2025 IL App (1st) 231959-U
THIRD DIVISION May 21, 2025
No. 1-23-1959
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AMEER NOURELDIN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 2019 M3 006436 ) DOUGLAS ANDERSON and ELA SOCCER CLUB, ) ) Honorable Martin C. Kelley, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The incomplete record on appeal does not establish that the trial court erred in (1) granting defendants’ motion to reconsider, (2) allowing defendants to amend their counterclaim, (3) denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants’ amended counterclaim, (4) denying plaintiff’s motion for “declaratory order [sic],” and (5) entering sanctions against plaintiff. Affirmed.
¶2 Plaintiff Ameer Noureldin filed a complaint against defendants Douglas Anderson and Ela
Soccer Club alleging breach of contract and a violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)). The trial court initially entered
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants then filed a motion to reconsider, which the
court granted. Defendants subsequently filed a “motion for default and /or [to] bar the plaintiff 1-23-1959
from testifying,” which the court granted following a hearing. On appeal, plaintiff contends that
the court erred in (1) granting defendants’ motion to reconsider, (2) allowing defendants to amend
their counterclaim, (3) denying his motion to dismiss defendants’ amended counterclaim,
(4) denying his motion for “declaratory order [sic],” and (5) entering sanctions against plaintiff.
For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The record on appeal lacks a report of proceedings or acceptable substitute for all but one
hearing in this cause. Accordingly, the following facts are taken from the limited record before
us, which includes the trial court’s docket entries, the pleadings, and the trial court’s orders.
¶5 Plaintiff Ameer Noureldin was a soccer coach with defendant Ela Soccer Club (Ela).
Defendant Douglas Anderson is the president of Ela. On September 6, 2019, plaintiff filed a three-
count verified complaint against defendants, alleging breach of contract (count I), a violation of
the Act against Ela (count II), and a violation of the Act against Anderson (count III).
¶6 Plaintiff’s complaint made the following allegations: On or about August 1, 2017, plaintiff
and defendants executed a written agreement (Agreement) pursuant to which plaintiff would be
paid $27,000 annually to be the soccer coach and trainer for Ela’s youth soccer program. On June
28, 2018, the parties renewed the Agreement for an additional period beginning on August 1, 2018,
and ending on July 31, 2019.
¶7 Around March 1, 2019, Ela assigned plaintiff to coach two teams at an annual tournament
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, which was scheduled to take place from July 12 - 20, 2019. Plaintiff
was to receive additional compensation of $1,700 ($850 of which plaintiff had received prior to
attending the tournament) and reimbursement for his travel and meal expenses.
¶8 On or about May 15, 2019, plaintiff notified Ela’s Director of Coaching (Jose Fleita) that
plaintiff would not renew the Agreement with defendants when the current Agreement ended. On
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July 13, 2019, Fleita notified plaintiff that he was immediately terminated by defendants for
“accepting employment with another club *** and that he would need to immediately leave” the
tournament premises. Plaintiff did so, after having completed approximately 19 hours’ work for
the tournament. Plaintiff stated that he had no further coaching duties regarding any of his assigned
teams as of July 13, 2019. Plaintiff alleged that he was owed an aggregate of $2,924.02,
comprising his final payment of wages owed under the Agreement ($1,520.83), compensation for
coaching the tournament ($850), and reimbursement for expenses related to coaching in the
tournament ($553.19).
¶9 Plaintiff attached a photographic copy of the Agreement to his complaint. The Agreement
contained a section entitled “Exclusive Employment” that included the following condition:
“During the term of this Agreement, [plaintiff] shall not work for, consult for, volunteer for, or
have any beneficial interest whatsoever in any other soccer club.” In addition, the section entitled
“Indemnification” included the following: “[Plaintiff] agrees to indemnify and save harmless [Ela]
from all claims, demands, penalties, suits or actions and from any and all loss, cost or expense in
connection therewith, including reasonable attorney fees, through any appellate procedure, ***
(iii) for any claims against, or losses of liability of, such indemnified party for any cause resulting
from, (A) [Plaintiff’s] failure to perform Employee’s duties and obligations under this Agreement,
(B) [Plaintiff’s] violation of Employer’s by-laws, rules and regulations or other applicable laws or
statu[t]es, (C) [Plaintiff] being found guilty of fraud or other intentionally tortuous [sic] or criminal
conduct or (D) any misrepresentation or false statement made by [Plaintiff].”
