ALLEN SHARP, Chief District Judge.
This action involves the breach of a contract to dig ditches, rather sophisticated ditches that constitute an underground cable television system. The plaintiff in this action, Nohcra Communications, Inc. (Noh-cra) entered into a subcontract agreement with defendant, AM Communications, Inc. (AM) to install cable television equipment. Several Chicago suburbs had franchised with Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. (Warner Amex) to bring cable television to the residents of Buffalo Grove, Elk Grove Village, Hoffman Estates, Palatine and Rolling Meadows. Warner Amex sought bids from various contractors to serve as general contractor for the entire [1009]*1009project. AM was the successful bidder. As general contractor, AM hired Nohcra (along with other subcontractors) to perform the cable installation. Nohcra was assigned underground (as opposed to aerial) cable work.
Nohcra’s subcontract is an elaborate agreement containing several schedules that specify what (and when) work is to be completed, to what specifications, and for what price. The agreement is dated March 26, 1982, and provides that its provisions are to be performed and construed according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.2 Nohcra commenced its work in mid-April. On July 9, 1982, AM orally notified Nohcra it was terminating their agreement. Three days later AM indicated in writing four reasons for the termination: (1) Nohcra failed to construct the required ten thousand feet per day; (2) Nohcra failed to install cable in continuity; (3) Nohcra generated excessive homeowner complaints; and (4) Nohcra lacked experienced personnel.
On August 25, 1982, after AM had failed to pay the vast majority of Nohcra’s invoices, Nohcra filed a five-count complaint against AM alleging breach of contract. Counts I, II and III seek compensation for work performed prior to the termination. Counts IV and V request lost profits resulting from the termination. In January 1983 AM filed a counterclaim against Nohcra and its president for breach of contract. AM asks for recovery of moneys spent by AM to repair Nohcra’s faulty work and for damages due to Nohcra’s fraudulent misrepresentations in negotiating the subcontract.
Following a bifurcated bench trial on the issues of liability and damages, the district court found for Nohcra and awarded compensatory damages (for work performed and lost profits) and prejudgment interest. The court dismissed AM’s counterclaim, holding that AM had failed to prove any material misrepresentation. The district court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
AM appeals, presenting five issues for our review: two relate to liability; two to damages; and one to the dismissal of the counterclaim.
I. LIABILITY PHASE
A.
The district court heard testimony in the liability phase of the trial that spanned six days. After reviewing the evidence, the district court held that AM’s failure to pay Nohcra’s invoices constituted a material breach of the subcontract agreement. Findings- of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Findings) at 6. On appeal, AM argues that, in an action for breach of contract (as opposed to quantum meruit), the plaintiff is required to prove more than the mere performance of some work without being paid. Rather, Nohcra must prove it performed all of its contractual obligations. Girard Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 524 F.Supp. 884, 891 (E.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1982), citing Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir.1980); 5A Corbin on Contracts § 1228, at 507-08 (1964).
AM characterizes Nohcra’s duties under the contract as furnishing all labor, tools, equipment, and necessary experience and personnel to produce a continuous and usable portion of the Warner Amex system to the satisfaction of AM, in a timely manner, and in accordance with the contract’s specifications. AM insists Nohcra did not perform any of these obligations. Appellant’s Brief at 14.
The district court found that Nohcra had performed its obligations in a commercially reasonable and acceptable manner. Findings at 6. Addressing AM’s reasons for termination, the court held that (1) Nohcra did not construct ten thousand feet per day because it was not assigned enough work to sustain that rate of production; also, [1010]*1010Nohcra encountered delays in obtaining utility locates and design maps that were entirely beyond its control; (2) Nohcra was not responsible for lack of continuity because it performed its work in accordance with assignments from Warner Amex and AM; also, delays in obtaining design prints and utility locates precluded Nohcra’s installation of cable in continuous runs; (3) although Nohcra generated some homeowner complaints, which is to be expected when installing underground cable systems, there was not an excessive number of complaints; and (4) AM failed to prove that Nohcra misrepresented its experience. AM challenges these findings and asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the pertinent standard of review: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” A finding is clearly erroneous when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (citations omitted). Speaking for the Court in Anderson, Justice White continued:
This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court.... If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous (citations omitted).
Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12; see also Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac Div., 824 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir.1987). We note that in no way does the majority opinion in Anderson, or the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Blackmun, diminish the important obligation of federal appellate courts to engage in a comprehensive review of the entire record.
The district court heard testimony from Nohcra’s president and project supervisor.
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ALLEN SHARP, Chief District Judge.
