[Cite as N.M.J., Inc. v. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2014-Ohio-4459.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
AKRON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT C.A. No. 27304 BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Appellee APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT v. ENTERED IN THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO REVISION, et al. CASE No. 2013-3572
Appellees
and
N.M.J. INC.
Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 8, 2014
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} N.M.J., Inc. appeals a decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals that determined
that the combined value of two of its parcels was $250,000. For the following reasons, this
Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} According to N.M.J., in 2004, Petro-Serv, Inc. entered into a land installment
contract with ADaPT Oil & Marketing, Inc. Under the contract, Petro-Serv agreed to pay
ADaPT $250,000 over eight years for two parcels of land in Akron. After five years, Petro-Serv
assigned its rights under the contract to N.M.J. for $5,000. Under the terms of the assignment, 2
N.M.J. agreed to pay off the remainder of the land installment contract, which was
approximately $92,000. N.M.J. successfully met its obligation under the assignment, making its
final payment to ADaPT in December 2012.
{¶3} After completing its purchase of the parcels, N.M.J. filed a “Real Property
Conveyance Fee Statement of Value and Receipt” with the Summit County Auditor. The
statement indicated that its consideration for the parcels was $250,000. The Akron City School
District Board of Education subsequently filed a “Complaint Against the Valuation of Real
Property,” requesting that the Auditor adjust the value of the parcels to $250,000 for 2012. After
N.M.J. opposed the complaint, the Board of Revision set the matter for hearing. At the hearing,
N.M.J.’s president testified that N.M.J had paid only approximately $97,000 for the parcels.
N.M.J., therefore, argued that the current fair market value of the parcels was not $250,000. The
Board of Revisions agreed, concluding that no change in valuation was warranted.
{¶4} The school district appealed the Board of Revision’s decision to the Board of Tax
Appeals. Upon review of the record, the Board of Tax Appeals determined that the December
2012 transaction was a recent arm’s-length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer.
Rejecting N.M.J.’s president’s argument that the property was only worth $97,000, it found that
the $250,000 price listed on the conveyance fee statement constituted the best indication of the
parcels’ value. N.M.J. has appealed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision, assigning as error that
the decision is not reasonable and lawful.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE DECISION OF THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS IS NOT REASONABLE AND LAWFUL. 3
{¶5} N.M.J. argues that the Board of Tax Appeals incorrectly determined that the value
of its parcels is $250,000. Former Revised Code Section 5713.03 provided that the county
auditor shall determine the true value of every parcel. “The true value of property is a ‘question
of fact, the determination of which is primarily within the province of the taxing authorities[.]’”
Akron City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 92, 2014-
Ohio-1588, ¶ 9, quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52 (1968),
syllabus. Accordingly, this Court “will not disturb a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals with
respect to such valuation unless it affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is
unreasonable or unlawful.” Id., quoting Fodor at syllabus; R.C. 5717.04. “We must affirm the
BTA’s findings of fact if they are supported by reliable and probative evidence, and we afford
deference to the BTA’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and its weighing of the
evidence subject only to an abuse-of-discretion review on appeal.” HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa,
132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, ¶ 10.
{¶6} Former Section 5713.03 provided that, if a parcel “has been the subject of an
arm’s length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time,
either before or after the tax lien date, the auditor may consider the sale price * * * to be the true
value of taxation purposes.” R.C. 5713.03. “The best evidence of the ‘true value in money’ of
real property is an actual, recent sale of the property in an arm’s-length transaction.” Akron City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at ¶ 12, quoting Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision, 50 Ohio
St.2d 129 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he only rebuttal lies in challenging
whether the elements of recency and arm’s-length character between a willing seller and a
willing buyer are genuinely present for that particular sale.” Id., quoting Cummins Property
Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, ¶ 13. The 4
Ohio Supreme Court has also explained that “when a sale price has been reported on the
conveyance-fee statement, the party opposing the use of that price typically bears the burden of
showing that the reported price is not the proper value.” Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v.