¶ 10 On November 6, 2019, defendants filed with their answer a two-count counterclaim for
breach of contract and breach of a covenant not to compete. Defendants argued in substance that
plaintiff breached the Agreement when he accepted employment with a rival soccer club, FCX,
prior to the end of the term of the Agreement, and that he violated the Agreement’s covenant not
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to compete provision by accepting a coaching position at FCX, which defendants alleged was
approximately 5 miles from Ela’s home office. In addition to a copy of the Agreement, defendants
attached a “screenshot” from July 13, 2019, which purportedly showed plaintiff as a member of
FCX’s coaching staff. Defendants further included the affidavit of Anderson, Ela’s president.
Anderson stated in his affidavit that Ela’s director of coaching (Jose Fleita) had been informed by
“one of his kid’s parents” that plaintiff had attended a “coaches/parents meeting” during the
previous week at an FCX facility. Anderson added that he printed out the screenshot of the FCX
website showing plaintiff as a coach for that team. Anderson stated that he decided not to pay any
further money to plaintiff based upon Anderson’s belief that plaintiff had breached the Agreement.
Defendants asked the court to award it $850 and its reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 11 On December 10, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting defendants “limited
discovery” to obtain plaintiff’s current employment contract.
¶ 12 The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion
argued in substance that there was no dispute that plaintiff provided his coaching services pursuant
to the Agreement until his termination and that he began his employment with FCX on August 14,
2019, which was after the Agreement expired. Defendants’ motion, by contrast, argued that there
was no dispute that plaintiff breached the Agreement when he began working for FCX prior to the
expiration (and in violation) of the Agreement. On January 26, 2021, following a hearing, the trial
court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment “in its entirety” and denied defendants’
motion. The court’s written order indicates that it was “fully advised,” but there is no report of
proceedings (or acceptable substitute) for this hearing.
¶ 13 On February 18, 2021, defendants filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order
granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendants’ summary judgment
motion. Defendants’ motion argued that the court misapplied the law because its ruling allowed
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plaintiff to benefit from his material breach of the parties’ contract, which defendants argued was
counter to existing precedent. Defendants also argued that the court should have denied plaintiff’s
summary judgment motion because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to when plaintiff
began working for Ela’s rival club, FCX. In particular, although plaintiff stated in his affidavit
that he began employment at FCX on August 14, 2019, defendants pointed out that his executed
contract with FCX was dated in July 2019. Defendants also recounted that it had presented
evidence of a screenshot (dated July 13, 2019) from the FCX website that showed plaintiff listed
as a coach for FCX. In addition, defendants noted that Anderson’s affidavit indicated that Fleita
told him that plaintiff had attended a “coaches meeting for FCX” prior to July 13, 2019. Finally,
defendants reiterated their arguments from their motion for summary judgment.
¶ 14 On May 10, 2021, the trial court entered a written order granting defendants’ motion to
reconsider. The order stated that the matter came “to be heard before this *** court” and further
vacated its prior order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Finally, the order stated
that plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees was “not considered” due to the granting of defendant’s
motion to reconsider. The matter was continued to July 13, 2021, and allowed the parties to
“conduct oral discovery [and] depositions instanter.” On July 13, 2021, the court allowed
discovery until August 31, 2021, and continued the cause to that date.
¶ 15 On August 24, 2021, defendants filed a motion to amend their counterclaim. Defendants’
amended counterclaim was substantially the same as their initial counterclaim but requested
$27,000 in additional damages, which defendants alleged represented plaintiff’s compensation
from FCX from June 28, 2018 – July 31, 2019, during which plaintiff violated the covenant not to
compete. Defendants also reiterated their request for $850 in monies advanced and their attorney
fees. On August 31, 2021, following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants’ motion and
gave plaintiff 28 days to answer. The court continued the matter to October 5, 2021.