This action involves the breach of a contract to dig ditches, rather sophisticated ditches that constitute an underground cable television system. The plaintiff in this action, Nohcra Communications, Inc. (Noh-cra) entered into a subcontract agreement with defendant, AM Communications, Inc. (AM) to install cable television equipment. Several Chicago suburbs had franchised with Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. (Warner Amex) to bring cable television to the residents of Buffalo Grove, Elk Grove Village, Hoffman Estates, Palatine and Rolling Meadows. Warner Amex sought bids from various contractors to serve as general contractor for the entire [1009]*1009project. AM was the successful bidder. As general contractor, AM hired Nohcra (along with other subcontractors) to perform the cable installation. Nohcra was assigned underground (as opposed to aerial) cable work.
Nohcra’s subcontract is an elaborate agreement containing several schedules that specify what (and when) work is to be completed, to what specifications, and for what price. The agreement is dated March 26, 1982, and provides that its provisions are to be performed and construed according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.2 Nohcra commenced its work in mid-April. On July 9, 1982, AM orally notified Nohcra it was terminating their agreement. Three days later AM indicated in writing four reasons for the termination: (1) Nohcra failed to construct the required ten thousand feet per day; (2) Nohcra failed to install cable in continuity; (3) Nohcra generated excessive homeowner complaints; and (4) Nohcra lacked experienced personnel.
On August 25, 1982, after AM had failed to pay the vast majority of Nohcra’s invoices, Nohcra filed a five-count complaint against AM alleging breach of contract. Counts I, II and III seek compensation for work performed prior to the termination. Counts IV and V request lost profits resulting from the termination. In January 1983 AM filed a counterclaim against Nohcra and its president for breach of contract. AM asks for recovery of moneys spent by AM to repair Nohcra’s faulty work and for damages due to Nohcra’s fraudulent misrepresentations in negotiating the subcontract.
Following a bifurcated bench trial on the issues of liability and damages, the district court found for Nohcra and awarded compensatory damages (for work performed and lost profits) and prejudgment interest. The court dismissed AM’s counterclaim, holding that AM had failed to prove any material misrepresentation. The district court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
AM appeals, presenting five issues for our review: two relate to liability; two to damages; and one to the dismissal of the counterclaim.
I. LIABILITY PHASE
A.
The district court heard testimony in the liability phase of the trial that spanned six days. After reviewing the evidence, the district court held that AM’s failure to pay Nohcra’s invoices constituted a material breach of the subcontract agreement. Findings- of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Findings) at 6. On appeal, AM argues that, in an action for breach of contract (as opposed to quantum meruit), the plaintiff is required to prove more than the mere performance of some work without being paid. Rather, Nohcra must prove it performed all of its contractual obligations. Girard Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 524 F.Supp. 884, 891 (E.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1982), citing Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (3d Cir.1980); 5A Corbin on Contracts § 1228, at 507-08 (1964).
AM characterizes Nohcra’s duties under the contract as furnishing all labor, tools, equipment, and necessary experience and personnel to produce a continuous and usable portion of the Warner Amex system to the satisfaction of AM, in a timely manner, and in accordance with the contract’s specifications. AM insists Nohcra did not perform any of these obligations. Appellant’s Brief at 14.
The district court found that Nohcra had performed its obligations in a commercially reasonable and acceptable manner. Findings at 6. Addressing AM’s reasons for termination, the court held that (1) Nohcra did not construct ten thousand feet per day because it was not assigned enough work to sustain that rate of production; also, [1010]*1010Nohcra encountered delays in obtaining utility locates and design maps that were entirely beyond its control; (2) Nohcra was not responsible for lack of continuity because it performed its work in accordance with assignments from Warner Amex and AM; also, delays in obtaining design prints and utility locates precluded Nohcra’s installation of cable in continuous runs; (3) although Nohcra generated some homeowner complaints, which is to be expected when installing underground cable systems, there was not an excessive number of complaints; and (4) AM failed to prove that Nohcra misrepresented its experience. AM challenges these findings and asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the pertinent standard of review: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” A finding is clearly erroneous when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (citations omitted). Speaking for the Court in Anderson, Justice White continued:
This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court.... If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous (citations omitted).
Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12; see also Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac Div., 824 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir.1987). We note that in no way does the majority opinion in Anderson, or the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Blackmun, diminish the important obligation of federal appellate courts to engage in a comprehensive review of the entire record.
The district court heard testimony from Nohcra’s president and project supervisor. The two gentlemen testified, and the court agreed, that Nohcra’s production rate was less than the contract specified because AM did not assign Nohcra enough work to meet its output requirement. Liability Trans, at 81-82; 254. This problem stemmed in large part from the utility companies’ failure to provide AM (or Nohcra) with necessary information on underground utility locations. Liability Trans, at 84-85; 239-44. It also explains why Noh-cra was unable to perform continuous production runs — Nohcra could dig only where it had been cleared to dig.