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 1, 2014-Ohio-853, ¶ 28.
{¶7} N.M.J. argues that the Board of Tax Appeals should have looked beyond the
$250,000 purchase price listed on the conveyance fee statement because that price was
negotiated in 2004 by a different entity and does not reflect the actual price that it paid for the
parcels in an arm’s-length transaction in 2010. It argues that it was required to put $250,000 on
the conveyance fee statement because that is the total consideration ADaPT received for the
parcels, even though the value of the parcels has fallen significantly over the last few years. The
school district, on the other hand, argues that the conveyance fee statement contains the best
evidence of the parcels’ value.
{¶8} Despite the appeal of N.M.J.’s argument, this Court’s review is not de novo. As
the Board of Tax Appeals noted, the real property conveyance fee statement indicates that
ADaPT sold two parcels of land to N.M.J. for $250,000 in cash. The Ohio Supreme Court has
held that, “[i]n determining the date a sale of property occurs, only for purposes of establishing
the true value of property pursuant to R.C. 5713.03, the auditor should use the date that the real
property conveyance-fee statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the
property.” HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-
687, paragraph two of the syllabus. N.M.J. submitted the conveyance fee statement to the
auditor in this case on December 28, 2012. Accordingly, in light of the fact that the record
contains evidence that the parcels were sold for $250,000 in December 2012, we conclude that
the Board of Tax Appeals’ factual findings are supported by reliable and probative evidence and 5
that its decision is not unreasonable or unlawful. See Hilliard City Schools, 2014-Ohio-853, at ¶
48 (“[I]t cannot be said that the record lacks support for the BTA’s conclusion, much less that
there is ‘a total absence of evidence to support’ its findings.”), quoting HealthSouth Corp., 2012-
Ohio-1871, at ¶ 14. N.M.J.’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶9} N.M.J.
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[Cite as N.M.J., Inc. v. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2014-Ohio-4459.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
AKRON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT C.A. No. 27304 BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Appellee APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT v. ENTERED IN THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO REVISION, et al. CASE No. 2013-3572
Appellees
and
N.M.J. INC.
Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 8, 2014
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} N.M.J., Inc. appeals a decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals that determined
that the combined value of two of its parcels was $250,000. For the following reasons, this
Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} According to N.M.J., in 2004, Petro-Serv, Inc. entered into a land installment
contract with ADaPT Oil & Marketing, Inc. Under the contract, Petro-Serv agreed to pay
ADaPT $250,000 over eight years for two parcels of land in Akron. After five years, Petro-Serv
assigned its rights under the contract to N.M.J. for $5,000. Under the terms of the assignment, 2
N.M.J. agreed to pay off the remainder of the land installment contract, which was
approximately $92,000. N.M.J. successfully met its obligation under the assignment, making its
final payment to ADaPT in December 2012.
{¶3} After completing its purchase of the parcels, N.M.J. filed a “Real Property
Conveyance Fee Statement of Value and Receipt” with the Summit County Auditor. The
statement indicated that its consideration for the parcels was $250,000. The Akron City School
District Board of Education subsequently filed a “Complaint Against the Valuation of Real
Property,” requesting that the Auditor adjust the value of the parcels to $250,000 for 2012. After
N.M.J. opposed the complaint, the Board of Revision set the matter for hearing. At the hearing,
N.M.J.’s president testified that N.M.J had paid only approximately $97,000 for the parcels.
N.M.J., therefore, argued that the current fair market value of the parcels was not $250,000. The
Board of Revisions agreed, concluding that no change in valuation was warranted.
{¶4} The school district appealed the Board of Revision’s decision to the Board of Tax
Appeals. Upon review of the record, the Board of Tax Appeals determined that the December
2012 transaction was a recent arm’s-length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer.