5 1-23-1959
¶ 16 On October 1, 2021, plaintiff filed a combined motion to dismiss defendants’ amended
counterclaim and to vacate the trial court’s prior order of May 10, 2021. Plaintiff argued that the
amended counterclaim should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) defendants were asking
for an equitable remedy from a court other than a chancery court, (2) defendants’ violation of the
Act “is an affirmative defense that renders the [Agreement’s] restrictive covenant unenforceable,”
(3) defendants are seeking $850 from plaintiff for “work he performed when it is undisputed they
garnished” $2,924.02 from plaintiff’s earned wages, (4) the requested relief is not tied to any
demonstrable damages defendants suffered; and (5) their damages claim, $27,850, exceeds the
limit for small claims cases. Plaintiff added that defendants’ “inability to provide any further
evidence at this time demonstrates there is no issue of material fact ***, and in consequence” the
court’s order granting defendants’ motion to reconsider (dated May 10, 2021) should be vacated
and the order granting plaintiff’s prior summary judgment motion (dated January 26, 2021) should
be reinstated. On December 14, 2021, following a hearing, the court denied plaintiff’s motion.
¶ 17 On March 13, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory “order” pursuant to section
2-701 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2022)) seeking a
declaration from the trial court that, pursuant to the Agreement and section 9 of the Act (820 ILCS
115/9 (West 2022)), “defendants had no right to withhold plaintiff’s earned wages *** due to
plaintiff never giving his consent” to the withholding. Plaintiff argued that a declaratory order that
plaintiff was “entitled to his wages, and conversely that defendants cannot continue to withhold
his wages, would not only end the vexatious discovery but also put a linchpin on this whole case.”
¶ 18 On April 28, 2023, defendants filed a “motion for default and /or [to] bar the plaintiff from
testifying.” Defendants said that they issued and served discovery on plaintiff on October 10,
2022, and sent a “201k letter” requesting discovery responses on January 6, 2023. Defendants
stated that the responses are “crucial to establish facts and evidence” supporting their counterclaim,
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but plaintiff did not respond to the October 2022 discovery and the subsequent 201(k) letter sent
in January 2023. Defendants noted, however, that plaintiff instead filed a motion for declaratory
order on March 13, 2023, seeking an order “essentially granting [plaintiff] summary judgment.”
Defendants asked the trial court to grant their motion for default or in the alternative, to bar plaintiff
from testifying and presenting evidence at trial. Plaintiff did not respond to this motion.
¶ 19 On May 17, 2023, following a hearing on “various motions,” the trial court issued a written
order denying plaintiff’s motion for declaratory order and granting defendants’ motion to bar
plaintiff from testifying. The court’s order further stated that it found that plaintiff’s failure to
provide defendants with discovery was “contemptuous and in bad faith,” and allowed defendants
to petition for their attorney fees. The court then entered default judgment in favor of defendants.
¶ 20 On June 28, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the trial court’s order
granting default judgment. Plaintiff first argued that default judgment was unwarranted because
defendants failed to first seek leave of court to conduct discovery pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 287 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 287 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992)). Plaintiff reasoned that, since defendants
never obtained leave, he was not obligated to answer defendants’ “unapproved discovery
requests.” Plaintiff further argued that sanctions were erroneously imposed because defendants
failed to file a motion to compel discovery prior to seeking sanctions, and plaintiff did not violate
any court order. Finally, plaintiff said he was not given adequate time to respond to the motion.
¶ 21 On September 25, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider.
During the hearing, plaintiff argued in part that defendants’ discovery was excessive and noted
that the case was a small claims case, so defendants needed first to obtain leave of court prior to
propounding discovery, but they never did so. Plaintiff then stated that he “should not be obligated
to answer something that [defendants] never got leave for.” Plaintiff further argued that, although
defendants stated in their motion for default that “several telephone conferences were made in
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order for them to be compliant with Rule 201(k),” those conferences never took place and plaintiff
was not given an opportunity to respond.
¶ 22 Defendants responded that this case was no longer a small claims matter because his
counterclaim exceeded the $10,000 limit. Defendants further argued that, although plaintiff
claimed that their discovery requests were unduly burdensome, plaintiff never responded,
objected, or filed a motion to quash or object. Defendants noted that prior precedent held that “six
months’ delay was sanctionable, and [the court] issued sanctions against that party.” Defendants
then argued that this case was “more egregious” because the delay was nearly 11 months without
plaintiff having filed either an answer or an objection. Finally, defendants argued that plaintiff
failed to request a briefing schedule to respond to their motion for default, so he could not complain
of having no opportunity to respond.
