In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 23–0217
Submitted September 11, 2024—Filed October 11, 2024
Bryan Norris,
Appellee,
vs.
Trudy Paulson,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, judge.
The plaintiff seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing
the district court’s denial of summary judgment on constitutional tort claims
premised on the subsequently decided case of Burnett v. Smith. Decision of
Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; District Court
Judgment Affirmed.
Per curiam.
John O. Haraldson, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellant.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West
Des Moines, for appellee. 2
Bryan Norris sued the City of Des Moines and one of its police officers,
Trudy Paulson, after Paulson shot Norris in the arm and the abdomen on
September 12, 2019, during an interaction at a homeless camp along the
Raccoon River. Norris asserted two claims against Paulson: a claim for
unreasonable seizure under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution premised
on excessive force and a common law assault claim. He also asserted an article
I, section 8 claim against the City premised on vicarious liability and failure to
train or supervise Paulson.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court denied on December 29, 2022. The court identified material issues of fact
concerning whether Paulson’s actions were protected by qualified immunity
under Iowa Code chapter 670 (2022) and whether they were justified, thereby
providing a defense to the common law assault claim. See Iowa Code § 804.8(1)
(2019) (“A peace officer, while making a lawful arrest, is justified in the use of
any force which the peace officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the
arrest or to defend any person from bodily harm while making the arrest.”).
Paulson filed an application for interlocutory appeal. She asserted that
Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022), enacted in June 2021 and directing that “[a]ny
decision by the district court denying qualified immunity shall be immediately
appealable,” applied retroactively and entitled her to an interlocutory appeal as
a matter of right. Even without that statutory provision, Paulson argued that the
district court misconstrued the due care protection provided under Iowa Code
§ 670.4(1)(c) (2019), which supported discretionary interlocutory review under
Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.104(1). We granted Paulson’s application on
April 5, 2023, ultimately transferring the appeal to the court of appeals. 3
In the meantime, we decided Burnett v. Smith, where we overruled Godfrey
v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), and held that “we no longer recognize a
standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution
unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of
a provision of the Iowa Constitution.” 990 N.W.2d 289, 307 (Iowa 2023). When
she filed her opening brief in the interlocutory appeal, Paulson changed the
issues. Paulson no longer based her interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity.
Instead, she argued that our intervening Burnett decision required vacating the
district court’s denial of summary judgment on Norris’s constitutional claims.
She also challenged the standard the district court applied to her justification
defense for the assault claim.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the common law assault
claim. However, it agreed with Paulson that Burnett precluded Norris’s
constitutional claims, and it reversed and remanded for dismissal of those
counts. We granted Norris’s application for further review.
With respect to Paulson’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment on
Norris’s common law assault claim, on further review we “let the court of appeals
decision stand as the final decision.” Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135
(Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019)). We
address only Paulson’s argument that the district court’s denial of her summary
judgment motion on the constitutional claims must be reversed in the wake of
Burnett.
Relying on some of our post-Burnett cases, see, e.g., Venckus v. City of
Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2023); White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647
(Iowa 2023); Carter v. State, No. 21–0909, 2023 WL 3397451 (Iowa May 12, 2023) 4
(per curiam), the court of appeals rejected Norris’s argument that error
preservation principles prevented the court from addressing Paulson’s new
argument on appeal premised on Burnett. In each of those cases, the district
court had dismissed the constitutional claims, either on the basis that the
constitutional provision at issue was not self-executing, see Venckus, 990
N.W.2d at 807 (noting that the district court granted summary judgment on
Venckus’s constitutional claims after concluding Godfrey claims were not
“available against municipalities” or their employees and that article I, section 1
was not self-executing); White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (“The district court held that
article I, sections 1 and 8 were not self-executing and could not support claims
for monetary relief.”), or for failure to state a claim, see Carter, 2023 WL
3397451, at *1. We affirmed those dismissals “[f]or the reasons stated in
Burnett.” Venckus, 990 N.W.2d at 812; see also White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (same);
Carter, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (same).
Unlike those cases, this appeal seeks interlocutory review of the district
court’s denial of Paulson’s request to dismiss the constitutional claims. Further,
the interlocutory review was granted—at least in part—based on Paulson’s
claimed entitlement to a statutory right of appeal from “[a]ny decision by the
district court denying qualified immunity” under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022).
This case is more like our recent decision in Thorington v. Scott County, where
we held that the automatic interlocutory appeal provision in Iowa Code
§ 670.4A(4) did not apply retroactively to conduct that predated its enactment.
No. 22–1194, 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (Iowa Mar. 1, 2024) (per curiam). As in
Thorington, Paulson was not entitled to this interlocutory appeal as a matter of
right under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4). 5
Also as in Thorington, this case will continue in district court, and it is
better to allow that court to decide the course of the constitutional claims in the
first instance. See 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (“[W]e decline to decide (or to direct
the district court how to decide) other requests for relief by the parties in this
appeal that have not been presented to the district court, including the
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In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 23–0217
Submitted September 11, 2024—Filed October 11, 2024
Bryan Norris,
Appellee,
vs.
Trudy Paulson,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, judge.
The plaintiff seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing
the district court’s denial of summary judgment on constitutional tort claims
premised on the subsequently decided case of Burnett v. Smith. Decision of
Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; District Court
Judgment Affirmed.
Per curiam.
John O. Haraldson, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellant.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West
Des Moines, for appellee. 2
Bryan Norris sued the City of Des Moines and one of its police officers,
Trudy Paulson, after Paulson shot Norris in the arm and the abdomen on
September 12, 2019, during an interaction at a homeless camp along the
Raccoon River. Norris asserted two claims against Paulson: a claim for
unreasonable seizure under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution premised
on excessive force and a common law assault claim. He also asserted an article
I, section 8 claim against the City premised on vicarious liability and failure to
train or supervise Paulson.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court denied on December 29, 2022. The court identified material issues of fact
concerning whether Paulson’s actions were protected by qualified immunity
under Iowa Code chapter 670 (2022) and whether they were justified, thereby
providing a defense to the common law assault claim. See Iowa Code § 804.8(1)
(2019) (“A peace officer, while making a lawful arrest, is justified in the use of
any force which the peace officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the
arrest or to defend any person from bodily harm while making the arrest.”).
Paulson filed an application for interlocutory appeal. She asserted that
Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022), enacted in June 2021 and directing that “[a]ny
decision by the district court denying qualified immunity shall be immediately
appealable,” applied retroactively and entitled her to an interlocutory appeal as
a matter of right. Even without that statutory provision, Paulson argued that the
district court misconstrued the due care protection provided under Iowa Code
§ 670.4(1)(c) (2019), which supported discretionary interlocutory review under
Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.104(1). We granted Paulson’s application on
April 5, 2023, ultimately transferring the appeal to the court of appeals. 3
In the meantime, we decided Burnett v. Smith, where we overruled Godfrey
v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), and held that “we no longer recognize a
standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution
unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of
a provision of the Iowa Constitution.” 990 N.W.2d 289, 307 (Iowa 2023). When
she filed her opening brief in the interlocutory appeal, Paulson changed the
issues. Paulson no longer based her interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity.
Instead, she argued that our intervening Burnett decision required vacating the
district court’s denial of summary judgment on Norris’s constitutional claims.
She also challenged the standard the district court applied to her justification
defense for the assault claim.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the common law assault
claim. However, it agreed with Paulson that Burnett precluded Norris’s
constitutional claims, and it reversed and remanded for dismissal of those
counts. We granted Norris’s application for further review.
With respect to Paulson’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment on
Norris’s common law assault claim, on further review we “let the court of appeals
decision stand as the final decision.” Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135
(Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019)). We
address only Paulson’s argument that the district court’s denial of her summary
judgment motion on the constitutional claims must be reversed in the wake of
Burnett.
Relying on some of our post-Burnett cases, see, e.g., Venckus v. City of
Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2023); White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647
(Iowa 2023); Carter v. State, No. 21–0909, 2023 WL 3397451 (Iowa May 12, 2023) 4
(per curiam), the court of appeals rejected Norris’s argument that error
preservation principles prevented the court from addressing Paulson’s new
argument on appeal premised on Burnett. In each of those cases, the district
court had dismissed the constitutional claims, either on the basis that the
constitutional provision at issue was not self-executing, see Venckus, 990
N.W.2d at 807 (noting that the district court granted summary judgment on
Venckus’s constitutional claims after concluding Godfrey claims were not
“available against municipalities” or their employees and that article I, section 1
was not self-executing); White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (“The district court held that
article I, sections 1 and 8 were not self-executing and could not support claims
for monetary relief.”), or for failure to state a claim, see Carter, 2023 WL
3397451, at *1. We affirmed those dismissals “[f]or the reasons stated in
Burnett.” Venckus, 990 N.W.2d at 812; see also White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (same);
Carter, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (same).
Unlike those cases, this appeal seeks interlocutory review of the district
court’s denial of Paulson’s request to dismiss the constitutional claims. Further,
the interlocutory review was granted—at least in part—based on Paulson’s
claimed entitlement to a statutory right of appeal from “[a]ny decision by the
district court denying qualified immunity” under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022).
This case is more like our recent decision in Thorington v. Scott County, where
we held that the automatic interlocutory appeal provision in Iowa Code
§ 670.4A(4) did not apply retroactively to conduct that predated its enactment.
No. 22–1194, 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (Iowa Mar. 1, 2024) (per curiam). As in
Thorington, Paulson was not entitled to this interlocutory appeal as a matter of
right under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4). 5
Also as in Thorington, this case will continue in district court, and it is
better to allow that court to decide the course of the constitutional claims in the
first instance. See 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (“[W]e decline to decide (or to direct
the district court how to decide) other requests for relief by the parties in this
appeal that have not been presented to the district court, including the
application of the holding in Burnett.”). Our error preservation rules normally do
not allow us to reverse the district court on an issue not decided by it—
particularly if the issue was not even presented to that court. See Lee v. State,
815 N.W.2d 731, 740 (Iowa 2012) (declining to address an issue on appeal
“because it was not presented to or ruled upon by the district court”); cf. Meier
v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 540 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (“A prevailing party may
support the district court judgment on any ground contained in the record,
provided that the affirmance on that ground does not alter the rights of the
parties established in the judgment.” (emphasis added)); cf. also State v. Maxwell,
743 N.W.2d 185, 192–93 (Iowa 2008) (recognizing our obligation “to affirm an
appeal where any proper basis appears for a trial court’s ruling, even though it
is not one upon which the court based its holding” but explaining we will apply
that rule only to evidentiary issues, not substantive or procedural issues, “if the
parties did not raise the issue in the district court” (quoting Citizens First Nat’l
Bank v. Hoyt, 297 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1980) (en banc))).
Paulson presents no other basis on appeal for overruling the district
court’s denial of summary judgment on Norris’s constitutional claims. The
district court’s order denying summary judgment is therefore affirmed.
Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part;
District Court Judgment Affirmed.
This opinion shall not be published.