Noha v. Duffy

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 5, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1994
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OLHA NOHA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01994 (UNA) ) SEAN DUFFY, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, who has submitted at least 17 mostly cryptic complaints in this Court in less than

four months, has filed a pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and an application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, in the instant matter. Upon review, the Court grants

Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sues the United States Secretary of Transportation and

Christine Wizer, who is apparently associated with the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration.

See Compl. at 1–2. The Complaint is vague and spare. Plaintiff sets forth a mere single statement,

“driver’s license,” and demands $2 million in damages. See id. at 4. No other information or is

provided.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). Here, as presented, neither the Court nor the Defendants can reasonably be

expected to identify Plaintiff’s intended claims, nor has Plaintiff established this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Although Plaintiff has also, in the interim, submitted numerous subsequent notices

containing random additional blurbs of information, contextless references to legal authority, and

proposed exhibits, all ostensibly intended to amend or supplement the Complaint, see, e.g.,

Notices, ECF Nos. 3, 6, 7, 8; Motion to Add Claims, ECF No. 4, these proposed additions fail to

comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C. Local Civil Rule 7(i) or 15(i), and to that same end,

“Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a LEGO set, something to be recreated,” at

her whim and in piecemeal fashion, see Whitman v. Dep’t of Army, No. 21-03163, 2023 WL

3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). Even if these submissions were procedurally sound, they

are largely incomprehensible, failing to improve Plaintiff’s intended claims.

For all these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion to Add

Claims, ECF No. 4, is denied as futile, and her other pending Motions, ECF Nos. 5, 9, are denied

as moot. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: August 5, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge