PER CURIAM.
Petitioner is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Illinois. It is engaged in the business of making investments to promote the community welfare and development of the Midwest Impact Area, an area characterized by high unemployment and substantial poverty on the west side of Chicago. These investments include an industrial park, a shopping mall, a thousand bed mixed-use health care facility, property management, a broadband telecommunications system and other investments in projects to construct and rehabilitate low and moderate income housing. It also wishes to acquire a bank being organized in Illinois, the Community Bank of Lawndale. The bank was to be acquired through purchase of 90% of its shares by petitioner for $1.8 million. This sum was to come from a $2 million grant of public funds pledged to petitioner for this purpose by the Community Services Administration under Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. § 2981
et seq.).
The Community Services Administration provides much of the capital contributions used to fund petitioner’s investments.
On September 4, 1974, the Illinois Commissioner of Banks issued petitioner a permit to organize the Community Bank of Lawndale, subject to petitioner’s obtaining prior approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to become a bank holding company before issuance of a charter. Accordingly, on January 13, 1975, petitioner filed applications with the Board seeking its approval to become a bank holding company and to engage in various non-banking activities. Specifically, petitioner applied for the Board’s approval, under Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1)), for the formation of a bank holding company through acquisition of 90% of the voting shares of the Community Bank of Lawndale, the proposed new bank. Simultaneously, petitioner applied for permission for the bank holding company to continue in various community development ventures in its economically depressed area on the ground that its activities are “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto” under Section
4(c)(8) of the Act (12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)) and 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(2), the procedural implementation provision of the Board’s Regulation Y. Petitioner maintains that its activities are permissible for bank holding companies in accordance with Section 225.-4(a)(7)
of Regulation Y as interpreted by Section 225.127.
On July 25, 1975, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation told petitioner that the required deposit insurance had been approved for the proposed bank. On October 15, 1975, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago advised petitioner that the Reserve Bank had completed its processing of petitioner’s revised applications and had forwarded them to the Board of Governors in Washington. Its recommendation regarding the approval of petitioner’s application was sent to Washington on December 22, 1975. The Board asked the petitioner for additional information by letter of January 12, 1976, and the petitioner responded on January 23, 1976, referring the Board to those portions of the previously submitted materials where the requested information could be found. A notice dated January 16, 1976, was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 1976, requesting comments on the proposed holding company.
No adverse comments ensued. In particular, the Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies advised the Board on January 28, 1976, that it had no objections.
By letter of January 30,1976, to the Board, the Community Services Administration clarified its funding role, both present and future, with respect to the bank. On March 11, 1976, representatives of the petitioner met with various Board staff members in Washington, D. C., to seek immediate action oh its applications. No written material was submitted by petitioner to the Board at that meeting. By order of June 7,1976, the applications were denied by the Board. This appeal followed under 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
In pertinent part, Section 3(b) and Section 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act provide:
“In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any application for [an order under this section] within the ninety-one-day period which begins on the date of submission to the Board of the complete record on that application, the application shall be deemed to have been granted” (12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(b) and 1843(c)).
Petitioner asserts that both its applications must be deemed granted as a matter of law because the Board’s order denying the applications was not made within ninety-one days from October 15, 1975, the date of submission to the Board of the complete record on the applications. Instead, the denial occurred 232 days after October 15, 1975.
We agree with petitioner that its applications must be deemed to have been granted because the Board did not act on them within ninety-one days after the complete record was submitted. We recently so ruled in
Tri-State Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975). As we said there:
“The [91-day] limit was enacted in response to an apparent slow pace on the part of the Fed in ruling on applications. It would have no meaning if the Fed had the power to determine when the time had begun to run.”
Id.
at 566.
As we noted, it is not impossible for the Board to meet the 91-day standard.
Id.
at 567.
To avoid the application of the 91-day limitation period, the Board contends that the record was not completed until the March 11, 1976, meeting between officers of the petitioner and the Board staff. In the Board’s view, the 91-day clock was reset on March 11, 1976, making the new deadline June 9,1976.
However, it was conceded by the Board at oral argument that there were only oral discussions concerning facts already in the record at the March 11 meeting, and this is borne out by the Board’s memorandum of March 11 (Board Appendix 21a — 22a). Oral argument marshalling facts already in the Board’s possession is not itself part of the “complete record” under the 91-day limitation provisions.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Illinois. It is engaged in the business of making investments to promote the community welfare and development of the Midwest Impact Area, an area characterized by high unemployment and substantial poverty on the west side of Chicago. These investments include an industrial park, a shopping mall, a thousand bed mixed-use health care facility, property management, a broadband telecommunications system and other investments in projects to construct and rehabilitate low and moderate income housing. It also wishes to acquire a bank being organized in Illinois, the Community Bank of Lawndale. The bank was to be acquired through purchase of 90% of its shares by petitioner for $1.8 million. This sum was to come from a $2 million grant of public funds pledged to petitioner for this purpose by the Community Services Administration under Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. § 2981
et seq.).
The Community Services Administration provides much of the capital contributions used to fund petitioner’s investments.
On September 4, 1974, the Illinois Commissioner of Banks issued petitioner a permit to organize the Community Bank of Lawndale, subject to petitioner’s obtaining prior approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to become a bank holding company before issuance of a charter. Accordingly, on January 13, 1975, petitioner filed applications with the Board seeking its approval to become a bank holding company and to engage in various non-banking activities. Specifically, petitioner applied for the Board’s approval, under Section 3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1)), for the formation of a bank holding company through acquisition of 90% of the voting shares of the Community Bank of Lawndale, the proposed new bank. Simultaneously, petitioner applied for permission for the bank holding company to continue in various community development ventures in its economically depressed area on the ground that its activities are “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto” under Section
4(c)(8) of the Act (12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)) and 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(2), the procedural implementation provision of the Board’s Regulation Y. Petitioner maintains that its activities are permissible for bank holding companies in accordance with Section 225.-4(a)(7)
of Regulation Y as interpreted by Section 225.127.
