NOBREGA v. YORK COUNTY

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedNovember 30, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00373
StatusUnknown

This text of NOBREGA v. YORK COUNTY (NOBREGA v. YORK COUNTY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
NOBREGA v. YORK COUNTY, (D. Me. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

DOMINGUS NOBREGA, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) v. ) 2:20-cv-00373-JDL ) YORK COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., ) ) Defendants )

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff, an inmate at the York County Jail, seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages based on the alleged conditions at the York County Jail. (Complaint, ECF No. 3- 1.) Plaintiff filed this action in state court, and Defendants removed the case to this Court. The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s objection to Defendants’ removal of the case to this Court (Objection, ECF No. 9) and Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the federal claims asserted in the complaint. (Motion, ECF No. 10.) Following a review of the record, I recommend the Court overrule the objection to the removal, construe Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as a motion to amend the complaint, grant the motion to amend, and remand the matter to state court for lack of jurisdiction. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this action in the Maine Superior Court (York County). In his complaint, Plaintiff included allegations that reference the standards established by the

United States Supreme Court for certain violations of the United States Constitution. (Complaint at 3.) Defendants’ removed the matter to this Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff objects to the removal based on his contention that he is not pursuing any federal claims. In an apparent attempt to confirm this assertion, Plaintiff has moved to dismiss any federal claims asserted in the complaint.

DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party who removed the case to federal court.” Me. Mun. Ass’n v. Mayhew, 64 F. Supp. 3d 251, 263 (D. Me. 2014). “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “[R]emoval of an action from state court to federal court is proper only if the federal court has original jurisdiction.” Mayhew, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 263; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under federal question jurisdiction, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well- pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Accordingly, “a court is to ask whether the plaintiff's claim to relief rests upon a federal right, and the court is to look only to plaintiff's complaint to find the answer.’" Rossello-Gonzalez v. Calderon-Serra, 398

F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Hernandez-Agosto v. Romero-Barcelo, 748 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original); see Ortiz-Bonilla v. Federacion de Ajedrez de Puerto Rico, Inc., 734 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2013) (“The jurisdictional question is determined from what appears on the plaintiff's claim, without reference to any other pleadings.”). Therefore, “[w]here a complaint ‘is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the

Constitution or laws of the United States,’ the federal court must entertain the suit.” Ortiz- Bonilla, 734 F.3d at 34 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946)). “It is immaterial that a claimant in retrospect views [his] federal claims as surplus, or after removal, moves to strike the federal claims. The plaintiff is the ‘master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.’" Ortiz-Bonilla, 734 F.3d at 36

(citation omitted) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). Further, "[a] federal court that exercises federal question jurisdiction over a single claim may also assert supplemental jurisdiction over all state-law claims that arise from the same nucleus of operative facts." BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 833 (1st Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

In this case, as a basis for his claims, Plaintiff referenced the standards established by the United States Supreme Court for certain violations of the United States Constitution. Defendants, therefore, have demonstrated that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claim and that removal was proper. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a); Mayhew, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 263. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection to the removal fails. B. Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff has moved to dismiss the claims that are based on federal law. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a plaintiff to dismiss “an action” voluntarily without a court order by filing “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment,” or by filing “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). Rule 41 has been

construed to “only permit[] complete dismissal of an ‘action,’ not partial dismissal of ‘fewer than all the claims.’” Featherston v. District of Columbia, 910 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2011). See also Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 687 – 90 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff cannot dismiss even with court approval fewer than all claims under Rule 41(a)(2)); Sudnick v. Dep’t of Defense, 474 F. Supp. 2d 91, 95

n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) (Rule 41 “cannot be invoked to eliminate ‘fewer than all of the claims against any particular defendant’” (quoting 8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.21[1] (3d ed. 1997)). Because Plaintiff seeks to dismiss only particular counts of his complaint against defendants who would remain in the case, he cannot voluntarily dismiss the claims. Plaintiff’s request to dismiss certain claims can properly be considered as a request

to amend his complaint. See Featherston, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 11. A court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.

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Related

Bell v. Hood
327 U.S. 678 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
CONNECTU LLC v. Zuckerberg
522 F.3d 82 (First Circuit, 2008)
Spooner v. EEN, INC.
644 F.3d 62 (First Circuit, 2011)
Gunn v. Minton
133 S. Ct. 1059 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Sudnick v. Department of Defense
474 F. Supp. 2d 91 (District of Columbia, 2007)
Featherston v. District of Columbia Superior Court
910 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2012)
Maine Municipal Ass'n v. Mayhew
64 F. Supp. 3d 251 (D. Maine, 2014)
Hernandez-Agosto v. Romero-Barcelo
748 F.2d 1 (First Circuit, 1984)

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NOBREGA v. YORK COUNTY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nobrega-v-york-county-med-2020.