----oo0oo---- N.M., a minor, by and through No. 2:25-cv-1389 WBS JDP Guardian Ad Litem STACIE MILLER, individually and as successor in interest to, ESTATE OF VINTON MILLER, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO Plaintiffs, DISMISS v. PLACER COUNTY, a municipal corporation; THE PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, a public entity; PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF’S HINTZE, individually; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL individually; CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS, a public entity; CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS OFFICER MATTHEW YARBROUGH, individually, EVAN MATSHES, individually; NAAG FORENSICS PC, an entity, and DOES 1 to 100, individually, Defendants.
----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Stacie Miller (“plaintiff”) brought this action against Placer County, the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, (collectively, “Placer County entities”), Deputy Coroner Eric Hintze (“Hintze”), the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), CHP Officer Clayton Guillemin (“Guillemin”), California State Parks & Recreation (“State Parks”), State Parks Officer Matthew Yarbrough (“Yarbrough”), and one-hundred (100) fictitiously named Doe defendants, in connection with the death of her spouse Vinton Miller (“decedent”) on January 26, 2024. (See Compl. at 2-26 (Docket No. 1).) With the exception of the Doe defendants, each remaining defendant (collectively, “defendants”) now moves to dismiss all claims. (See Docket Nos. 19, 21-22, 31.) I. Factual Background The decedent lived in Placer County, worked at a ski resort known as Palisades Tahoe in Olympic Valley, and struggled “with mental health issues, including diagnosed schizophrenia.” (See Compl. at 9.) On the morning of January 26, 2024, the decedent told plaintiff that he was leaving for work despite the fact that “he did not have to be at work” then. (See id. at 10- 11.) Sometime later, plaintiff learned that the decedent “was driving to an unknown location in an unknown vehicle that was not his and told her that someone was trying to kill him.” (See id. (citation modified).) She dialed 911 to inform law enforcement about the situation. (See id.) After contacting the police, plaintiff spoke with the decedent once more to encourage him to go to the nearby Olympic Valley Events Center, which he agreed to do. (See id.) She then called law enforcement once again to provide an update on where she thought her husband was headed. (See id.) Soon after, CHP officer Guillemin learned about the decedent driving “a white Ford F-150 truck northbound on Highway 89 in the North Lake Tahoe area, heading towards Olympic Valley in the County of Placer.” (See id. at 11-12 (citation modified).) One of the decedent’s coworkers called law enforcement around the same time to notify them that he had taken a company vehicle which matched the F-150’s profile and drove away in it. (See id. at 12.) Guillemin began his pursuit of the decedent and notified his dispatch “that he was going to make a stop on the truck.” (See id. at 12-13.) After Guillemin lost track of the decedent, he began heading towards the decedent’s workplace. (See id. at 13.) Guillemin eventually approached the decedent’s supposed destination and pulled over “onto the right shoulder at the intersection of Highway 89 and the entrance of Olympic Valley Events Center.” (See id.) State Parks officer Yarbrough then appeared and stopped his vehicle next to Guillemin’s own to discuss the situation. (See id.) While doing so, “the white truck with the Palisades Tahoe logo drove past the officers, on the right side of the road, heading towards Olympic Valley Events Center, which is a dead-end street.” (See id. at 13-14 (citation modified).) Yarbrough “almost immediately took off at a high rate of speed after the white truck” without “activating his emergency sirens.” (See id. at 14 (citation modified).) While nearing the dead end, Yarbrough crashed his vehicle “into the driver’s side of the white truck with the Palisades logo that the decedent was driving.” (See id. at 14- 15.) As both vehicles’ doors opened, Guillemin appeared at the scene in his own vehicle. (See id. at 15.) The decedent emerged from the white truck and approached Yarbrough in his vehicle. (See id. at 15-16.) The decedent turned around to flee, and then