Noha v. Noem

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2363
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) OLHA NOHA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02363 (UNA) ) KRISTI NOEM, et al. ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, who has submitted multiple other cryptic complaints in this Court in the past four

months has, in this matter, filed another puzzling pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

an Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Upon review, the

Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this

matter without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sues the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, President

Donald Trump, former President George H.W. Bush, and the Transportation Security

Administration and its Deputy Administrator. See Compl. at 1–3. The Complaint states only

“REAL ID. Rule 5.1 and 28 U.S.C. § 2403 are broader provisions that apply to any constitutional

challenge of any federal or state statute.” See id. at 5. The relief sought, if any, is unspecified.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to contain “(1) a

short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted

so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the

doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, as

presented, neither the Court nor the Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s

intended claims, nor has Plaintiff established this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Although Plaintiff has also, in the interim, submitted numerous subsequent notices

containing haphazard blurbs of information and random legal authority, ostensibly intended to

amend or supplement the Complaint, see, e.g., Notices, ECF Nos. 5–10, 12–14, 16, 19–25 these

proposed additions fail to comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C. Local Civil Rule 7(i) or 15(i),

and to that same end, “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a LEGO set, something

to be recreated,” at her whim and in piecemeal fashion, see Whitman v. Dep’t of Army, No. 21-

03163, 2023 WL 3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). In any event, Plaintiff’s additional

submissions are difficult to discern, so even if they were procedurally sound, they do not assist in

making her intended claims any more cognizable.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s remaining pending

Motions, ECF Nos. ECF Nos. 4, 11, 15, 26 are all denied as moot. A separate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: September 4, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge