Noor Alkhalili, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

District Court, E.D. Virginia·Decided September 8, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-00601·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION NOOR ALKHALILI, et al. ) Plaintiffs, Vv. 1:25-cv-601 (LMB/WEF) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF _) KOREA, ) Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before the Court are a Motion for Default Judgment as to Liability and a Motion for Default Judgment as to Damages (collectively, “Default Motions”) brought by 47 United States nationals, including servicemembers and civilians who were either killed or injured in seven terrorist attacks between 2019 and 2023, together with immediate family members of those victims, seeking compensation from the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”) under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (the “FSIA”). [Dkt. No. 1]. The Complaint alleges that Iran and North Korea provided material support to the terrorist groups that committed the attacks. Because, after being properly served, Iran and North Korea did not answer the Complaint, a default was entered against them. [Dkt. No. 30]. Plaintiffs now move the Court for entry of judgment on the default against each defendant, holding Iran and North Korea jointly and severally liable for their material support of the attacks, and awarding plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages for the deaths and injuries they or their family members sustained. See [Dkt. Nos. 36, 39].

I. JURISDICTION Despite the entries of default, under the FSIA a default judgment against a foreign state may be entered only after: (1) subject matter jurisdiction exists and personal jurisdiction has been properly established through valid service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1608, and (2) “a plaintiff ‘establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.’” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 55 F. Supp. 3d 189, 192 (D.D.C. 2014) (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); and then citing Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp.1, 6 (D.D.C. 1998)). “This provision requires the court to satisfy itself that there exists an adequate legal and factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims.” Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 495 F. Supp. 2d 541, 544 (E.D. Va. 2007). The FSIA “provides ‘the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in [federal] court [ ].’” Rux, 495 F.Supp.2d at 554 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)). “Under the FSIA, foreign states enjoy immunity from suit in U.S. courts unless Congress waives immunity under an enumerated exception.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604). The applicable exception here is § 1605A, also known as the “terrorism exception.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. That section provides, in relevant part, that: A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). “For a court to hear a claim under this section, Section 1605A also requires that, at the time the ‘act’ described above occurred, the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and ‘the claimant or the victim’ was either a national of the United

States or had a qualifying occupation enumerated in paragraph (2).” Kumar v. Republic of Sudan, No. 2:10CV171, 2019 WL 13251350, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A(a)(1)-(2)). Here, plaintiffs’ claims against Iran and North Korea meet the requirements of § 1605A for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction. All plaintiffs are American nationals seeking money damages for personal injuries or deaths or injuries of relatives that occurred from terrorist attacks that were materially supported by Iran and North Korea. [Dkt. No. 37] at 1. Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 pursuant to section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. § 4605), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2371), and section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2780), and has remained so designated ever since. See [Dkt. No. 1] at { 9; see State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of terrorism/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2026). Similarly, North Korea was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988 pursuant to the same authorities as Iran, and remained continuously designated from 1988 until late 2008, when the United States de-listed North Korea as part of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reach a nuclear deal with North Korea. [Dkt. No. 1] at § 10. In 2017, the United States again designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, and North Korea has remained so designated ever since. Id.; see State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of terrorism/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2026). “Personal jurisdiction over a non-immune sovereign exists so long as service of process has been made under § 1608 of the FSIA.” Rux, 495 F.Supp.2d at 555 (internal citation omitted). Section 1608(a) provides four ways in which service can be made on a foreign state:

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Noor Alkhalili, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (E.D. Va. 2026).

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