Norman Christian Wolfe, Jr. v. United States

256 F.2d 434, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4351

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 1958
• Docket: 13377_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by a Jehovah’s Witness from a judgment of conviction and a sentence thereon of three years’ imprisonment upon his conviction on an information charging that, after he had been duly and regularly notified by a designated local board in Michigan to report for civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest, he reported at the North-ville State Hospital in Michigan but wil-fully refused to obey the order and accept such civilian work in accordance with Section 1660 of Selective Service Rules and Regulations of 1948, as amended, and in violation of Sections 456(j) and 462(a), U.S.C.A., Title 50, Appendix.

In a painstaking opinion dealing with all the material arguments advanced by the attorney for appellant, the district judge denied a motion for acquittal and held the defendant-appellant guilty as charged in the information. He properly applied the opinion of this court in Row-ton v. United States, 6 Cir., 229 F.2d 421, in which we held that the failure of a local Selective Service Board to post the names of advisors to registrants in the board’s office, as required by regulations, did not prejudice nor deny procedural due process to three persons who, upon classification as conscientious objectors, had refused to do civilian work of national importance in lieu of induction into the armed forces, the three appellants having been afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to present claims of exemption based upon ministerial status as Jehovah’s Witnesses.

We think the opinion of the district court has made it abundantly clear that the local board in this case properly classified the defendant 1-0. In Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396, 74 S.Ct. 152, 157, 98 L.Ed. 132, the Supreme Court said: “If the facts are disputed the board bears the ultimate responsibility for resolving the conflict — the courts will not interfere. Nor will the courts apply a test of ‘substantial evidence.’ ” Of course, as was well pointed out by the district judge, the court held in the Dickinson case that there was no basis in fact for the board’s refusal to give the defendant a 4-D classification, because of the facts involved; but the facts in the instant case do not correspond to those in the Dickinson case.

Under the circumstances confronted here, thoroughly developed in the opinion of District Judge Freeman, it is apparent that neither the local board, nor the appeal board, nor the presidential board acted without basis in fact, or arbitrarily, or capriciously, or contrary to law, in refusing to grant the appellant here a 4-D ministerial classification. The district court demonstrated in its opinion that no other ground urged by appellant in the district court and repeated here was meritorious.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.