The district court also found that, although Nohcra generated some homeowner complaints, there was not an excessive or unusually high number of complaints. Findings at 6. AM argues that much of the property destruction occurred because Nohcra failed to provide an experienced site supervisor required by paragraph 7(B) of their agreement.3 Robert Kampf, Noh-cra’s project supervisor, was acknowledged even by AM personnel as experienced and possessing technical expertise. Liability Trans, at 765-66. Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the amount of time Kampf actually spent supervising the cable-tv installation, the district court chose to credit Kampf’s testimony that he spent 12-13 hours per day on the Nohcra project. Liability Trans, at 218. We cannot conclude, as AM urges, that the district court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous. Nor did the court commit clear error by finding that Nohcra did not generate an [1011]*1011excessive number of homeowner complaints. Liability Trans, at 67; 93-94; 236. There was corroborating evidence to this effect from AM officials. Deposition of Jerold Evans, 1/18/87, at 25-26. The district court’s view of this evidence is reasonable and permissible. Because we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511, we affirm this portion of the district court’s judgment.
B.
AM also alleges error in the district court’s conclusion that termination of the contract was unjustified. AM argues it acted within its contractual rights by terminating the agreement pursuant to paragraph 17. Paragraph 17(A) of the contract provides in relevant part:
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, all work performed by [Noh-cra] shall be to the satisfaction of [AM]. If [AM] shall be of the good faith opinion that [Nohcra] is not properly performing the work in accordance with the terms of this Subcontract, or is delaying other subcontractors ..., or is not adhering to the Progress Schedule, then [Nohcra], upon written notice from [AM], shall be deemed to be in breach of this Subcontract. ...
Under the law of “satisfaction" contracts, the party for whom performance is rendered may reject if his dissatisfaction is genuine. There is no objective standard. The relevant inquiry is not whether he ought to have been satisfied, but whether he was satisfied. There is, however, one limitation. The dissatisfaction must be sincere and not prompted by caprice or bad faith. Jenkins Towel Service, Inc. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 422 Pa. 601, 223 A.2d 84, 86 (1966).
AM argues it was of the good-faith opinion that Nohcra’s performance was unsatisfactory and, accordingly, AM exercised its privilege of termination under paragraph 17. The district court held otherwise, concluding that AM's termination was not made in good faith. Findings at 6. Although the district court characterized this finding as a conclusion of law, Pennsylvania regards it as a finding of fact. Com. Dept. of Property and Supplies v. Berger, 11 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 332, 312 A.2d 100, 105 (1973). The district court’s label is not decisive. Because we hold that the court’s “bad faith” holding is one of fact, not law, we proceed to review it under the “clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52.
There was testimony, and the district court found, that at no time prior to the termination did AM notify Nohcra that its performance was inadequate.4 Liability Trans, at 64-70; Findings at 5. Furthermore, as noted above, the court concluded that Nohcra was not responsible for its deviations from the contract requirements because of extraneous factors beyond its control. Based on these findings, the court found that AM’s decision to terminate the agreement was not made in good faith. This finding is entitled to deference and may not be overturned absent clear error. Because we. view this finding as plausible in light of the entire record, we affirm this portion of the district court’s judgment.
II. DAMAGES PHASE
Following the liability phase of the trial in which AM was found in breach of contract, the district court heard testimony concerning the amount of damages to which Nohcra was entitled. Nohcra claimed damages for work performed, lost profits and prejudgment interest.
A. Work Performed
Nohcra’s exhibit 15 consists of invoices and field reports by Nohcra employees reflecting the nature and amount of work performed and the amount due for that [1012]*1012work. Memorandum Opinion and Order (Damages Order)6 at 2. Based on these documents, the district court awarded damages of $172,123.62. The court found that most of these invoices and work reports were approved by AM personnel and constitute admissions that the work specified therein was performed according to the contract, and that Nohcra was entitled to payment. Damages Order at 2.7 AM argues these invoices and work reports are inadmissible hearsay and cannot form the basis of the court’s damage award.
We agree with the district judge that those field reports which AM signed and acknowledged constitute admissions8 of work Nohcra performed according to the contract for which compensation is due.9 However, we cannot ascertain from the district court’s Damages Order whether the court excluded from the damages award those invoices which AM never acknowledged. Accordingly, we vacate and remand this portion of the court’s judgment for a determination by the district judge of specifically which documents were “admitted to” by AM and for an accounting of the amount due Nohcra on such unpaid invoices.
Because AM does not argue that the district court’s award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate, this judgment is affirmed. The amount of prejudgment interest is to be modified by the district court only as necessary to reflect the interest .assessed on the revised “work performed” award from above.
