SHIPMAN, District Judge.
The disputed facts, in this case, lie within a very limited range, and were all distinctly submitted to the jury. The only matter now for consideration is, whether the court correctly instructed the jury on the questions of law applicable to the facts.
1.As to the waiver of proofs of loss. This point was raised on the trial, and, although not insisted on upon the argument of the motion, we will notice it here. It is conceded, that there were no formal proofs presented to the defendants, as provided for in the policy. But the written admission of the defendants, produced on the trial, conclusively proves, that the plaintiffs gave the defendants timely and proper notice that the loss had occurred, and that the latter, after examining the wreck, and inquiring into the circumstances, denied all liability under the policy, on the ground that the loss was the result of a marine, and not of a fire, peril. This was all done before the time within which the plaintiffs were, by the terms of the policy, bound to present the formal proofs, had expired. The court charged the jury, that this denial of all liability whatever,- by the defendants, was, in judgment of law, a waiver of any further proofs of loss. On this point, the authorities are numerous and decisive, and fully sustain the rule laid down by the court. The denial, by the defendants, of all liability in the case, expressly conceded that there was a loss, and was a notice to the plaintiffs that they would not be bound, in any event, though formal proofs were furnished. The presentation of proofs, under such circumstances, was of no importance to either party, and the law rarely, if ever, requires the observance of an idle formality, especially after the party for whose benefit the original stipulation was made, has rendered conformity thereto unnecessary, and practically superfluous. Schenck v. Mercer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 4 Zab. [24 N. J. Law] 447; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Har. & J. 408; McMasters v. Westchester County Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 379; Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 404: Tayloe v. Merchants’ Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. [50 U. S. 390; O’Neil v. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co. 3 Comst. [3 N. Y.] 122; Maryland Ins. Co. v. Bathurst, 5 Gill & J. 159; Graves v. Washington Marine Ins. Co., 12 Allen, 391.
2. There was no error in that part of the charge which '■instructed the jury that the suit was not -prematurely brought. There was a provision in the policy, that the loss should be payable after sixty days from notice and the furnishing of preliminary proofs of loss to the underwriters. If the matter had gone through the formal stages provided for in the policy, and the proofs had been made, without any denial of all liability on another ground, no suit could have been sustained on the policy, until the sixty days had expired. This clause was for the protection, or convenience, of the underwriters; but, when they waived the preliminary proofs, they also waived the benefit of this stipulation, and rendered it nugatory. It would be absurd to say that they still retained the right to have sixty days within which to pay a loss which they had declared they would not -pay at any time, or under any circumstances. Columbian Ins. Co. v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 383; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Har. & J. 408; Phillips v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220.
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SHIPMAN, District Judge.
The disputed facts, in this case, lie within a very limited range, and were all distinctly submitted to the jury. The only matter now for consideration is, whether the court correctly instructed the jury on the questions of law applicable to the facts.
1.As to the waiver of proofs of loss. This point was raised on the trial, and, although not insisted on upon the argument of the motion, we will notice it here. It is conceded, that there were no formal proofs presented to the defendants, as provided for in the policy. But the written admission of the defendants, produced on the trial, conclusively proves, that the plaintiffs gave the defendants timely and proper notice that the loss had occurred, and that the latter, after examining the wreck, and inquiring into the circumstances, denied all liability under the policy, on the ground that the loss was the result of a marine, and not of a fire, peril. This was all done before the time within which the plaintiffs were, by the terms of the policy, bound to present the formal proofs, had expired. The court charged the jury, that this denial of all liability whatever,- by the defendants, was, in judgment of law, a waiver of any further proofs of loss. On this point, the authorities are numerous and decisive, and fully sustain the rule laid down by the court. The denial, by the defendants, of all liability in the case, expressly conceded that there was a loss, and was a notice to the plaintiffs that they would not be bound, in any event, though formal proofs were furnished. The presentation of proofs, under such circumstances, was of no importance to either party, and the law rarely, if ever, requires the observance of an idle formality, especially after the party for whose benefit the original stipulation was made, has rendered conformity thereto unnecessary, and practically superfluous. Schenck v. Mercer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 4 Zab. [24 N. J. Law] 447; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Har. & J. 408; McMasters v. Westchester County Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 379; Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 404: Tayloe v. Merchants’ Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. [50 U. S. 390; O’Neil v. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co. 3 Comst. [3 N. Y.] 122; Maryland Ins. Co. v. Bathurst, 5 Gill & J. 159; Graves v. Washington Marine Ins. Co., 12 Allen, 391.
2. There was no error in that part of the charge which '■instructed the jury that the suit was not -prematurely brought. There was a provision in the policy, that the loss should be payable after sixty days from notice and the furnishing of preliminary proofs of loss to the underwriters. If the matter had gone through the formal stages provided for in the policy, and the proofs had been made, without any denial of all liability on another ground, no suit could have been sustained on the policy, until the sixty days had expired. This clause was for the protection, or convenience, of the underwriters; but, when they waived the preliminary proofs, they also waived the benefit of this stipulation, and rendered it nugatory. It would be absurd to say that they still retained the right to have sixty days within which to pay a loss which they had declared they would not -pay at any time, or under any circumstances. Columbian Ins. Co. v. Catlett, 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 383; Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Har. & J. 408; Phillips v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220.