¶ 23 Following the hearing, the court issued a written order denying plaintiff’s motion to
reconsider and granting in part defendant’s petition for attorney fees. The court stated that it
neither read nor heard anything to change its ruling from May 17, 2023. The court added that
plaintiff’s refusal to respond to discovery was “exactly the kind of conduct the Supreme Court was
contemplating [and] addressing with [Rule] 219(c).” The court awarded defendants their attorney
fees in the amount of $3,712.50, which the court stated comprised fees from the date discovery
was issued (October 11, 2022) until the filing of the petition for fees (May 17, 2023).
¶ 24 On October 24, 2023, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, seeking review of the following
orders: May 10, August 31, and December 14, 2021; and May 17 and September 25, 2023.
¶ 25 ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erroneously (1) granted defendants’ motion
to reconsider, (2) allowed defendants to amend their counterclaim, (3) denied his motion to dismiss
defendants’ amended counterclaim, (4) denied his motion for “declaratory order [sic],” and
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(5) sanctioned plaintiff for certain discovery violations. Before considering these arguments on
appeal, however, we must discuss the state of the record on appeal. 1
¶ 27 The Record on Appeal
¶ 28 The record on appeal includes a report of proceedings for only one hearing: the hearing on
September 25, 2023, which concerned plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the trial court’s order
granting default judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. There is no transcript (or
acceptable substitute) for the hearing on May 10, 2021 (resulting in the granting of defendants’
motion to reconsider and the vacatur of the prior summary judgment order in favor of plaintiff),
May 17, 2023 (resulting in the default judgment against plaintiff), nor any other hearing date.
¶ 29 Illinois Supreme Court Rules 321 and 324 require an appellant to provide a complete record
on appeal, including a certified copy of the report of proceedings. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct.
1, 2021); Ill. S. Ct. R. 324 (eff. July 1, 2017). If a verbatim transcript is unavailable, the appellant
may file an acceptable substitute, such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts, as
provided for in Rule 323. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). The burden of providing a
sufficient record on appeal rests with the appellant (here, plaintiff). Corral v. Mervis Industries,
Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005); Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984) (“From the very
nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before it the record to review
in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.”). In the absence of
such a record, we must presume the trial court acted in conformity with the law and with a
1 In their brief, defendants also ask that we dismiss this appeal because of plaintiff’s purported violations of Supreme Court Rule 341 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), including the failure to specify the standard of review for each issue raised and the use of the term “Soccer Club” to refer to Ela, which defendants characterize as “pejorative.” Since, however, we are able to discern plaintiff’s argument as to the standard of review for the issues raised and do not consider the term “soccer club” to be so pejorative as to merit dismissal of an appeal, a particularly harsh sanction (see Trapp v. City of Burbank Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2024 IL App (1st) 231311, ¶ 14 (citing In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132 (2005))), we decline defendant’s request.
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sufficient factual basis for its findings. Id. at 392. Furthermore, any doubts arising from an
incomplete record will be resolved against the appellant. Id. With these limitations in mind, we
now turn to the issues plaintiff raises in this appeal.
¶ 30 Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider
¶ 31 The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court’s attention (1) newly
discovered evidence that was unavailable at the time of the hearing, (2) changes in the law, or
(3) errors in the court’s previous application of existing law. Caywood v. Gossett, 382 Ill. App.
3d 124, 133 (2008). Arguments raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration in the
circuit court are forfeited on appeal. Id. at 134. Finally, our standard of review depends upon the
underlying nature of the motion to reconsider. Where, as here, the motion to reconsider merely
argues that the trial court misapplied existing law, our review is de novo. O’Shield v. Lakeside
Bank, 335 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (2002).
¶ 32 Here, defendants’ motion to reconsider concerned an earlier order granting summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018).
“Although summary judgment is encouraged in order to aid the expeditious disposition of a
lawsuit, it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation.” Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL
122486, ¶ 12. Accordingly, summary judgment should only be granted when the moving party’s
right to judgment is “ ‘clear and free from doubt.’ ” Colon v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 2024 IL
App (1st) 221841, ¶ 27 (quoting Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.
2d 90, 102 (1992)). If reasonable people would draw divergent inferences from undisputed facts,
summary judgment is inappropriate. MEP Construction, LLC v. Truco MP, LLC, 2019 IL App
(1st) 180539, ¶ 12 (citing Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008)).
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¶ 33 To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, we construe the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of
the opponent. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 131-32). It is well established that
“facts contained in an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment which are not
contradicted by counteraffidavit are admitted and must be taken as true for purposes of the
motion.” Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241 (1986) (citing Heidelberger v. Jewel Cos., 57 Ill. 2d
87, 92-93 (1974)). Nonetheless, “[s]tatements in an affidavit which are based on information and
belief or which are unsupported conclusions, opinions, or speculation are insufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact.” (Alteration in the original.) MEP Construction, 2019 IL App (1st)
180539, ¶ 13 (quoting Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 132). In addition, a party’s admissions
contained in an original verified pleading are judicial admissions that bind the pleader throughout
the litigation, even after the filing of an amended pleading that supersedes the original, unless they
are the product of mistake or inadvertence. Id. We also review a trial court’s entry of summary
judgment de novo. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 102.
¶ 34 In this case, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to
reconsider. Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide this court with either a report of proceedings
or an acceptable substitute. There is no record supporting plaintiff’s argument that the court
improperly failed to “hold [defendants] to bringing forth new evidence of [plaintiff] working for
FCX prior to August of 2019.” In addition, there is no record demonstrating that the court allowed
defendants’ “mere allegation” to support its decision to grant their motion to reconsider. His
claims are thus unfounded. Where, as here, the record is incomplete or does not demonstrate the
alleged error, we may not speculate as to what errors may have occurred below. See Foutch, 99
Ill. 2d at 391-92; Smolinski, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 757; see also People v. Edwards, 74 Ill. 2d 1, 7
(1978) (“A reviewing court may not guess at the harm to an appellant * * * where a record is
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incomplete. * * * Where the record is insufficient or does not demonstrate the alleged error, the
reviewing court must refrain from supposition and decide accordingly.”). Under these
circumstances, as noted above, we must presume that the court acted in conformity with the law
and with a sufficient factual basis for its findings. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 156-57. Consequently,
we have no basis for disturbing the trial court’s judgment. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. We must
therefore reject plaintiff’s claims on this ground alone.
¶ 35 Moreover, on the limited record before us, we are compelled to uphold the trial court’s
judgment. Defendants’ motion to reconsider explained that, although plaintiff was obligated under
the Agreement to work solely for Ela through July 2019, there was evidence establishing that
plaintiff instead had begun working for a rival club (FCX) in that same month. This evidence
consisted of both the screen shot from July 13, 2019, showing plaintiff as a member of FCX’s
staff, Anderson’s statement in his affidavit that the director of coaching reported that plaintiff had
attended FCX’s coaches meeting on that same date, as well as other unspecified “evidence” that
plaintiff executed his contract with FCX in July 2019. At a minimum, these facts raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to when exactly plaintiff began working for FCX, and whether his work
for FCX would violate the noncompete or exclusivity provisions in the Agreement. We note that
defendants assert in response that the court did find a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
plaintiff violated those two provisions, thus warranting both the granting of defendants’ motion to
reconsider and also the denial of summary judgment. Unfortunately, there is no report of
proceedings, so we cannot determine whether that statement accurately reflects what transpired at
the hearing or whether any arguments were forfeited. Plaintiff’s claim thus fails.
¶ 36 Defendants’ Motion to Amend Their Counterclaim
¶ 37 Plaintiff also contends, somewhat obliquely, that the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion to amend their counterclaim. Defendants respond that plaintiff has forfeited
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any challenge because he failed to raise any objection during the hearing on this motion. This
contention of error is meritless for multiple reasons.
¶ 38 Section 2-616(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2022)) reads in pertinent part:
“At any time before final judgment[,] amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable terms,
*** adding new causes of action or defenses, and in any matter, either of form or substance, in any
process, pleading, bill of particulars or proceedings, which may enable *** the defendant to make
a defense or assert a cross claim.” To determine whether to allow an amendment to the pleadings,
a trial court considers the following factors: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the
defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the
proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous
opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof
Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992). The decision whether to allow a party’s motion to
amend its pleadings is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we may not disturb that
decision absent a “manifest abuse of such discretion.” Id. at 273-74. A trial court abuses its
discretion only where its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable
person would adopt the court’s view. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill.2d 21, 36 (2009).
¶ 39 Here, the record on appeal indicates that there was a “Zoom hearing” set for August 31,
2019. The trial court’s written order (dated August 31, 2019), which granted defendants’ motion
to amend its counterclaim, stated that it had been “fully advised.” There is, however, no report of
proceedings (or acceptable substitute) for this hearing. Accordingly, we cannot determine whether
the court abused its discretion in granting defendants’ motion, whether the court properly evaluated
the various Loyola Academy factors, or whether plaintiff did indeed fail to raise any objections to
the proposed amendment (thus forfeiting any challenge on appeal). Consequently, we may not
speculate as to any errors that may have occurred below (see Edwards, 74 Ill. 2d at 7), and we
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must further presume that the court’s decision had sufficient factual and legal support (see Corral,
217 Ill. 2d at 156-57). On this basis alone, we may uphold the trial court’s decision.
¶ 40 Moreover, plaintiff’s argument on appeal fails to provide any substantive argument on this
point before this court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) states that the
briefs shall contain “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” In this case,
however, plaintiff’s argument and citations do not focus on section 2-616 or decisions interpreting
that statute; instead, plaintiff’s few citations solely relate to the Act and whether it applies to breach
of contract actions. Plaintiff has thus forfeited this issue on this additional ground. We must
therefore reject plaintiff’s contention of error on this point.
¶ 41 Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Amended Counterclaim
¶ 42 Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss
defendants’ amended counterclaim. This claim is incorporated with plaintiff’s challenge to the
court’s granting of defendants’ motion to amend their counterclaim. Plaintiff argues that the
amended counterclaim was insufficiently pled, failed to properly allege damages, and did not “state
a basis for the relief sought.”
¶ 43 Plaintiff’s motion was brought pursuant to both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. 735
ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2022). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 33. In contrast, section 2-619
provides for involuntary dismissal based upon certain defects or defenses. 735 ILCS 5/2-619
(West 2022). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section 2-615 or section 2-619, a
court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences
from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw &
Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). Therefore, a motion to dismiss under either section
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cannot be granted unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle
the plaintiff to recovery. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006) (section 2-
615); Snyder v. Heidelberger, 2011 IL 111052, ¶ 8 (section 2-619). We review de novo the trial
court’s decision on motions to dismiss brought under both sections 2-615 and 2-619. Solaia
Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006).
¶ 44 Here, however, and as with plaintiff’s other claims, the record contains no transcript for
the hearing on December 14, 2021, when the trial court heard argument on the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff, the appellant in this case, has not provided a report of proceedings (or acceptable
substitute) of those hearings, despite the fact that he is obligated to do so pursuant to supreme court
rule. See Ill. S.Ct. Rs. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021), 323 (eff. July 1, 2017), 324 (eff. July 1, 2017); see
also Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 156 (it is the appellant’s burden to provide a sufficient record on appeal).
Although we review the court’s judgment and not reasoning, and we may affirm on any basis in
the record irrespective of whether the trial court relied upon that basis (Leonardi v. Loyola
University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 97 (1995)), our review is hindered by the lack of a complete
record. In particular, we have no ability to evaluate defendants’ response that plaintiff never
argued any of the points raised in his written motion to dismiss at the hearing before the trial court
on his motion. Under such circumstances, we must presume the court’s judgment was supported
by a sound factual and legal basis in the absence of a complete record on appeal (Foutch, 99 Ill.
2d at 392). See also Taliani v. Resurreccion, 2018 IL App (3d) 160327, ¶ 20 (affirming the trial
court’s granting of a motion to dismiss “because of the lack of a sufficient record on this issue”).
¶ 45 Moreover, based upon the limited facts before us, the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiff’s motion. Accepting all well-pleaded facts in the counterclaim as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of defendants (i.e., the nonmoving party) (see
Edelman, Combs & Latturner, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 164), defendants alleged in essence that plaintiff
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violated the exclusivity and noncompete provisions of the Agreement when he began employment
prior to the expiration of the Agreement with FCX, one of Ela’s competitors that was purportedly
located within the prohibited geographic range of the noncompete provision of the Agreement. If
those facts were proved, it would entitle defendants to a recovery. Therefore, since it is not clearly
apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to a recovery, the court
did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. See Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429; Snyder, 2011
IL 111052, ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s claim of error on this point is therefore meritless.