Yarbrough used a firearm against him. (See id. at 16.) The decedent was shot in the back and “immediately fell to the ground on his stomach, severely wounded.” (See id. at 18.) Both officers shouted “drop the knife” to the decedent, which “was the first and only command they gave to him.” (See id. (citation modified).) Yarbrough and Guillemin “then pounced on the decedent and handcuffed him.” (See id. at 18-19 (citation modified).) The officers claim that they began administering medical aid to the decedent after handcuffing him. (See id. at 18-19.) Neither Yarbrough nor Guillemin “called dispatch for additional medical aid for the decedent after he was shot. Instead, the decedent was assisted by Palisades Tahoe ski patrol paramedics.” (See id. at 21.) Nobody ever took the decedent to a hospital, and “30 to 40 minutes after he was shot,” he was “pronounced dead” at the scene that morning. (See id. at 21, 26.) On February 1, 2024, the decedent was autopsied at the direction of the Placer County entities, which concluded that a bullet had entered his “upper back” in an autopsy report. (See id. at 24.) On the death certificate, Hintze noted that the decedent’s cause of death was a “gunshot wound of chest.” (See id.) II. Procedural Background Plaintiff brings eleven claims against defendants: (1) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the CHP, Guillemin (collectively, “CHP defendants”), State Parks, and Yarbrough (collectively, “State Parks defendants”); (2) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, against the Placer County entities, the CHP defendants, and the State Parks defendants; (3) negligence against the CHP defendants, the State Parks defendants, and the Placer County entities; (4) assault and battery against the CHP defendants, and the State Parks defendants; (5) violation of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 701, 12101 against the Placer County entities, State Parks, and the CHP; (6) denial of medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Yarbrough and Guillemin; (7) unwarranted interference with familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, and the Placer County entities; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the State Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, and the Placer County entities; (9) wrongful death, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60, against the State Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, and the Placer County entities; (10) supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State Parks, the CHP, and the Placer County entities; and (11) fraudulent misrepresentation against Hintze and the Placer County entities.1 (See Compl. at 27-51.) 1 “Under California law, a cause of action is not lost by reason of a plaintiff's death.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.20). In such a case, “a survival action can be maintained by the decedent's ‘personal representative’ or ‘successor in interest.’” See id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.30). “‘Successor in interest’ is defined as the Defendants move to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 III. Discussion A. Eleventh Amendment In addition to moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), State Parks moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See Docket No. 22 at 11-15 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).) Under separate cover, the CHP joined State Parks’ motion in that respect. (See Docket No. 23 at 1-2.) Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment insulates the CHP and State Parks from civil liability. (See, e.g., Docket No. 22 at 13-18, Docket No. 23 at 1-2.) “The Eleventh Amendment protects states and state instrumentalities from suit in federal court.” See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 891 F.3d 1147, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2018). It is undisputed that the CHP and State Parks are both “state instrumentalities.” See id. Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss this action in its entirety as against defendants CHP and
beneficiary of the decedent's estate or ‘other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action.’” See id. (citation modified) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.11). Plaintiff attests that she is the decedent’s successor in interest. (See Compl. at 3-4, 54.)
