Noyes v. Des Moines Club

178 Iowa 815
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 13, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 178 Iowa 815 (Noyes v. Des Moines Club) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 178 Iowa 815 (iowa 1916).

Opinion

Gaynor, J.

[816]*8161. trial : verdict: díctfnSeTneg-lig-ence. [815]*815Defendant is a corporation, owns, occupies and controls a certain five-story .brick building situated at [816]*816the southwest corner of the intersection of the streets known as 8th and Locust Streets, in the city of Des Moines. A portion of the building is occupied by tenants. For its own uses and purposes, it occupies and controls the following: the lobby on the first floor, the passenger elevator leaving said lobby, all the third floor and the fifth floor, the entire basement, and about half of the second .floor. Defendant also used and controlled an elevator in the rear part of the building during the month of May, 1911-, including May 18, 1911. This was a freight elevator for the use of the defendant in the transportation of merchandise, supplies, etc. This is the elevator in controversy. This elevator is in the southeast corner, and carries freight to each of the floors above. There is a door leading from the alley on the first floor. The alley is on the west end of the building. The wall of Chase & "West’s building adjoins defendant’s building on the south. There are doors leading from this lobby where this elevator is situated, into the rooms occupied by tenants on the east. The elevator is in the southeast comer of this lobby. It is about 25 feet from the door leading from the alley to the door of the elevator. The door from the alley opens into the northwest corner of the lobby. The only natural light that may enter comes through this doorway and windows from the alley. The entrance to the elevator faces to the north.

On the 18th day of May, 1911, the plaintiff was engaged in delivering goods to the defendant in their building aforesaid. These goods had been ordered and directed delivered, by the defendant. Plaintiff entered through the alley door, proceeded towards the east until he reached the elevator in the southeast corner. He was carrying a sack of potatoes weighing about 150 pounds. There was a gate to the elevator, which was supposed to be closed when the elevator was not at a particular floor. As he entered, he attempted to take this elevator to carry the potatoes to one of the upper floors. He claims that the elevator had been removed to one of the [817]*817floors above, and tbe gate was not closed; that he fell into the pit and was injured. It appears that no regular operator was ever used for this elevator; that it had gates or doors on each floor which were supposed to close automatically when the elevator left the floor. The elevator was operated by the user by means of a rope.

Plaintiff brings this action for the injuries received, and as a basis for such recovery alleges: That the defendant was negligent in having said elevator shaft unprotected, and said gate or door open when said elevator was not at the first floor, and in not having an áttendant or operator at said elevator, and further, in not having the hall or alleyway about said elevator so lighted that one in entering said alleyway or alley could see whether said elevator was at the first, floor or not, that, said gate not being closed, plaintiff supposed the .elevator was at the floor; that plaintiff walked into the open pit, fell, and was injured.

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the court, on motion of the defendant, instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. This being done, and judgment having been entered for the defendant on the verdict, plaintiff appeals.

The only question here is whether or not, under the evidence, the court erred in so instructing the jury. Under our system of practice, the jury is the trier of the fact, and, whenever the evidence is such that reasonable minds searching for the truth might differ as to whether the evidence establishes the ultimate fact upon which liability rests, the question is then for the jury. A motion to direct a verdict is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. It is not the province of the' court to weigh the evidence and sit upon the credibility of the witnesses. Before the court is justified in invading the province of the jury, and determining the facts of the case as well as the law, the case must be such that, conceding to the plaintiff’s evidence all the probative force [818]*818it is fairly entitled to, it is not sufficient to justify a verdict. We no longer adhere to the scintilla rule. That was repudiated in Meyer v. Houck, 85 Iowa 319.

As said in Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Iowa 615, 618:

“While the trial court may determine as to whether the contestants had given evidence sufficient to support a verdict, if one should be returned in their favor, it cannot, under the rule announced in Meyer v. Houck, pass upon the question as to whether the preponderating weight of all of the evidence is in favor of or against the contestants; that is a question always for the jury. So it is for the jury to determine as to the weight of the evidence, though there be one witness testifying on one side to certain facts, and many witnesses on the other side testifying to a contrary state of facts. It is not the province, in such a case, of the court to pass upon the credibility. of the several witnesses, and say which one told the truth, or that the story of one is more likely to be correct than that of another.”

To the same effect see In re Estate of Betts, 113 Iowa 111. This brings us to a consideration of the evidence as it was before the court at the time the motion was sustained.

The physical facts disclosed by the evidence are that the only outside entrance to this passageway was from the alley on the west side of the building. This alley door is a double door 5 feet wide and 7 feet high, and each door contains four large panes of frosted glass, re-enforced by wire. Oyer the double door there is a transom 64 inches high and 27 inches wide, made of 8 window lights. The transom consists of two double sashes, similar to two windows, one above the other. In the southwest corner facing on the alley is another window. This is obscured by the stairway immediately east of the window. There is also a window south. This window is also partially obscured by lockers built in the north side- of the passageway. Immediately south of this alley was a two-story building. . This building stood right across the alley from the entrance to the building referred to. The injury [819]*819happened about ten o’clock in the morning. The day was dark and cloudy. The elevator was in the southeast corner. There were no openings on the south, and no openings on the east through which light could enter. ■ The elevator was walled off. The evidence tends to show that the windows referred to were fitted in with dark glazed glass, that did not give light to. the elevator for the reason that the door of the elevator faces to the north. Plaintiff testified:

“There is no light in the room near the door, and when you get back into the elevator you turn to the door of the elevator and it faces the wall. There is no light facing the elevator. There was no light in the basement, and the hole was perfectly dark. There were light fixtures in the hallway leading to the elevator. There was no globe in it, and the light was not lit or burning. ’ ’

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Bluebook (online)
178 Iowa 815, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/noyes-v-des-moines-club-iowa-1916.