Noel Jackson v. Ron Broomfield

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2024
• Docket: 22-55937
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 1 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOEL JACKSON, No. 22-55937

Petitioner-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:97-cv-03531-MWF

v. MEMORANDUM* RONALD BROOMFIELD, Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ,** District Judge.

Appellant Ron Broomfield, Warden of San Quentin Rehabilitation Center,

appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief to Appellee, Noel Jackson, who is

serving a sentence of life in prison without parole. Broomfield contends that the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. district court erred in finding that the prosecutor at Jackson’s trial impermissibly

struck all Black potential jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986).1 Specifically, Broomfield argues that the district court erred when, after

conducting a comparative juror analysis, it held that the state trial court

unreasonably accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking these

jurors.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo

a district court’s decision to grant or deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See

Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019). Pursuant to the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we defer to

the last reasoned state-court decision on the merits of any claim unless the state

court’s ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal Law,” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented at the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924–25 (9th Cir.

2008).2 In evaluating a Batson claim, we must look to the “totality of the relevant

facts,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, being mindful that “the Constitution forbids striking

1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not discuss them in detail. 2 Here, the last reasoned state-court decision was the decision of the California Supreme Court. People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268–70 (1996).

2 even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” United States v.

Vasquez- Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). Applying these standards, we

affirm.

Broomfield argues that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, none of

the race-neutral justifications provided by the prosecutor for striking the three

Black potential jurors were pretextual. We disagree. While some of the reasons

provided by the prosecutor for striking the three potential jurors may have been

legitimate, others were not. The prosecutor struck one Black potential juror

allegedly because that potential juror was “too fair minded.” But this justification

is contradicted by the record, given the number of seated jurors who described

themselves similarly. For example, one non-Black seated juror stated they “would

be very fair.” Another non-Black seated juror stated they would be “fair and

impartial.” And a third non-Black seated juror stated that they have “never been

one to jump to conclusions or make initial judgment” and that they give “people

the benefit of the doubt.”

The prosecutor justified his strike of another Black potential juror by

pointing to that juror’s statement that “[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist ha[s]

interviewed the person, they would know quite a bit about that person.” According

to the prosecutor, that statement suggested that the Black potential juror “may give

too great a weight to psychiatric testimony.” But again, when compared to the

3 responses provided by seated jurors, the prosecutor’s proffered justification is not

supported. For example, two seated jurors indicated that psychiatric/psychological

evaluations may “always” be considered to understand human behavior, whereas

the Black potential juror indicated that such evaluations may only “sometimes” be

considered. Another non-Black seated juror, a longtime registered nurse, indicated

they had a favorable experience with psychiatric professionals and expressed no

reservations about considering expert psychiatric or psychological evaluations.

The prosecutor’s strike of another Black potential juror on the basis that the

potential juror “enjoy[ed] soap operas” bore no explained relation to that

individual’s ability to serve as a juror. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239

(2005) (“[T]he prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of

his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at

98 n.20) (some alterations in original)). And the prosecutor often failed to question

and follow up with Black potential jurors regarding his purported subjects of

concern, which casts further doubt on the legitimacy of his justifications.

Other evidence bolsters our conclusion that at least some of the prosecutor’s

race-neutral justifications were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. One

hundred percent of Black potential jurors were struck from the venire as opposed

to approximately a third of non-black jurors. Ervin v. Davis, 12 F.4th 1102, 1107

(9th Cir. 2021) (finding that statistical anomalies were “too disparate to be

4 explained away or categorized as mere happenstance” (quoting Flowers v.

Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2019))); And the prosecutor eliminated all

Black potential jurors using the first seven of his eighteen peremptory strikes. The

sequence of the prosecutor’s strikes here is suspect, and “give[s] rise to an

inference of discrimination.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Batson, 476

U.S. at 97).

Given the “totality of the relevant facts,” we conclude, as did the district

court, that race was at least a “substantial motivating factor” in the prosecutor’s

exercise of at least one strike. Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 605, 614 (9th

Cir. 2016) (first quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); and then

quoting Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010)). We therefore agree

with the district court’s conclusion that the state court’s decision to the contrary

was unreasonable on the record before it.

AFFIRMED.