2 At the conclusion of oral argument on August 18, 2025, counsel for plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the claims of the decedent’s minor child N.M. as well all claims as against Dr. Evan Matshes and his medical practice Naag Forensics PC. State Parks. B. Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count One) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for excessive force as against Yarbrough and Guillemin. (See Compl. at 27-28.) To determine whether police officers’ use of force was excessive, “our question is whether the officers employed an ‘objectively unreasonable’ amount of force under the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” See Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County, 69 F.4th 614, 618-20 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Brooks v. Clark County, 828 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2016)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2024). As part of this inquiry, the court must consider factors such as “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” See id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). It must also assess “the type and amount of force inflicted, the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citation modified). “Each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. It follows that liability may not be imposed on a team effort theory that would allow the jury to lump all the defendants together, rather than require it to base each individual’s liability on his own conduct.” See Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 888-91 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). “Instead, for an official to be liable for another actor’s depriving a third party of his constitutional rights, that official must have at least the same level of intent as would be required if the official were directly to deprive the third party of his constitutional rights.” Id. (citation modified). Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough shot the decedent in the back while he faced away from the officer. (See Compl. at 16-19, 21, 24.) Because decedent was not actively trying to escape from the scene or endanger anybody while walking away from Yarbrough, this allegation is sufficient to state a claim that Yarbrough used excessive force against the decedent. See Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 131 F.4th 702, 704-08 (9th Cir. 2025). Construing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it can be inferred that while the decedent had stolen a vehicle and evaded arrest prior to his face-to-face confrontation with Yarbrough, he posed no threat to the officers’ safety in the moment with his back turned to them. (See Compl. at 16-19, 27-31.) Therefore, the defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Yarbrough in Count One will be denied. Plaintiff also alleges that Guillemin used excessive force against the decedent. (See id.) Unlike Yarbrough, Guillemin did not shoot or attempt to shoot the decedent, so it cannot be reasonably inferred that Guillemin had the same level of intent that Yarbrough did. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 888-91. The complaint alleges only that Guillemin helped handcuff the decedent after Yarbrough shot the decedent in the back. Another judge of tis court has previously recognized that “the use of handcuffs during an arrest is quite common and often a standard practice and, ordinarily, the use of handcuffs during an arrest is a very low quantum of force that will not constitute excessive force.” See Knickerbocker v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-1811 DAD JLT, 2020 WL 1433141, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020), aff’d, 858 F. App’x 243, 244 (9th Cir. 2021). However, the court has acknowledged that “the manner in which an individual is handcuffed may, under some circumstances, amount to excessive force,” such as if the handcuffs are too tight. Id. (citing Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Spencer v. Pew, 117 F.4th 1130, 1137-45 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that police officers who used a Taser repeatedly on the plaintiff, beat him repeatedly, and then handcuffed him did not use excessive force until an officer started “kneeling on the plaintiff after he was handcuffed”). But no such facts are alleged here. (See Compl. at 19, 27-28.) To state a claim for excessive force against Guillemin, plaintiff would need to allege that Guillemin used additional force against the decedent beyond just assisting in handcuffing him. (See id.) Thus, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Guillemin in Count One. C. Denial of Medical Care (Count Six) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for unconstitutional denial of medical care against Yarbrough and Guillemin under the Fourth Amendment. (See Compl. at 39-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).) The Fourth Amendment requires “‘objectively reasonable post-arrest care,’ which means that police officers must seek ‘the necessary medical attention for a detainee when he has been injured while being apprehended by either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a hospital.’” See D’Braunstein v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 131 F.4th 764, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2006)). This rule “does not ‘require an officer to provide what hindsight reveals to be the most effective medical care for an arrested suspect.’” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough and Guillemin failed to provide the decedent with sufficient medical care after he was shot in the back and handcuffed on the ground. (See Compl. at 18-21, 39-40.) Specifically, the complaint states that Yarbrough and Guillemin attempted to “administer medical aid to the decedent,” but neither officer “called dispatch for additional medical aid.” (See id. at 19-21.) Because neither officer “summoned medical help or took the injured arrestee to a hospital,” plaintiff states a claim for denial of medical care against Yarbrough and Guillemin. See Holcomb v. Ramar, No. 1:13- cv-1102 AWI SKO, 2013 WL 5947621, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013); see also Estate of F.R. v. County of Yuba, No. 2:23-cv- 846, 2023 WL 6130049, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2023) (denying police officer’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that the officer prevented the decedent there from receiving medical aid after a third party shot him). Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s denial of medical care claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Six. D. Interference with Familial Relations in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for unwarranted interference with familial relations under the First Amendment against Yarbrough, Guillemin, and the Placer County entities.3 (See Compl. at 40-41.) The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly dodged the question of whether a widow may assert a § 1983 claim for unwarranted interference with familial association for loss of her spouse. See, e.g., Peck, 51 F.4th at 892-94 (“This case involves a familial-association claim asserted by a spouse, rather than a parent or child. We have not previously held whether a substantive due process right exists in that context, and other courts of appeals have reached conflicting conclusions.”); Hampton v. California, No. 22-15481, 2023 WL 6443897, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Diaz v. Polanco, 144 S. Ct. 2520 (2024); Estate of Elkins v. Pelayo, No. 22-16027, 2023 WL 9020556, at *2-3 & n.4 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2023) (citation modified) (“This court has not established whether spouses may bring a loss of companionship claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Similar claims have had mixed results in other courts. In Griffin v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit considered a spousal 3 Courts disagree on whether the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment protects familial relations. See Estate of Chivrell v. City of Arcata (Chivrell I), 623 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1043-45 & n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (citing IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1191-93 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, courts treat “the liability analysis of a familial association claim brought under the First Amendment as the same as for a familial association claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.” See id. (citation modified). claim for unwarranted interference with familial relations and reversed a judgment against a defendant police officer on that claim. See 983 F.2d 1544, 1546-49 (10th Cir. 1993). In Harbury v. Deutch, the D.C. Circuit affirmed as a matter of law the dismissal of a spousal claim for unwarranted interference with familial association. See 233 F.3d 596, 604-07 (D.C. Cir. 2000). However, the Supreme Court overruled its decision on other grounds in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405-06, 421-22 (2002). As the Ninth Circuit did in Peck, this court will assume that plaintiff’s claim is cognizable and address whether her allegations satisfy its elements, instead of deciding a constitutional question on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See 51 F.4th at 892-94. To state a claim for unwarranted interference with familial relations, the complaint must contain more than “conclusory statements that do not allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that plaintiff had the deep attachments and commitments with the decedent required to merit such constitutional protections.” See Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 1044-45 (citing IDK, 836 F.2d at 1192-93). Plaintiff pleads that she was intimately involved in the decedent’s life. (See Compl. at 3-4, 9-11.) The complaint indicates that she lived with him, bore a child with him, was involved in his day-to-day life (by, inter alia, being aware of his work schedule and routines), and looked out for his safety. (See id.) The complaint goes beyond “merely labelling the decedent as plaintiff’s spouse,” and therefore plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an underlying intimate relationship. See Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 1044-45 (citation modified). However, plaintiff must also allege that “the officers’ conduct deprived plaintiff of her familial interest in a manner that shocks the conscience.” See Peck, 51 F.4th at 892-94 (citation modified). The Ninth Circuit applies a “deliberate- indifference standard when officials had ample time to correct their wrongful conduct. But if the defendants had to make a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, then their conduct does not shock the conscience unless they acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id. (citation modified). Plaintiff’s allegations of the officers’ misconduct can be divided into at least three sets of acts: Yarbrough crashing his car into the decedent’s vehicle, Yarbrough shooting the decedent in the back, and both officers failing to find adequate medical care for the decedent after he was shot. (See Compl. at 15-21.) Plaintiff alleges that the officers had “30 to 40 minutes after he was shot” to connect the decedent with adequate medical care. (See id. at 21-26.) Plaintiff thus states a claim based on the third set of acts because “actual deliberation was practical” under these circumstances. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation modified) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1998)). At the point that Yarbrough and Guillemin had handcuffed the decedent and left him lying on the ground for 30 minutes, “an escalating situation” was no longer present, and the officers had “ample time to correct their wrongful conduct.” See Peck, 51 F.4th at 892-94; see also Corbera v. Taylor, No. 2:21-cv-1998 WBS KJN, 2022 WL 17741089, at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) (denying officer’s motion to dismiss familial association claim under deliberate indifference standard where officer had “approximately seven minutes between the time the officer agreed to respond to the call and the time of his collision with the decedent’s vehicle, which tends to show that he had sufficient time to deliberate on his actions”). Because plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the officers’ conduct shocks the conscience, the court need not address whether the other allegations state a familial association claim. Therefore, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s unwarranted interference with familial relations claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Seven. E. Tom Bane Act (Count Two) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for violation of the Tom Bane Act against Yarbrough, Guillemin, and the Placer County entities. (See Compl. at 28-31 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1).) “The Tom Bane Act provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). “The elements of an excessive force claim under the Tom Bane Act are the same as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. (citation modified). Because plaintiff has stated a claim that Yarbrough violated the Fourth Amendment in using excessive force against the decedent, she also states a claim against him under the Tom Bane Act. See Rivera v. Cater, No. 2:18-cv-56 WBS EFB, 2018 WL 1621095, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018). The complaint also states a claim for violation of the Tom Bane Act against Guillemin. (See Compl. at 28-31, 40-41.) Plaintiff premises this claim against him upon unwarranted interference with familial associations. (See id.) Therefore, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under the Tom Bane Act against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Two. F. Negligence (Count Three) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for negligence against the State Parks defendants and the CHP defendants. (See Compl. at 31-33.) “Under California negligence law, ‘a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach, 988 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 628-33 (2013)). “The officer’s conduct must only ‘fall within the range of conduct that is reasonable’ viewed ‘in light of the totality of circumstances.’” Id. (citation modified). “California negligence law regarding the use of deadly force overall is ‘‘broader than federal Fourth Amendment law.’” Id. (quoting Villegas ex rel. C.V. v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2016)). Because plaintiff states a claim for excessive force against Yarbrough, she states a claim for negligence against him. (See Compl. at 15, 31-33.) The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Tabares that California negligence law is broader than what the Fourth Amendment circumscribes means that police conduct which runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment is also unreasonable. See 988 F.3d at 1125-26. However, the converse is not true: a police officer’s negligent conduct does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See Alves v. County of Riverside, 135 F.4th 1161, 1171-74 (9th Cir. 2025). Thus, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim against Yarbrough in Count Three. The complaint also states a claim for negligence against Guillemin. (See Compl. at 21, 31-33, 39-40.) It alleges that Guillemin owed the decedent a duty of due care, which he breached by not calling for the decedent to receive medical attention, after restraining the decedent. See Estate of F.R., 2023 WL 6130049, at *3-4 (citation omitted) (“Plaintiffs allege that F.R. was in custody and in need of urgent medical attention. The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants owed F.R. a duty of care.”); see also Alves, 135 F.4th at 1171-74 (citation modified) (“The officers owed the decedent a duty of due care after restraining him in handcuffs and breached their duty of care by not placing him in a recovery position and failing to check whether he was breathing and had a pulse.”). Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim against Guillemin in Count Three. G. Battery (Count Four) Under California law, a plaintiff bringing a battery claim against a police officer must show that the officer used “unreasonable force.” See Monzon v. City of Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-73 (4th Dist. 1998)). “This analysis requires the same ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry applied to negligence claims.” McLeod v. City of Redding, No. 2:22-cv- 585 WBS JDP, 2024 WL 3011227, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 639-40). Because plaintiff pleads that Yarbrough’s use of force against the decedent was unreasonable, she also states a claim for battery against him. (See Compl. at 27-34.) The same reasoning applies to plaintiff’s allegation that Guillemin used unreasonable force against the decedent. See id. While Guillemin did not shoot the decedent, the complaint alleges that he negligently assisted Yarbrough in handcuffing the decedent after he had fallen to the ground wounded. See id. Thus, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s battery claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Four. H. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Eight) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Yarbrough, Guillemin, and the Placer County Entities. (See Compl. at 42- 43.) To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must show “extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 874-75 (4th Dist. 2010) (citation modified) (quoting Christensen v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 902-04 (1991)). “Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. Further, “it is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” Id. (citation modified). The court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Eight of the complaint. (See Compl. at 42-43.) Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough and Guillemin “engaged in extreme conduct, with reckless disregard of the probability that the decedent would suffer emotional distress and did suffer severe emotional distress pre-mortem.” (See id. (citation modified).) In Estate of F.R., this court denied a police officer’s motion to dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the defendant prevented the decedent from receiving medical attention for an ultimately fatal gunshot wound. See 2023 WL 6130049, at *8-9. The court will do the same here because the officers’ seizure of the decedent prevented him from receiving medical attention and they failed to summon medical attention for an extended period of time. See id. (“Whether defendants’ conduct was sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of fact, and therefore inappropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”). Thus, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Eight. I. Wrongful Death (Count Nine) “A family member may bring a state law wrongful death claim to recover damages based on her own injuries resulting from a decedent’s death. A plaintiff who brings a wrongful death claim must plead and prove standing.” Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 1045-46 (citation modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60). Here, plaintiff states that she was “the decedent’s spouse, and his successor in interest and succeeds to the decedent’s interest in this action.” (See Compl. at 54 (citation modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.11).) The complaint also states the manner in which defendant was negligent and how such negligence caused or contributed to any specified injury. See Estate of Chivrell v. City of Arcata (Chivrell II), 694 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1240-41 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 389-91 (1999)). Further, Yarbrough’s use of excessive force and Guillemin’s denial of medical care would each suffice to meet the wrongful act or neglect element of a wrongful death claim. (See Compl. at 27-34, 39-40, 43-45.) Accordingly, the complaint sufficiently alleges a wrongful death claim against Yarbrough and Guillemin. J. Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count Eleven) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent misrepresentation against Hintze and the Placer County entities. (See Compl. at 49-50.) The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “defendants represented that an important fact was true; that representation was false; defendants knew that the representation was false when defendants made it, or defendants made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; and defendants intended that plaintiff rely on the representation.” See Thomas v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 97 Cal. App. 5th 587, 637-38 (1st Dist. 2023) (citation modified). Plaintiff must also show that she “reasonably relied on the representation,” the misrepresentation “harmed” her, and that her “reliance on defendant’s representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm.” Id. (citation modified). Plaintiff seeks to impose fraud liability on Hintze and the Placer County entities because the decedent’s death certificate states that he died of “a gunshot wound to the chest” when the decedent was shot in the back. (See Compl. at 23-24, 49-50.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that the wording of the decedent’s death certificate is grounds for such a claim. (See, e.g., Docket No. 41 at 4-8.) Because she does not allege that any representation defendants made to this effect was false, plaintiff fails to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. (See Compl. at 24, 49-51.) Further, plaintiff does not indicate that she reasonably relied on the Hintze’s wording in the autopsy report or on the death certificate.4 (See id.) Thus, the court finds plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claims in Count Eleven to be frivolous at best, and will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss those claims. K. Municipal Liability (Count Ten) The Placer County entities move to dismiss all claims against them. (See Compl. at 28-33, 34-38, 40-51.) “In California, a public entity is not liable for an injury arising from an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee except as provided by statute.” Doe v. L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 37 Cal. App. 5th 675, 686-87 (2d Dist. 2019) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a)). However, “a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.”5 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a) (citation modified). Plaintiff concedes that the Placer County entities are 4 At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel was not able to explain how her client relied at all on the language of the death certificate or in the autopsy report.
5 Plaintiff brings claims against Doe 1, “a dispatcher for the Placer County Sheriff’s Office who communicated messages to law enforcement agents during the incident giving rise to this action at all material times.” (See Compl. at 6, 28-34, 39-45 (citation modified).) Because Doe 1 has not moved to dismiss, plaintiff’s claims against Doe 1 and any potential vicarious liability that may attach to the Placer County entities as a result are not in front of the court at this time. (See Docket No. 39 at 8.) Therefore, the court declines to decide whether plaintiff states claims against Doe 1. public entities. (See Compl. at 4-5 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2).) Because plaintiff does not state a claim against any of the Placer County entities’ employees, such as Hintze, plaintiff does not state a tort claim against the Placer County entities either. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815, 815.2(a), 815.4. Therefore, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against the Placer County entities in Counts Two, Three, Five, Eight, Nine, and Eleven.6 Plaintiff’s claims against the Placer County entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Counts Seven and Ten similarly fail. (See Compl. at 40-41, 45-48.) “Because § 1983 imposes liability only where a state actor, ‘under color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another's constitutional rights,’ Congress did not intend to impose vicarious liability on municipalities ‘solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.’” Colorado City, 935 F.3d at 808-09 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978)). “Moreover, Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. (citation modified). “Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local government’s policy or custom led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (citation modified).