¶ 46 Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Order
¶ 47 Plaintiff contends, in two paragraphs with only one statutory citation, that the trial court’s
denial of his motion for a declaratory order was improper. Plaintiff faults the trial court for having
“refused to declare [plaintiff’s] rights under the Act, instead dismissing and defaulting him” when
defendants filed their motion for default against plaintiff on that same day. Defendants argue that
the trial court denied this motion for the same reasons that it vacated its prior summary judgment
order in favor of plaintiff, namely, that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding both
summary judgment and a declaratory order in favor of plaintiff. Defendants add that the court
further found that this motion was, in effect, a second motion for summary judgment, so the court
denied the motion for declaratory order for the same reasons.
¶ 48 These findings, however, took place during the hearing on May 17, 2019, for which we
have no transcript. As noted above, it is plaintiff’s obligation to provide this court with a complete
record on appeal, in the absence of which we may not speculate as to what errors may have
occurred below. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. The standard of review applied to a declaratory
judgment depends upon the nature of the trial court proceeding: Legal determinations are subject
to de novo review, whereas factual determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Oak Run Property Owners Ass’n v. Basta, 2019 IL App (3d) 180687, ¶ 50. We have no
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knowledge, however, as to the precise grounds upon which the court rejected plaintiff’s 2-701
motion. Plaintiff’s motion alleged in part that defendants were in material breach of the Agreement
and that their “insistence that plaintiff worked for two clubs at the same time is *** a fabrication.”
Those are factual findings, which would require that we review the court’s decision for an abuse
of discretion. Id. Plaintiff, however, also argued in his motion that he was entitled to his wages
under the Act, which appears to be a legal determination that would warrant a de novo standard of
review of the court’s decision. Id. The written order denying plaintiff’s 2-701 motion merely
states that it was “denied” following a hearing. Without any record of that hearing, there is nothing
for us to review. Accordingly, we must presume the court’s order was both factually and legally
sound. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.
¶ 49 Moreover, plaintiff’s argument consists of merely two paragraphs with bare citations to the
statute and a federal district case concerning breach of contract claims. As noted above, Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) states that the briefs must contain “[a]rgument,
which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the
authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” On this additional basis, this matter is forfeited.
We therefore reject plaintiff’s contention of error on this issue.
¶ 50 The Trial Court’s Sanctions on Plaintiff
¶ 51 Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously granted defendants’ motion for
default and to bar plaintiff’s testimony. Specifically, plaintiff argues that default judgment “should
only be awarded as a final resort when all other measures have been exhausted and not *** at the
first opportunity to award such.” Plaintiff further argues that, since defendants were not granted
leave by the trial court to issue interrogatories pursuant to rule 287, plaintiff was not obligated to
answer their discovery requests, so a sanction on that basis is unwarranted. Finally, plaintiff asserts
that the trial court erroneously failed to provide him with an opportunity to respond.
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¶ 52 As plaintiff notes in his brief, the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to bar
plaintiff from testifying or for default judgment was entered pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 219(c) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2022). Plaintiff’s brief, however, does not provide
any discussion of Rule 219(c). This is inadequate under Supreme Court Rule 341. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating that an appellant’s brief shall contain “argument, which
shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the
authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** Points not argued are forfeited and shall not
be raised in the reply brief *** or on petition for rehearing.”); see also Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill.
2d 352, 369 (2010) (failure to argue a point in the appellant's opening brief results in forfeiture of
the issue). Plaintiff has forfeited this point of error, and we therefore need not consider it.
¶ 53 Moreover, as with his motion for declaratory order, the trial court’s default finding and
imposition of sanctions also took place during the hearing on May 17, 2023, which plaintiff has
failed to include in the record on appeal. As such we must again presume the court’s default and
sanctions order was well grounded both factually and legally, and we are prohibited from
speculating as to possible errors that the trial court may have made. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-
92; Edwards, 74 Ill. 2d at 7. We recognize that plaintiff did include a report of proceedings for
the hearing on his motion to reconsider sanctions, which took place on September 25, 2023. That
transcript, however, provides no insight into the proceedings of May 17, 2023; instead, the court
merely stated that it had neither heard nor seen anything to convince it that its prior decision (on
May 17, 2023) was erroneous. As with the other claims, we cannot determine whether the court
abused its discretion on this incomplete record. Consequently, plaintiff has forfeited review of
this issue on this additional ground.
