North Carolina Railroad v. Commissioners of Alamance

91 N.C. 454
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedOctober 5, 1884
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 91 N.C. 454 (North Carolina Railroad v. Commissioners of Alamance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
North Carolina Railroad v. Commissioners of Alamance, 91 N.C. 454 (N.C. 1884).

Opinion

Smith, C. J.

Among the several paragraphs in section 8, chapter 117 of the acts of 1881, enumerating the several subjects of taxation, is the following:

6. Shares in national, state and private banks, railroad, telegraph, canal, bridge or other incorporated or joint stock association, with their true value, and the cashier of each bank or banking association (whether state or national) shall give in to the list-taker for the township in which such bank or banking association is situated, all shares of stock composing their corporation, as agent for and in the name of the owners of said shares of stock, who may be non-residents of this state, and the treasurer of each railroad or other incorporated company shall in like manner list the shares of non-resident holders.

In the concluding clause, amended by the act of 1883, ch. 363, § 8, to remove the obscurity pointed out in Railroad v. Commissioners of Wake, 87 N. C., 426, it is provided that “ stockholders in valuing their shares may deduct their ratable proportion of the value of taxable property, the tax whereof is paid by the corporation.

Section 3 of the act is in these words: Every person required to list property shall make out and deliver to the township list taker a statement, verified by his oath, of all the real and personal property, moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stock, joint-stock companies, annuities or other *456 wise, in his possession or under his control on the first day of June, either as owner or holder thereof, or as parent, husband, guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, accounting officer, partner, agent, factor or otherwise.

The power of taxation is conferred in section three, article five of the constitution, which directs that “laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in stocks, joint-stock companies or otherwise, and also all real and personal property, according to its true value in money; and further authorizes a tax on “ trades, professions, franchises and incomes,” but not on incomes derived from property that is already taxed.

The constitution evidently contemplates the imposition of taxes upon moneys, credits and investments in corporate stocks, as well as upon other forms of property thatare within the jurisdiction of the state and subject to its power.

“Credit” is a term attaching to the creditor and designates property possessed by him in contra-distinction to the correlative word “ debt,” which has reference to the debtor and a personal obligation resting upon him. The indebtedness is made liable to taxation, as following the person to whom it is due, at his domicil, while it cannot be reached at the domicil of the debtor if the person to whom it is owing be not a resident. This is the import of the constitutional provision and is recognized .and enforced as a correct principle in The State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall., 300, by the supreme court of the United States. In that case"FiELD, J., delivering the opinion, says : “ Corporations may be taxed like natural persons upon their property and business. But debts owing by corporations, like debts owing by individuals, are not property of the debtors in any sense. They are obligations of the debtors and only possess value in the hands of the creditors. With them they are property and in their hands may be taxed. To call debts property of the debtor is simply to misuse terms. All the property *457 there can be in the nature of things, the debts of corporations belongs to the creditors to- whom they are payable, and follows their domicil wherever that may be. Their debts can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due. *********

The bonds issued by the railroad company in this case are undoubtedly property, but property in the hands of the holders, not property of the obligors. So far as they are held by non-residents of the state, they are property beyond the jurisdiction of the state.”

The court declared that the act directing the company to withhold 5 per cent, of the interest and pay it as a tax into the state treasury impaired the obligation of the contract and was repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Four of the judges dissented as to this last conclusion, and were of opinion that the case was one of state law only and involved no federal element.

In Tappan v. Mer. Nat. Bank, 19 Wall., 490, the Chief Justice declares that the power of taxation by any state is limited to persons, property or business within its jurisdiction.

The same proposition in regard to the situs of the debt, as determined by the creditor’s domicil, for the purpose of taxation, is agaih affirmed in Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. Rep., 491, reviewed upon a writ of error to the supreme court of Connecticut, where the case was decided in a similar way, 42 Conn., 436. See Feresman v. Byrons, 68 Ill., 247; Burroughs Taxation, §41 and 42; Cooley Taxation, 15, 63, 134, 270.

Assuming this to be the law, and that the credit, in opposition to the debt, terms which denote the relations "between the parties to whom and from whom the debt is owing, except in cases where the indebtedness consists in notes, bonds or other securities which are in the hands of an agent and are, therefore, like visible personal property, having a situs of its own for purposes of taxation, as held in *458 Redmond v. Commissioners, 87 N. C., 122, must be taxed where th'e owner has his. domicil, we proceed to inquire whether the principle extends to shares of stock, as a distinct form of property, held by non-residents in corporations formed under our laws and doing business in the state.

There can be no question as to the liability of the corporate body to the full measure of taxation to which an individual resident is subject. All of its property, inclusive of its franchise, which (if owned by a citizen could be), may be made to bear its portion of the public burdens by an ad valorem assessment, unless protected by some contract of exemption entered into by the state. So a tax may be imposed, measured by the value of the stock which represents the corporate property, upon the corporation, and it be compelled to pay it. Thus, unrestrained by an ad valorem rule, it was decided that a tax on bank stock or stock in any moneyed corporation of loan and discount, of fifty cents on each share of one hundred dollars held therein, is a valid exercise of • the taxing power possessed by the general assembly of Kentucky. Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall., 353. The tax, though affecting alike the interest of the resident and non-resident stockholders, as does any exaction diminish the resources of the company, is‘a legitimate burden put upon it in common with other property owners of the state. “ The tax is,” as Mr. Justice Miller observes, “ a tax upon the shares of the stockholder,” but it is nevertheless a tax upon the corporation, the amount of which is. ascertained by the number of shares upon each of which is imposed a specific sum to be paid by it.

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Bluebook (online)
91 N.C. 454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-carolina-railroad-v-commissioners-of-alamance-nc-1884.