North Carolina Ex Rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority

593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20015, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4427, 2009 WL 77998
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedJanuary 13, 2009
DocketCivil 1:06CV20
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 593 F. Supp. 2d 812 (North Carolina Ex Rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
North Carolina Ex Rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20015, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4427, 2009 WL 77998 (W.D.N.C. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

LACY H. THORNBURG, District Judge.

THIS MATTER came on for trial before the Court without a jury. The Court now enters its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment in this matter.

*815 I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff North Carolina, on behalf of its citizens, filed the instant action in public nuisance against Defendant Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in January 2006. The complaint cites urgent environmental concerns in this state, allegedly caused by air pollution emitted by TVA’s coal-fired power plants in other states. North Carolina contends, and TVA denies, that airborne particles from TVA’s electricity generating plants enter North Carolina in unreasonable amounts, thereby threatening the health of millions of people, the financial viability of an entire region, and the beauty and purity of a vast natural ecosystem. North Carolina further alleges, and TVA denies, that TVA’s air pollution costs the state government and its citizens billions of dollars every year in health care expenses, sick days, and lost tourism revenue; and that there are also less quantifiable costs to be considered, stemming from the loss of human, animal, and plant life and irreversible environmental damage in protected wilderness areas.

TVA does not deny that some of its emissions enter North Carolina, but disputes the amount of such emissions and suggests that the adverse environmental effects experienced by North Carolina are largely attributable to this state’s own electric utilities and other industrial sources, or to private sources such as automobile and truck emissions. Further, as evidence that TVA is acting reasonably, TVA cites its millions of customers’ undeniable need for — and expectation of — reliable, inexpensive sources of energy, deployed to serve the homes and businesses of the rapidly growing population in the southeastern United States. Finally, TVA points to its own efforts to reduce its plants’ emissions, as further evidence that those TVA emissions which do enter North Carolina do not do so in unreasonable amounts.

The parties do agree on one thing: the pollution controls that North Carolina contends are necessary to abate TVA’s alleged public nuisance are very costly. North Carolina’s experts contend the relief it seeks would cost $3 billion. TVA’s experts put that figure at $5 billion. TVA’s customers, spread throughout seven states (including North Carolina itself), would inevitably bear the vast majority of such costs.

The ancient common law of public nuisance is not ordinarily the means by which such major conflicts among governmental entities are resolved in modern American governance. Instead, the federal executive branch (through its arm, the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA) has traditionally been the chief arbiter of interstate air pollution concerns. The executive branch’s authority to govern in this arena dates to at least 1955, when Congress passed clean air legislation directing the Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to work with state and local authorities in mitigating “the dangers to public health and welfare, injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation from air pollution.” Act of July. 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 360-159, 69 Stat. 322, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.). This brief statute, the genesis of the modern Clean Air Act (CAA), has since evolved into an elaborate scheme of regulation and administrative review intended as “a lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major social issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 848, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

*816 Indeed, even in the present dispute, North Carolina began its pursuit of relief by utilizing the normal administrative channels established by the CAA. See North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 905 (D.C.Cir.2008) (per curiam); Rulemaking on Section 126 Petition from North Carolina to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 71 Fed.Reg. 25,328 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Apr. 28, 2006). Although the administrative route has certainly borne some interesting fruit, 1 it has not, thus far, resulted in the reduction of emissions from upwind, out-of-state sources that North Carolina is ultimately seeking. 2

North Carolina now turns to the federal courts as the final source of relief in its efforts to curb the out-of-state air pollution which the state believes clouds its scenic vistas, poisons its wildlife, and sickens its people. The undersigned has previously held that the CAA’s comprehensive scheme for the adjudication of interstate pollution disputes does not impair the inherent equitable powers of this Court to address North Carolina’s concerns. See North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.Supp.2d 725, 729 (2008) (discussing CAA savings clause, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e), which permits actions to abate air pollution pursuant to state law doctrines, such as public nuisance). Indeed, the judiciary. has always played a significant role in the abatement of public nuisances, particularly when such lawsuits are brought by the United States or by sovereign states. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 603-05, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (listing and discussing parens patriae cases involving suits to enjoin public nuisance). See generally Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 1701, *817 1756-62 (2008) (discussing the relaxed standing requirements for parens patriae suits by states seeking to enjoin public nuisance). This is partly because of “the extraordinary weight courts of equity place upon the public interests in a suit involving more than a mere private dispute, and ... the deference courts afford the political branches in identifying and protecting the public interest.” United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1359 (5th Cir.1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 60-61, 80 S.Ct. 177, 4 L.Ed.2d 169 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the judiciary’s historic use of equity powers, at the request of a sovereign, to enjoin activity found to be a public nuisance).

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593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20015, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4427, 2009 WL 77998, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/north-carolina-ex-rel-cooper-v-tennessee-valley-authority-ncwd-2009.