do but to obey it. They may give a sensible and reasonable interpretation to legislative expressions which are obscure, but they have no right to distort those which are clear and intelligible. The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern. . . .

These rules are especially applicable to constitutions; for the people, in passing upon them, do not examine their clauses with a view to discover a secret or a double meaning, but accept the most natural and obvious import of the words as the meaning designed to be conveyed. [People ex rel Twitchell v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 167-168 (1865).]

31 See part v.