¶ 54 Setting aside the inadequacy of plaintiff’s brief and the record on appeal, plaintiff’s
arguments are meritless. At the outset, plaintiff’s argument that, since this matter began as a small-
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claims case, defendants’ failure to first seek leave to conduct discovery obviated any requirement
that plaintiff respond to defendants’ discovery requests. Small claims cases are limited to civil
actions based upon tort or contract for money damages not exceeding $10,000. Ill. S. Ct. R. 281
(eff. Jan. 1, 2022). When counsel for both parties sought their respective attorney fees pursuant to
the fee-shifting provision in the Agreement, the case was no longer a small claims matter because
the damages exceeded that amount.
¶ 55 In addition, it is well established that circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 530 (2001). The trial court in this case, sitting in
District 3 of the Municipal Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County, hears “civil actions
*** at law seeking compensatory and consequential money damages not in excess of $100,000,”
as well as actions seeking the recovery of property valued $100,000 or less, actions for forcible
entry and detainer, and certain emergency petitions for involuntary inpatient admission. See Cook
County Cir. Ct. G.O. 1.2, 2.3(b)(2) (Jan. 1, 2008). The trial court was therefore empowered to
continue hearing the matter under the rules of civil procedure applicable to non-small claims
matters. Nonetheless, even where a matter has been filed in the wrong division, the circuit judge’s
authority is nonetheless unaffected. See People v. Velazquez, 2020 IL App (1st) 181958, ¶ 15.
“Although the circuit court is comprised of different divisions that hear certain types of cases, that
fact does not affect a circuit judge’s authority ‘to hear and dispose of any matter properly pending
in the circuit court.’ ” Id. (quoting Fulton-Carroll Center, Inc. v. Industrial Council of Northwest
Chicago, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 821, 823 (1993)). We thus reject plaintiff’s argument that he was
entitled to ignore defendants’ discovery requests because defendants failed to obtain leave of court
prior to submitting its discovery requests.
¶ 56 We further disagree with plaintiff’s implied assertion that the trial court entered default
judgment “at the first opportunity.” On the incomplete record before us, the trial court entered
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three separate orders directing plaintiff to respond to defendants’ discovery requests, but plaintiff
failed to respond whatsoever. Although plaintiff claims that he was never provided an opportunity
to respond to defendants’ motion, there is no transcript to substantiate that the court denied
plaintiff’s request to respond. To the extent there are any doubts arising from an incomplete record,
we must resolve them against the appellant (i.e., plaintiff). Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.
¶ 57 Rule 219(c) provides in relevant part as follows:
“If a party *** unreasonably fails to comply with any provision of
part E of article II of the rules of this court (Discovery, Requests for
Admission, and Pretrial Procedure) or fails to comply with any order
entered under these rules, the court, on motion, may enter, in
addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as
are just, including, among others, the following:
***
(iv) That a witness be barred from testifying concerning that
issue;
(v) That, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to
which that issue is material, a judgment by default be entered against
the offending party ***;
(vi) That any portion of the offending party’s pleadings
relating to that issue be stricken and, if thereby made appropriate,
judgment be entered as to that issue ***.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff.
July 1, 2022).
The rule further provides that the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may also order the
offending party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees.
20 1-23-1959
¶ 58 “The decision to impose a particular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion of
the trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifies reversal.” (Emphasis added.)
Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120 (1998). A court abuses its discretion
only where its ruling is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would
adopt the court’s view.” TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 376 Ill. App. 3d 218, 227 (2007).
¶ 59 Again, based upon the limited record before us, plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’
discovery requests even when ordered to do so by the trial court on three separate occasions. The
incomplete record plaintiff has submitted with his appeal does not reveal that the court’s ruling
was arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or one that no reasonable person would adopt, so we are
compelled to hold that the court did not abuse its discretion.
¶ 60 Plaintiff’s reliance upon Buffington v. Yungen, 322 Ill. App. 3d 152 (2001) does not alter
our holding because in that case, the court stated that there was “nothing in the record that exhibits
a deliberate or contumacious disregard for the court's authority.” Id. at 156. Here, by contrast,
there is an incomplete record, so we cannot determine whether there is a similar absence of
evidence—or evidence that would refute plaintiff’s failure to respond to discovery despite three
separate court orders to do so. Plaintiff’s final contention of error is thus without merit.
¶ 61 CONCLUSION
¶ 62 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 63 Affirmed.