Norman v. United States

392 F.2d 255, 183 Ct. Cl. 41
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 15, 1968
DocketNo. 295-62; No. 321-62; No. 336-62; No. 256-64; No. 351-64; No. 313-64
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 392 F.2d 255 (Norman v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norman v. United States, 392 F.2d 255, 183 Ct. Cl. 41 (cc 1968).

Opinion

Durfee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Each of the plaintiffs herein seeks to recover the difference between the active duty pay he would have received as an [44]*44officer in the Air Force if be bad not been retired early under tbe provisions of the so-called White Charger Act and the retired pay he has received since the date of his retirement under that Act. We conclude that none of the plaintiffs is entitled to recover.

The “White Charger Act”1 derived its name from an observation that this legislation went through Congress “like a White Charger.” The Act permitted early mandatory retirement of not to exceed 20 percent of officers in the military service in the grade of permanent colonel and an unlimited number of permanent colonels with 20 years or more of service who had been considered for promotion twice, but not recommended.

The Act took initial form in Senate Bill S. 1795 which was the outgrowth of proposed legislation submitted by the Secretary of Defense who explained its purpose to the Congress on April 20,1959:

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to enable the Armed Forces to meet more effectively the objective of a Regular officer corps of the highest quality in all ranks by (1) more closely relating the retention of officers after 20 years of service who are serving in the permanent grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel, commander and captain to the requirements of the services, including the degree of contribution or productivity of the officer and the needs of the services rather than solely to a “guaranteed” number of years of service; (2) according increased recognition and incentive for outstanding ability and competence; * * * and (4) expediting the separation from the service of officers who have been twice deferred from permanent promotion. [Emphasis supplied]
‡ ‡ ‡
It is emphasized that the present legislation is not intended to cause, and will not be used for, the involuntary removal of Regular officers from the active list solely because of a reduction in the actual or authorized personnel strength of the service concerned. Rather it is intended that the removal of Regular officers from the active list will continue to be authorized only for the reasons and under the procedures and limitations now [45]*45provided by law for such removal and as further 'provided by the proposed legislation. [Emphasis supplied]

The need “to meet more effectively the objective of a Regular officer corps of the highest quality in all ranks” arose from the sudden expansion of the Regular officer corps in World War II, and again during the Korean War. The law as finally enacted was limited to the Army and the Air Force, but the principal problem of quality of service by senior officers resulted mainly from the rapid expansion in the number of Air Force officers during wartime. For example, the Regular Air Force officer corps was increased from 1,400 at the time of our entry into World War II to 23,000 after World War II and to 69,000 in 1956 after the hostilities in Korea.

As a result of this expansion, many officers were promoted rapidly for the purpose of staffing the increased number of higher grade positions. Some officers were promoted to the grade of colonel in the Air Force with 12 or 13 years of service, 10 years before they would have reached that grade in the Army or Navy. As a consequence of this rapid promotion, however, these Air Force senior officers faced many years of service in their attained rank with severely limited prospects of further promotion.

Under the Officer Personnel Act of 19412 lieutenant colonels could expect to continue in active service until they had completed 28 years of service (61 Stat. 905); this same expectation of continued service for colonels was until completion of 30 years of service (61 Stat. 904). During the middle of the 1950’s responsible officials of the Air Force became concerned as to the quality of service of some of these senior officers in view of new and increasing requirements, and the fact that the existing law provided a sanctuary in long continued active service in grade for them.

Mandatory elimination by separation or retirement of deferred officers of the Army in junior grades who failed of selection for promotion, was provided by this Act of 1947. However, the only method for the elimination of officers of the grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel was for demon[46]*46strated deficiency in performance of such, degree as to warrant elimination through show cause procedures, which had been largely ineffective. When used, this method had the colorable effect of stigmatizing subject officers. In April, 1956, the Deputy Chief of Personnel of the Air Force, in reviewing this problem, stated:

The 1946 and 1947 integration program increased the Eegular Officer corps to 17,500. * * *
As a result, the age and experience of 12,000 of our Eegular officers is concentrated in the five year bracket of officers commissioned from 1941 through 1945.
‡ ‡ *
With as many of our regular officers concentrated in this five year group, and with only a limited number of spaces available for promotion to permanent colonel, junior officers of this group would be mandatorily retired as lieutenant colonel without ever competing for promotion to permanent colonel.
In light of this, a plan was developed in 1953 and has been in use since 1955 which will assure every Eegular Air Force Officer at least two opportunities for permanent promotion to colonel before he is mandatorily retired.
‡ ‡ ‡
Since the great majority of the eligible officers are all well qualified for promotion, the board, soon realizes that in reality, they are selecting the best of the best qualified.
In this situation non-selection reflects in no way upon the indwid/ual qualifications of the officers concerned or the Air Force’s continued reliance on and the need for their services. [Emphasis supplied]

All of the foregoing considerations were included in the Eeport to the Secretary of Defense by an advisory group known as the Cordiner Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation in 1957. This Committee noted “the Military Manpower Problem” as follows:

The modern military manpower problem, reduced to its simplest terms, is one of quality rather than quantity. It is not merely a matter of the total number of people [47]*47on band, but is much more a matter of the level of competence, skill and experience of those people.
❖ íjs # Hí
(8) As retention of quality military personnel improves, revitalize existing personnel controls and institute new controls to accomplish the following:
$ $ ‡ ‡
A stiffening of the criteria of selection for promotion and retention to insure the retention and advancement in all grades of only the highly qualified.
* * * *

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392 F.2d 255, 183 Ct. Cl. 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norman-v-united-states-cc-1968.