6 Count Five for violations of the ADA and RA is a federal claim, but state law mirrors federal law in terms of municipal and vicarious liability for purposes of this claim. See United States v. Town of Colorado City, 935 F.3d 804, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against either of the Placer County entities because she does not identify a specific “policy or custom” upon which an agent of the Placer County entities acted. See T.O. ex rel. Morris v. County of Nevada, No. 2:24-cv-1131, 2024 WL 4216754, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2024) (citation modified) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95 (1978)). Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Placer County entities in Counts Seven and Ten.7 L. Qualified Immunity In the current preliminary posture, the court declines to address whether qualified immunity shields any defendants from liability. See Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2018). “While courts are permitted to consider qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, the Ninth Circuit has explained that doing so ‘raises special problems for legal decision making.’” Jones v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:22-cv-1574 WBS JDP, 2024 WL 2153646, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2024) (quoting Keates, 883 F.3d at 1234-35). “By considering qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, the courts may be called upon to decide far-reaching constitutional questions on a nonexistent factual record.” Id. (citation modified). “At this stage, if the operative complaint 7 In the alternative, the court construes plaintiff’s untimely response to Hintze and the Placer County Entities’ motion to dismiss as a non-opposition to it. See L.R. 230(c). They moved to dismiss on June 23, 2025. (See Docket No. 21.) The parties stipulated to giving plaintiff until July 28, 2025 to oppose the motion. (See Docket No. 33.) Plaintiff did not do so until August 4, 2025. (See Docket No. 41.) contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, then plaintiff is entitled to go forward with her claims.” Id. (citation modified). As discussed above, plaintiff pleads facts which make it “possible that defendants violated a clearly established right” under the Fourth Amendment, such as Yarbrough’s alleged use of excessive force. See id. (citation modified). “Denial of qualified immunity at this juncture therefore sheds little light on whether defendants might ultimately be entitled to qualified immunity once the case proceeds at least to the summary judgment stage, where the court is presented with facts providing context for the challenged actions.” Id. (citation modified). Thus, the court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss for qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.8 M. Leave to Amend Defendants request that the court dismiss plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. (See, e.g., Docket No. 22 at 15-16, 26-27.) However, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that the court should ‘freely give leave when justice so requires.’” Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. 8 For a similar reason, the court does not reach defendants’ arguments that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because she did not timely comply with the California Government Claims Act to avoid using “extrinsic evidence.” See Wilson v. Timec Servs. Co., No. 2:23-cv-172 WBS KJN, 2023 WL 5753617, at *1-2 & n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12). Such defenses are better suited for adjudication on a motion for summary judgment. See id. Accordingly, the CHP defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED. (See Docket No. 19-6.) Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.’” Id. (citation modified). Given that some of the described pleading defects may be curable, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all claims by or on behalf of plaintiff N.M., and all claims as against defendants Dr. Evan Matshes and Naag Forensics PC be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED with prejudice; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count One of the complaint be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants Guillemin, State Parks, and the CHP; Count Two is DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants Placer County, the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, and the CHP; Counts Three, Seven, and Nine are DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants State Parks, the CHP, Placer County, and the Placer County Sheriff’s Office; Count Four is DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants State Parks and the CHP; and Counts Five, Ten, and Eleven are DISMISSED without prejudice as against all defendants; Count Eight is DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants State Parks, Placer County, and the Placer County Sheriff’s Office; AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motions to dismiss be, and the same hereby are, DENIED in all other respects.9 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of
9 In other words, the sole remaining claims are Count One against Yarbrough, and Counts Two, Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine against both Yarbrough and Guillemin. eee NE EIR EEE NE ON
this Order to file an amended complaint if she can do so consistent with this Order. Dated: August 22, 2025 hte a ~ ak pag! sé UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26