Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Jacobs

549 F. Supp. 2d 990, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37614, 2008 WL 1932576
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedMay 5, 2008
Docket3:05 CV 7304
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 549 F. Supp. 2d 990 (Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Jacobs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. 2d 990, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37614, 2008 WL 1932576 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KATZ, District Judge.

I. Background

This case arises out of a contractual relationship between Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”), Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”), and James R. Jacobs (or “James Jacobs”) d/b/a J-Star Consolidated, J-Star Consolidated, Inc., and Jacobs Industries, Inc. (corporations collectively referred to as “Jacobs”) relating to certain property located in Lucas County, commonly referred to as Airline Yard (or “the Property”).

Conrail (Norfolk Southern’s predecessor-in-interest to the Property) had a contract with Chrysler Corporation (“Chrysler”) to provide interstate transport services to Chrysler for its eastbound new vehicle production from its Toledo, Ohio Jeep plant. At that time, Conrail did not have Chrysler’s origin (local) switching and vehicle transloading business. This work was being performed by the Ann Arbor Railroad at its facility in north Toledo.

In 1995, Conrail entered into business discussions with Jacobs. McNeil Depo. at 38; J. Jacobs Depo. at 24-25; 30-31. Conrail, seeking to avoid the capital expense of developing an automobile trans-loading facility, planned to have Jacobs, at its cost, construct an automobile transload-ing facility at Conrail’s Airline Yard, which became the Toledo Automotive Terminal. McNeil Depo. at 43. Jacobs would then provide vehicle transloading services and would be compensated on a per-vehicle basis for such services.

The compensation rate was to be set at an above-market price that would allow Jacobs, over time, to recover development expenses. McNeil Depo. at 43, 69-70. To effectuate their agreement, Jacobs and Conrail entered into two contracts drafted by Conrail: a Property Lease dated October 16, 1995 (“Lease”), and a General Service Contract dated December 13, 1995 (“Service Agreement”). Pursuant to the Property Lease, Conrail agreed to lease Jacobs a tract of land adjacent to two railroad tracks operated by Conrail for a lease term of five years at a rate of one dollar per year. Lease at ¶¶ 1-3. Under the terms of the Lease, Jacobs agreed to pay all taxes and utilities for the Property. Lease at ¶¶ 6-7. A five year renewal op *993 tion was included in the Lease. Lease at ¶ 36.

Pursuant to the Service Contract, Jacobs was obligated to load and unload autos from Conrail rail cars, as well as adhere to certain safety precautions related to such work. See Svc. Contract, Appx. II at ¶¶ 1-20. In exchange for Jacobs’s services, Conrail agreed that the Terminal would “operate up to 24 hours per day 7 days per week,” and that “Conrail will supply or make available expected train volume and arrival times by the end of each working day, but Conrail does not guarantee actual train arrival times.” Id. at ¶ 21. The Service Contract also contained a standard incorporation clause:

This agreement together with all Schedules, Appendices and Exhibits constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all previous agreements and understandings relating to the services required under this agreement.

Id. at Art. 16(F). The terms of the Service Agreement were later modified to provide that Conrail would pay for the utilities and taxes on the Property during the operation of the Service Agreement.

A large part of the parties’ dispute revolves around the “expected train volume” language. According to Norfolk Southern, during the negotiation process, Jacobs sought to reallocate the risk of the development to Conrail by establishing a minimum vehicle volume guarantee to be made by Conrail. Jacobs’ Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Doc. 47, Ex. 3 at 3. Conrail claims to have rejected Jacobs’ request for such a guarantee. Id. at 9. Conrail explained that if such a volume guarantee were provided, the economics of the deal would change and Conrail would do the development itself. Id. If Conrail had provided the volume guarantee sought by Jacobs, it claims it would have been forced, by accounting requirements, to capitalize this investment and show it as a liability on its financial records, which was the effect it was seeking to avoid by involving Jacobs. McNeil Depo. at 9. If the cost and risk of the development were solely with Jacobs, Conrail claims it would not have had to reflect a liability on its financial records. Id. In a September 4, 1995 letter, Jacobs sought a volume commitment by asking:

D.... Basically only one concern. Conrail should give a[n] obligation of average volume amount of 28,000 units for 5 years. This constitutes only the basic volume of eastbound traffic, thus it should be achievable.
1. In essence, what I’m looking for is a total of 140,000 vehicles in 5 years @ 6.00 each, thus we inbound 840K, not enough to pay the bill, but enough to show good faith from Conrail, since the deal is structured on years not on cars.

Id. at 2.

Conrail’s response in its September 8, 1995 letter was:

D. A set volume commitment would materially change the deal from our standpoint, and would lead Conrail to invest the capital itself and contract the facility in a more traditional manor. We may be in a position to commit that all outbound Chrysler shipments, moved contractually by Conrail, would utilize this facility.

Id. at 9.

Jacobs has a different impression of the negotiations. Jacobs posits that the phrase “expected train volume” refers to a volume commitment Conrail made during the course of contract negotiations. Because Jacobs was investing all of the capital necessary to build the Toledo Automotive Terminal, even though Conrail stood to profit from its creation, Jacobs recalls insisting that Conrail commit a minimum *994 volume of traffic to guarantee a steady revenue stream into the Terminal. Jacobs takes the language from the September 4 and 8, 1995 letters to illustrate the understanding that a specific volume commitment was intended by the parties and is incorporated into the Service Agreement by the “expected train volume” clause. Jacobs also points to a September 18, 1995 memo in which Conrail states in a letter to Jacobs that it would “make the following commitment”:

Conrail currently has under contract Chrysler finished vehicle traffic from Toledo terminating in Albany, NY, Westborough, MA, and Newark, NJ. The existing contract is for a period of six years, and has another five years remaining. This traffic is currently approximately 28,000 vehicles per year. Conrail will commit to handle this traffic at the proposed Airline Auto Terminal [later renamed the Toledo Automotive Terminal], effective January 1,1996.

Id. at 10. The letter further states:

It is understood between the parties that any definitive agreement will contain other terms and conditions which will have to be negotiated and agreed to before it could be finalized.

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Bluebook (online)
549 F. Supp. 2d 990, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37614, 2008 WL 1932576, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norfolk-southern-railway-co-v-jacobs-ohnd-2008.