Rejecting N.M.J.’s president’s argument that the property was only worth $97,000, it found that
the $250,000 price listed on the conveyance fee statement constituted the best indication of the
parcels’ value. N.M.J. has appealed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision, assigning as error that
the decision is not reasonable and lawful.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE DECISION OF THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS IS NOT REASONABLE AND LAWFUL. 3
{¶5} N.M.J. argues that the Board of Tax Appeals incorrectly determined that the value
of its parcels is $250,000. Former Revised Code Section 5713.03 provided that the county
auditor shall determine the true value of every parcel. “The true value of property is a ‘question
of fact, the determination of which is primarily within the province of the taxing authorities[.]’”
Akron City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 92, 2014-
Ohio-1588, ¶ 9, quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52 (1968),
syllabus. Accordingly, this Court “will not disturb a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals with
respect to such valuation unless it affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is
unreasonable or unlawful.” Id., quoting Fodor at syllabus; R.C. 5717.04. “We must affirm the
BTA’s findings of fact if they are supported by reliable and probative evidence, and we afford
deference to the BTA’s determination of the credibility of witnesses and its weighing of the
evidence subject only to an abuse-of-discretion review on appeal.” HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa,
132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, ¶ 10.
{¶6} Former Section 5713.03 provided that, if a parcel “has been the subject of an
arm’s length sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer within a reasonable length of time,
either before or after the tax lien date, the auditor may consider the sale price * * * to be the true
value of taxation purposes.” R.C. 5713.03. “The best evidence of the ‘true value in money’ of
real property is an actual, recent sale of the property in an arm’s-length transaction.” Akron City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at ¶ 12, quoting Conalco, Inc. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision, 50 Ohio
St.2d 129 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he only rebuttal lies in challenging
whether the elements of recency and arm’s-length character between a willing seller and a
willing buyer are genuinely present for that particular sale.” Id., quoting Cummins Property
Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-1473, ¶ 13. The 4
Ohio Supreme Court has also explained that “when a sale price has been reported on the
conveyance-fee statement, the party opposing the use of that price typically bears the burden of
showing that the reported price is not the proper value.” Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v.
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 1, 2014-Ohio-853, ¶ 28.
{¶7} N.M.J. argues that the Board of Tax Appeals should have looked beyond the
$250,000 purchase price listed on the conveyance fee statement because that price was
negotiated in 2004 by a different entity and does not reflect the actual price that it paid for the
parcels in an arm’s-length transaction in 2010. It argues that it was required to put $250,000 on
the conveyance fee statement because that is the total consideration ADaPT received for the
parcels, even though the value of the parcels has fallen significantly over the last few years. The
school district, on the other hand, argues that the conveyance fee statement contains the best
evidence of the parcels’ value.
{¶8} Despite the appeal of N.M.J.’s argument, this Court’s review is not de novo. As
the Board of Tax Appeals noted, the real property conveyance fee statement indicates that
ADaPT sold two parcels of land to N.M.J. for $250,000 in cash. The Ohio Supreme Court has
held that, “[i]n determining the date a sale of property occurs, only for purposes of establishing
the true value of property pursuant to R.C. 5713.03, the auditor should use the date that the real
property conveyance-fee statement is filed in the auditor’s office as the sale date of the
property.” HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-
687, paragraph two of the syllabus. N.M.J. submitted the conveyance fee statement to the
auditor in this case on December 28, 2012. Accordingly, in light of the fact that the record
contains evidence that the parcels were sold for $250,000 in December 2012, we conclude that
the Board of Tax Appeals’ factual findings are supported by reliable and probative evidence and 5
that its decision is not unreasonable or unlawful. See Hilliard City Schools, 2014-Ohio-853, at ¶
48 (“[I]t cannot be said that the record lacks support for the BTA’s conclusion, much less that
there is ‘a total absence of evidence to support’ its findings.”), quoting HealthSouth Corp., 2012-
Ohio-1871, at ¶ 14. N.M.J.’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶9} N.M.J. has not established that the Board of Tax Appeals’ determination of the
true value of its parcels was unreasonable or unlawful. The judgment of the Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT 6
WHITMORE, J. MOORE, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ROBERT C. HUNT, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DAVID H. SEED, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and TIMOTHY J. WALSH, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellees.