Ninfa Flores, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 8, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-03072
StatusUnknown

This text of Ninfa Flores, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al. (Ninfa Flores, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ninfa Flores, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al., (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 NINFA FLORES, et al. Case No. 2:25-cv-03072-FLA 12 Plaintiffs, (SSCx) [Consolidated with Case 13 v. No. 2:25-cv-06943-FLA (SSCx)]

14 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al. STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 15 Defendant(s). ORDER1 16

17 1. INTRODUCTION 18 1.1 Purposes and Limitations. Discovery in this action is likely to 19 involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for 20 which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any 21 purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 22 Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to 23 24 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties 25

26 1 This Stipulated Protective Order is substantially based on the model 27 protective order provided under Magistrate Judge Stephanie S. 1 acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all 2 disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords 3 from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or 4 items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 5 legal principles. 6 1.2 Good Cause Statement. Defendants contend that there is 7 good cause and a particularized need for a protective order to preserve 8 the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer personnel file 9 records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 10 following reasons. 11 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal 12 privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable 13 expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and 14 arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California 15 law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033–34 (9th 16 Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 17 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to 18 privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state 19 privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly 20 assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. 21 22 City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace 23 officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not 24 inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 25 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend 26 that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can 27 1 threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 2 families/associates. 3 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law 4 enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process 5 privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement 6 privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work 7 product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers 8 – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that 9 contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 10 evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or 11 rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited 12 to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or 13 reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, 14 and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 15 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033–34; 16 Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 17 1092–95 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613 & n4; Kelly v. City of 18 San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668–71 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 19 F.R.D. 175, 176–77 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. 20 LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 21 22 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend 23 that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the 24 public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law 25 and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of 26 officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness 27 information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 1 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion 2 regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a 3 public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 4 measures that may be required. 5 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the 6 same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled 7 statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to 8 permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See 9 generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828–30 (1985); 10 cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 11 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order 12 preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and 13 will likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s 14 interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, 15 obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the safety of 16 witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 17 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, 18 and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally 19 undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential 20 information – as can and often does result in litigation. 21 22 Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ 23 contentions stated above. Plaintiffs agree, however, that there is good 24 cause for a Protective Order so as to preserve the respective interests of 25 the parties. Plaintiffs recognize that, absent this Stipulated Protective 26 Order, the parties' respective privilege interests may be impaired or 27 harmed, and that this Stipulated Protective Order may mitigate such 1 harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk 2 that confidential information will become matters of public record. 3 The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized 4 need for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and 5 autopsy photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. 6 Plaintiff L.M.E. is a minor, and there may be a need to protect certain 7 records pertaining to them. Because of these sensitive interests, a Court 8 Order should address these documents rather than a private agreement 9 between the parties. 10 2. DEFINITIONS 11 2.1 Action: this pending federal lawsuit. 12 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the 13 designation of information or items under this Order. 14 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information 15 (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible 16 things that qualify for protection under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of 17 18 Civil Procedure, and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 19 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as 20 well as their support staff).

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Shumate v. Wahlers
19 F.R.D. 173 (E.D. Michigan, 1956)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)

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