Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of PMC Marketing Corp v. The Coca Cola Company

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided May 10, 2017·No. 12-00098·Unknown

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

4 IN RE: CASE NO. 09-02048 BKT 5 6 PMC MARKETING CORP Chapter 7

7 Adversary No. 12-00098 8 9 Debtor(s)

10 NOREEN WISCOVITCH RENTAS, 11 CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FOR THE 12 ESTATE OF PMC MARKETING CORP

13 Plaintiff 14 vs. 15 THE COCA COLA COMPANY 16

17 Defendant(s) FILED & ENTERED ON 05/10/2017

18 19

20 OPINION & ORDER 21 Before this court is Defendant, The Coca Cola Company’s (“TCCC”) Emergency Motion to 22 23 Expedite Consideration of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Execution [Dkt. No. 36], Defendant’s 24 Motion requesting Entry of Order [Dkt. No. 37], Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 25 Execution [Dkt. No. 38], Plaintiff/Trustee’s Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 1 Execution [Dkt. No. 42], and Defendant’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 2 Execution [Dkt. No. 46]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside 3 Judgment and Execution [Dkt. No. 38] is DENIED. 4 5 I. FACTS 6 On March 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint for turnover of property of the estate pursuant 7 to 11 U.S.C. § 547 [Dkt. No. 1]. On March 6, 2012, summons was issued to Defendant’s resident 8 9 agent address [Dkt. No. 2]. On May 8, 2012, Plaintiff sent a copy of the complaint, the summons and 10 order setting pretrial conference to Defendant’s resident agent [Dkt. No. 5]. Since no answer was 11 received, new summons were requested and later served on Defendant’s physical address. [Dkt. Nos. 12 13 8, 14, 16, 19]. On November 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting the Entry of Default [Dkt. 14 No. 15] which was sent to Defendant to its physical address [Dkt. No. 20]. On May 31, 2013, the 15 court entered Defendant’s default [Dkt. No. 21]. On June 17, 2013, Plaintiff requested a Judgment by 16 17 Default [Dkt. No. 23], and a copy of the motion requesting judgment by default was sent to 18 Defendant to its physical address [Dkt. No. 23]. On July 28, 2013, the court entered judgement by 19 default against Defendant [Dkt. No. 26]. On August 16, 2013, the adversary proceeding was closed. 20 21 On December 19, 2016, more than three (3) years later, Defendant requested the court to set 22 aside the default judgment and execution [Dkt. No. 38]. Defendant argues that it never received 23 notice of the complaint. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default and 24 25 judgment by default [Dkt. No’s. 15 and 23] issued were improvidently granted, because Plaintiff

failed to include the affidavits required by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus, 1 the court was prevented from considering these motions. Lastly, Defendant argued that TCCC has 2 never done business with Plaintiff, thus TCCC is not the proper defendant in this case and it is an 3 unrelated entity. 4 5 Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Execution on the grounds 6 that Defendant failed to meet the standard of Rule 60(b) of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. because the 7 request was filed untimely as it was filed 3 years later after judgment by default was entered, and 8 9 because Defendant did not provide evidence of the existence of any exceptional circumstances that 10 would favor the extraordinary relief as required by Rule 55(c) of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. [Dkt. 11 No. 42]. 12 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that a court may set aside a final default judgment under Fed. 15 R. Civ. P. 60(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 affords six categories of reasons or grounds on which to base a 16 17 motion seeking relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding. Particularly, Defendant proffers 18 that the default judgment should have been vacated as void because it was never notified of the 19 adversary complaint, and because Plaintiff failed to include the affidavits required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 21 55. 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeks to balance the interest in the stability of 23 judgments with the interest in seeing that judgments do not become instruments of oppression and 24 25 fraud. 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶9024.03 (16th ed.). “[T]he court may relieve a party …from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding [if]… the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). 1 Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions invoking that rule 2 should be granted sparingly. Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002). Such relief 3 is available in our jurisdiction only when exceptional circumstances exist to justify this extraordinary 4 5 relief. In re Rodríguez Camacho, 361 B.R. 294 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2007)(citing Simon v. Navon, 116 6 F.3d 1, 5 (1stCir. 1997)). A party who seeks relief under Rule 60(b) must persuade the court, at a 7 bare minimum, that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the 8 9 judgment is set aside, he has the right evidence to mount a potentially meritorious claim of defense; 10 and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted. In re 11 Rodríguez Camacho supra (citing Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1stCir. 2002)). 12 13 However, such relief must be applied so as to recognize the desirability of deciding disputes 14 on their merits, while also considering the importance of finality as applied to court judgments. 15 Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 457 F.3d. 58, 64 (2001). The 16 17 decision to grant or deny Rule 60(b) relief lies in the sound discretion of the court and will be 18 reviewed only to determine if the court abused its discretion. 19 Defendant makes four arguments in support of its position that the default judgment entered 20 21 in this case should be set aside. First, Defendant argues that the service of process was invalid 22 because TCCC was never notified of the complaint. Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s motion 23 requesting the entry of default failed to comply with Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24 25 because Plaintiff failed to include affidavits that show TCCC’s failure to plead or otherwise defend.

Third, Defendant argues that the default judgment was improvidently granted because Plaintiff failed 1 to provide an affidavit showing the amount due, and showing that the Defendant against whom the 2 default judgment was entered was neither a minor nor an incompetent as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.

Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of PMC Marketing Corp v. The Coca Cola Company, (prb 2017).

Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of PMC Marketing Corp v. The Coca Cola Company (Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate of PMC Marketing Corp v. The Coca Cola Company) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related