On July 25, 1975, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation told petitioner that the required deposit insurance had been approved for the proposed bank. On October 15, 1975, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago advised petitioner that the Reserve Bank had completed its processing of petitioner’s revised applications and had forwarded them to the Board of Governors in Washington. Its recommendation regarding the approval of petitioner’s application was sent to Washington on December 22, 1975. The Board asked the petitioner for additional information by letter of January 12, 1976, and the petitioner responded on January 23, 1976, referring the Board to those portions of the previously submitted materials where the requested information could be found. A notice dated January 16, 1976, was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 1976, requesting comments on the proposed holding company.
No adverse comments ensued. In particular, the Illinois Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies advised the Board on January 28, 1976, that it had no objections.
By letter of January 30,1976, to the Board, the Community Services Administration clarified its funding role, both present and future, with respect to the bank. On March 11, 1976, representatives of the petitioner met with various Board staff members in Washington, D. C., to seek immediate action oh its applications. No written material was submitted by petitioner to the Board at that meeting. By order of June 7,1976, the applications were denied by the Board. This appeal followed under 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
In pertinent part, Section 3(b) and Section 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act provide:
“In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any application for [an order under this section] within the ninety-one-day period which begins on the date of submission to the Board of the complete record on that application, the application shall be deemed to have been granted” (12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(b) and 1843(c)).
Petitioner asserts that both its applications must be deemed granted as a matter of law because the Board’s order denying the applications was not made within ninety-one days from October 15, 1975, the date of submission to the Board of the complete record on the applications. Instead, the denial occurred 232 days after October 15, 1975.
We agree with petitioner that its applications must be deemed to have been granted because the Board did not act on them within ninety-one days after the complete record was submitted. We recently so ruled in
Tri-State Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
524 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1975). As we said there:
“The [91-day] limit was enacted in response to an apparent slow pace on the part of the Fed in ruling on applications. It would have no meaning if the Fed had the power to determine when the time had begun to run.”
Id.
at 566.
As we noted, it is not impossible for the Board to meet the 91-day standard.
Id.
at 567.
To avoid the application of the 91-day limitation period, the Board contends that the record was not completed until the March 11, 1976, meeting between officers of the petitioner and the Board staff. In the Board’s view, the 91-day clock was reset on March 11, 1976, making the new deadline June 9,1976.
However, it was conceded by the Board at oral argument that there were only oral discussions concerning facts already in the record at the March 11 meeting, and this is borne out by the Board’s memorandum of March 11 (Board Appendix 21a — 22a). Oral argument marshalling facts already in the Board’s possession is not itself part of the “complete record” under the 91-day limitation provisions.
Tri-State Bancorporation, Inc., supra,
524 F.2d at 566. Moreover, at the January 4 oral argument before us, the Board admitted that petitioner had advised Board personnel on March 11 that they were entering into the discussions on that date with the express understanding that the meeting would not toll the ninety-one day time limit.
We hold that to avoid the ninety-one day rule, the Board was obliged to act on the application by May 4, 1976, which was ninety-one days from the submission to the Board of the January 30, 1976, letter of the Community Services Administration responding to a telephone inquiry from the Board.
To miss the May 4, 1976, deadline, the Board relies solely on the March 11, 1976 meeting
but, as seen, there was no new submission of material for the record on that date. Since “all factual data from external sources necessary for the decision [had] been actually submitted to the Fed” by January 30, 1976, under
Tri-State Bancorporation, supra,
524 F.2d at 567, the 91-day period expired on May 4, 1976. Because the Board did not act on these applications until June 7, 1976, its order must be set aside and the applications must be granted as a matter of law. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of the controversy.
By letter of December 23,1976, the Board called our attention to
First Lincolnwood Corporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
546 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1976).
However, the ninety-one day period did not run there because the Board acted on January 9, 1976, “well within [the] ninety-one days of the last submission to it by First Lincolnwood on November 8, 1975, of the third quarter financial statements of the Bank” (546 F.2d at 721). Instead of departing from
Tri-State
in
First Lincoln-wood,
we expressed accord with the
TriState
holding that “the ninety-one day period does not start to run until the final material needed for the Board’s decision is received from various interested sources outside the Board”
(Id.).
As seen, the final material needed for the Board’s decision here was received on February 2 or 4, 1976 (note 6
supra),
so that the Board’s June 7, 1976, order came too late.
The Board also relies on
Blackstone Valley National Bank v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
537 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1976). However, the holding there was merely that in order to invoke the ninety-one day rule as a “party aggrieved” by denial of an application for a bank holding company to acquire a bank under 12 U.S.C. § 1842, a bank in Blackstone’s position must first have participated in the application proceedings before the Board. No such standing problem is presented here. Moreover, apart from
jus tertii
considerations, the applicant in
Blackstone
may have waived its rights under the 91-day statute since it did not raise the issue itself.
This decision will not wreak any havoc at the Board because after
Tri-State
it has been changing its procedures for processing applications. Also, the public interest will not be put at an undue risk. As we noted in
Tri-State,
since 1974 the Board has had the power to subject bank holding companies to continuing supervision under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3). See 524 F.2d at 567. In addition, we were advised by Board counsel that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the State of Illinois can supervise the new bank and apparently, if necessary, respectively revoke approval and permit, whether or not the Board can do so.
The order of June '7, 1976, is vacated and set aside and the applications of petitioner are deemed granted as a matter of law.