Belo v. Commissioners of Forsyth County

82 N.C. 415
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJanuary 5, 1880
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 82 N.C. 415 (Belo v. Commissioners of Forsyth County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belo v. Commissioners of Forsyth County, 82 N.C. 415 (N.C. 1880).

Opinion

Smith, C. J.

The plaintiff is the owner of three hundred and forty-five shares of the capital stock of the North Carolina railroad company, which have been assessed and charged with an ad valorem tax in the manner prescribed by law, and the tax list has been made out and delivered to the defendant, Hill, the sheriff of Forsyth, for collection. This suit is instituted to restrain him and the county com *416 missioners from levying and collecting the tax, on the ground of alleged exemption under the charter of the company, and for the further reason that all proper taxes upon the taxable property of the company are paid by the company.

It is conceded that the franchise and property of the company have been leased to the Richmond & Danville railroad company at an annual rent of two hundred and sixty thousand dollars, or six anda half per centum per annum upon the par value of the stock; that no dividends or distribution of profits has been made among the shareholders in excess of six per cent, and the half per cent has been appropriated to the payment of salaries and other necessary expenses of the lessor corporation, and the interest, and in reduction of the principal of its debt. Upon these admitted facts, a perpetual injunction was awarded and the defendants appeal.

The clause in the amended charter of the company which, it is claimed, protects the plaintiff from the demand of any tax upon his stock, is in these words : “ That all real estate held by said company for right of way, for station places of whatever kind and for work-shop location shall be exempt from taxation until the dividends or profits of said company shall exceed six per centum per annum.” Acts 1854-55, ch 32, § 5.

This section has received an authoritative interpretation in the R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Com’rs of Alamance, 76 N. C., 212, and is thus explained by Bynum, J.: “ It is clear that the real estate which the company may own, is not exempt, but such only as may be held by the company for the right of way, for station houses and for work-shop location. Real estate held and used for other purposes is not exempt from taxation. The exemption is coupled with a condition, and that condition equally attaches to each of the three purposes described in the act. Land held for the right of way *417 is exempted for that use only; that held for station places; must be applied to that purpose; and that held for workshop location can be applied to no other uses than for workshops. Otherwise, in each case the land so held becomes liable to taxation as other property.” N. C. R. R. Co. v. Com’rs of Alamance, 77 N. C., 4.

Upon a statement of the facts essentially the same as. those now before us, it has been held that the immunity conferred remains unimpaired. R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Brogen, 74 N. C. 707.

It is also settled that the franchise of the company and its property outside the exemption are liable as distinct subjects of taxation. R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Brogden, supra. W., C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Com’rs of Brunswick, 72 N. C., 10; Bridge Co. v. Com’rs of New Hanover, Id., 15.

The only question then for us to consider is this: As all* the property of the company, real and personal, is either given in for taxation and the taxes thereon paid by the company, or is exempt under the act, can the shares in the-hands of the stockholders be also assessed and charged as; an independent subject of taxation? The question is-scarcely open to debate, and we shall only refer to some among the many authorities sustaining the affirmative of.' the proposition.

In Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. (U. S.) 133, Mr. Justice WayNE thus expresses himself: “The franchise is their'corporate property, which like any other property, would be taxable, if a price had not been paid for it,. The capital stock is another property, corporately associated; for the purpose of banking, but in its parts, is the individual property of the stockholders, in the proportion they may own them; and being their individual property, they maybe taxed for it as they may for any other property they may own. * * * A franchise for banking is, in every state in the Union, recognized as property. The banking capi *418 tal attached to (he franchise is another property, owned in its parts by persons, corporate or natural, for which they are -•liable to'be taxed, as they are for all other property, for the' support of government.”

In an able opinion of the author of that valuable work on railways, commenting on the law, he says: “ We here >find the clear recognition of this kind of corporate property, taxable to the corporation, and the shares in the hands of the corporators, distinctly defined as a fourth species of corporate property, taxable only to the owners or holders. 1. The capital stock; 2. The corporate property; 3. The franchise of the corporation, all of which is taxable to the corporation and the-shares in the capital stock which are taxable only to the shareholders.” 1 Red. Am. R. Cases, 497.

A tax on the shares of stockholders in a corporation is a different thing from a tax on the corporation itself, or its stock, and may be laid irrespective of any taxation of the corporation where no contract .relations forbid it. Cooley Const. Lim., 169. Field on Corp., 521.

A share of stock in a corporation is personal estate and 4s taxable to the owner thereof, as other personal estate, at 'the place of his residence. Burroughs Taxation, § 90.

Stock in a corporation is in the nature of a chose in action. It has no locality and of necessity follows the person of the owner. The tax upon it is in the nature of a tax upon income which of necessity is confined to the person of the owner. 1 Potter’s Law Corp., § 192.

In Massachusetts it has been decided under a statute of "that state that a citizen may.be taxed for his stock in a turnpike company in another state. Great Barrington v. Com'rs of Berkshire, 16 Pick., 572.

In Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall., 573, it is held that shares in a National bank may be taxed to the holder, although the whole capital is invested in securities of the *419 national government, which an act of congress declares to be exempt from taxation by state authority.

These references are sufficient to shew that shares of stock in an incorporated company may be taxed as a distinct species of property, belonging to the holder., independently of the taxation imposed upon the value of the franchise and upon the real and personal estate of the corporation itself.

Has the legislature exercised its power to tax the plaintiff’s stock upon its assessed value, and thus secured the uniformity prescribed in the constitution ?

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Bluebook (online)
82 N.C. 415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belo-v-commissioners-of-forsyth-county-nc-1880.