Nivison-Weiskopf Co. v. Commissioner

18 T.C. 1025, 1952 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 101
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 18, 1952
DocketDocket No. 26564
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 18 T.C. 1025 (Nivison-Weiskopf Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nivison-Weiskopf Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1025, 1952 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 101 (tax 1952).

Opinion

OPINION.

Offer, Judge:

This proceeding grows out of a partial denial of an application for relief from excess profits tax under section 722. Respondent’s rejections of the claims for refund were in the respective amounts of $7,744.05 for 1942 and $5,796.24 for 1945. As to the latter year, respondent has now abandoned his contest, so that the only year remaining in controversy is 1942 and the only question to be decided is whether respondent was correct in applying the ruling known as E. P. C. 29 to petitioner’s claim and thereby reducing its constructive base period net income under section 722 from $50,834.72 to $12,493.48.

All of the facts have been stipulated. They are hereby found accordingly. Petitioner filed its income and excess profits tax returns with the collector for the first district of Ohio.

The essence of E. P. C. 29 (1948-1 C. B. 90 )1 is that where there is involved in a reconstruction of income under section 722 an actual loss at the end of the base period so that the taxpayer obtains the benefit of a net loss carry-over to an excess .profits tax year, the constructive average base period net income otherwise applicable to that year will be reduced by one hundred ninety-fifths of the net loss carry-over.

Applying that concept with conceded fidelity, “respondent” in the words of the stipulation “in determining that petitioner’s constructive average base period net income of $50,834.72 for the taxable year 1942 should be adjusted to $12,493.48, applied a ruling designated as E. P. C. 29. * * His computation was as follows:

Constructive average base period net income-$50,834.72
Net operating loss deduction-$36,424.18
10Ó/95 of $36,424.18- 38> 341.24
Constructive average base period income as adjusted-$12,493.48

Having ascertained that the tax would be less under the invested capital method, respondent denied relief for 1942 under section 722.

Petitioner’s “constructive average base period net income” is thus determined to be $50,834.72, the figure for which petitioner contends. If this were doubtful, it would be confirmed by the fact that the same figure has been employed in granting relief for other years not here in controversy; that the parties have agreed that “in the event the Court should find that the application of E. P. C. 29 * * * is erroneous, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of an unused excess profits credit carry-over, based on its constructive average base period net income determined under Section 722 * * and by the reference in E. P. C. 29 to “the object of the adjustment” as being “to subject to excess profits tax an amount of adjusted excess profits net income equal to the amount that would have been taxed had there Been no net operating loss deduction.”

In attempting thus to neutralize the net loss carry-over we think the Council and respondent are in error. The two provisions are distinct, and there is no indication that special relief under section 722 was intended to be bought at the price of foregoing the net loss carry-over to which all eligible taxpayers are entitled. In fact, the concept of the “constructive” base period income as an “average” and the provision for its application as a credit in lieu of actual base period income for each excess profits tax year,2 is at war with the hypothesis that it needs adjustment depending on the special circumstances of one year as against another. See Clinton Carpet Co., 14 T. C. 581, 587. Since section 722 and the net loss provisions are in each case separately applicable, we see no problem of equity in applying both where both are appropriate. Cf. Industrial Loan Society, Inc., (Md.), 14 T. C. 487.

That the section 722 figure is a “constructive” or imaginary, and hence necessarily an unreal, amount, see Fezandie & Sperrle, Inc., 5 T. C. 1185; D. L. Auld Co., 17 T. C. 1199, 1208, renders it totally unnecessary to attempt, as the Council and respondent have done in E. P. C. 29, to reconcile actual losses and their statutory consequence with the “constructive average base period [plus] income” of section 722.

E. P. C. 29 is no more than a ruling. It has never been given the force of a regulation. Cf. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110. We view it, and respondent’s action here based upon it, as erroneous.

Keviewed by the Special Division.

Decision will be entered under Rule B0.

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Related

United States v. Francis L. Higginson, Trustees
238 F.2d 439 (First Circuit, 1956)
Standard Tube Co. v. Commissioner
26 T.C. 915 (U.S. Tax Court, 1956)
Nivison-Weiskopf Co. v. Commissioner
18 T.C. 1025 (U.S. Tax Court, 1952)

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Bluebook (online)
18 T.C. 1025, 1952 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nivison-weiskopf-co-v-commissioner-tax-1952.