B. Lost Profits
Pennsylvania law provides that lost profits may be recovered in a contract action where (1) there is evidence that they were within the parties’ contemplation at the time of contract formation and (2) the amount of lost profits can be established with reasonable certainty. Keystone Floor Products Co. v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 432 F.Supp. 869, 881 (E.D.Pa.1977), citing Taylor v. Kaufhold, 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347 (1951).
AM appeals the district court’s judgment of nearly $265,000 in lost profits, arguing that they were not contemplated by the parties, and that the award is based on pure speculation.
The district court held that future profits were contemplated by the parties because paragraph 1 of the contract (entitled “Scope of Work”) assigned Nohcra a specific amount of work to perform — 260 miles. Findings at 3. Paragraph 1 provides in part: “The amount or quantity of such construction work shall be that which is described and set forth in Schedule ‘C’.” Schedule C is a one-page progress sheet setting forth scheduled completion dates for various mileage increments up to 260 miles.
It is well established that, when interpreting a contract, a court must determine the intent of the parties and give effect to all relevant contractual provisions. Com., Dep’t of Transp. v. Manor Mines, Inc., 523 Pa. 112, 565 A.2d 428, 432 (1989). We believe the district court’s finding in this regard fails to do so. The district court’s meager reading of paragraph 5 (Damages Order at 5) eviscerates that provision of any meaning whatsoever, an oversight we think erroneous. Paragraph 5 (entitled “Modifications”) specifies that “[AM] may, upon five (5) days written notice, require changes including modifica[1013]*1013tions, reductions or additions to the work.” This provision suggests the parties attempted — not to guarantee Nohera a certain level of assigned work, as the district court found, but — to indicate that Nohera was NOT entitled to perform a predetermined amount of work since that amount was subject to change.
Contractual damages are intended to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as it would have been in had the contract been performed. Because of paragraph 5, full performance might have required Nohcra’s satisfactory completion of all 260 miles of work, or only 26 miles of work, or some other amount altogether. Because the contract did not guarantee Nohera a given level of work, we find that lost profits were not within the parties’ contemplation. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment awarding lost profits.
III. AM’S COUNTERCLAIM
Following the institution of this lawsuit by Nohera, AM filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of moneys it spent to repair Nohcra’s faulty work and for damages arising from Nohcra’s fraudulent misrepresentations in negotiating the contract. The district court dismissed the counterclaim, finding that AM had failed to prove any material misrepresentation by Nohera. As to AM’s first allegation of error, we reiterate our approval of the district court’s finding that “Nohera performed the work it was assigned in a commercially reasonable and acceptable manner.” Findings at 6. As we indicated above (section I.A.), it was not clear error for the district court to conclude that Nohera did not generate an excessive number of homeowner complaints.
AM also argues the district court improperly found the evidence inadequate to support its claim against Nohera of fraudulent misrepresentation. We disagree with AM’s position and hold that the district court’s dismissal was sufficiently supported by the record.
By way of background, the testimony revealed that Nohcra’s president, Julio Loizzo, was also an officer in a sister company called Archon Construction (Ar-chon),10 both companies owned by Loizzo’s wife and her family. Prior to entering the agreement with AM, Julio Loizzo met with AM officers at their headquarters in Pennsylvania. There Loizzo introduced himself as Archon’s president, and explained that Archon did significant underground utility work for Illinois Bell Telephone Company in the same Chicago suburbs in which Warner’s cable television system was to be installed. Loizzo indicated he was starting a new company (Nohera) specifically to do cable installation work and was interested in submitting a bid for the Warner Amex project. Liability Trans, at 9; 18-20.
Loizzo testified he told AM officers that, although Nohera had no existing equipment, it would be purchasing trucks, trenchers, plows and boring equipment if it were successful in landing the bid with AM. Loizzo emphasized he had no prior experience in cable-tv installation, but that the work was very similar to their utility work with Illinois Bell, and that he was familiar with northwest Chicago’s suburban area. Liability Trans, at 20-21. The district court credited the testimony of an AM officer who, corroborating Loizzo’s testimony, acknowledged that he was aware of Nohcra’s inexperience in cable-tv installation. Liability Trans, at 765. We believe the district court’s finding — that AM failed to prove it had been fraudulently induced to enter into its subcontract agreement with Nohera — was not clearly erroneous, and affirm this portion of the district court’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment that Nohera performed its contractual obligations in a commercially reasonable and acceptable manner, and that AM’s termination of the contract was not done in good faith. We vacate the district court’s award of compensatory damages for work per[1014]*1014formed and remand for a determination of specifically which invoices and work reports AM acknowledged as complying with the contract for which compensation is due. The award of prejudgment interest is affirmed, to be modified by the district court only as necessary to reflect interest owing on the district court’s revised “work performed” award. We reverse the district court’s award of lost profits because the parties’ contract did not contemplate such an award, as Pennsylvania law requires. Finally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of AM’s counterclaim.