3. We discover no error in that part of the charge in which the court submitted to the jury the question, whether or not the proximate cause of the loss for which a recovery was sought, was to be found in the fire which followed the collision. There was little or no controversy about the facts which characterized the disaster, up to the time the fire broke out. The boat was struck on her port side, forward of her wheel house, and her hull was stove in below the water line. She immediately began to fill, and, in ten or fifteen minutes after the collision, the water rose to her furnaces, and forced the fire out upon the wood-work. It made rapid progress, and soon enveloped her in flames. She continued to float for half or three-quarters of an hour, and until a considerable portion of her upper works was consumed, when she went down, bow foremost, ending completely over, and resting on the bottom, keel up. in about twenty fathoms of water. Up to the time the fire broke out, all the damage the boat had received was the wound in her side, and the injury resulting from the water, which rushed in. And here an important question of fact arose, and that was, wheth[451] er the consequences resulting from the collision alone, without the intervention of the. fire, would have gone beyond her filling, and settling in the water to her promenade deck, and there remaining suspended in the water, until she could be towed to a place of safety, her side be repaired, and the whole boat be restored to her former condition. The uncou-tradicted evidence was, that, had she so remained, suspended in the water, she could easily have been towed to a place of safety, ‘her wound repaired, and every part of the boat, including her furniture, which would have been injured by the water, restored to the condition it was in before the collision, for a sum not exceeding $15,000. The actual loss proved, however, was about $S4,000. On this point, there was no conflicting evidence. The difference between these sums is $09,-000, and this latter sum was claimed by the plaintiffs to be the amount of their loss naturally and necessarily resulting from the fire, and which, but for the fire, would not have happened. They offered evidence to show that, from the predominance of the floating over the sinking materials, in her structure and cargo, in connection with the fact that she was so housed in, from stem to stern, between her main and her upper or .promenade deck, that her cargo would have been kept in its place, although immersed' in water, her sinking was impossible, as a result of the collision merely. They also offered the testimony of eye-witnesses of the conflagration, to prove that she did actually float for half or three-quarters of an hour, and that it was not till her upper works were all on fire, and nearly consumed, by which her light freight was liberated, and enabled to float away, and her floating capacity thus greatly reduced, that she finally sank. To overcome this evidence, no proof was offered by the defendants. The court instructed the jury, that the contract upon which the plaintiffs sought to recover, was one of indemnity against loss by fire only, and that, therefore, whether her sinking was the natural and necessary result of the fire, became a vital' question; and that, if the jury found this question in the negative, the plaintiffs could not recover. This instruction was more favorable to the defendants than they had a right to demand, for it was conceded, that a considerable portion of the steamer’s upper works was actually consumed. The other injuries resulting after the fire broke out, for which the plaintiffs sought to recover, were occasioned by her sinking to the bottom. But, in order to simplify the question to the jury, they were instructed, that, if they found the boat would have finally sunk, had no fire broken out, their verdict must be for the defendants. They must, therefore, have found, by their verdict, that she would not have sunk, but for the fire, and, consequently, that all the damage which naturally resulted from the marine injury, was $15,000, and that all the rest was the natural and necessary result of the fire. This part of the charge may not have been couched in the formal and technical language of the text-writers on this branch of the law, but it distinctly presented the question, as to the proximate cause of the loss for which a recovery was claimed. The effect of the verdict, therefore, is to bring the case within the scope of the sound proposition (1 Phil. Ins. 5th Ed., p. 679; subsec. 1136; Id., 4th Ed. p. 692) that “in case of the concurrence of two causes of loss, one at the risk of the assured, and the other insured against, or one insured against by A, and the other by B, if the damage by the perils respectively can be discriminated, each party must bear his proportion.” In the case before us this was clearly done. The loss resulting from the fire was distinctly separated, by the evidence, from any loss resulting from the collision, and the jury were instructed that the plaintiffs could recover only for such loss as naturally and necessarily resulted from the former element. There was no conflict of evidence on this point, and the jury founcl no damages, except such as were chargeable to fire, as the proximate cause. It is well settled, by numerous authorities, that the proximate cause of loss is to be looked to. This rule prevails in both fire and marine insurance. Jewett, J., in Gates v. Madison County Mut. Ins. Co., 1 Seld. [5 N. Y.] 469, 478, and cases there cited.
4. The rule of damages was correctly stated, under the circumstances. The rule prescribed by the policy was the cash value of the boat just before the fire. The offer was made by the plaintiffs to prove her cash value, deducting the amount she was damaged by the collision, including all necessary consequences. To this mode the defendants objected, and the only other mode was, to ascertain what it cost to repair the damages necessarily resulting from the fire. The jury were instructed that, if the cost of the repairs exceeded the fire damage, and rendered the boat more valuable, they should • deduct the excess. Under the instructions, the plaintiffs could obtain no more than indemnity for the loss by fire. This they were entitled to.
5. The objection to the allowance of $22,-500 for raising the wreck is untenable. This was found to be the precise value of the wreck when recovered. It was in proof that it cost over $40,000 to raise it, but no more was allowed than the value of the same when raised. So much was saved from an otherwise total loss, and, as the defendants had the benefit of it, in the adjustment of the damages, they are chargeable with the necessary and reasonable cost of saving it. A new trial is, therefore, denied, on all the grounds.