Nikola v. Foley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-4674
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS LINDSEY NIKOLA, No. 24-4674 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00811-SPG-JPR Central District of California, v. Los Angeles PETER FOLEY and UNITED STATES ORDER SKI & SNOWBOARD,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 24-4752 ROSEY FLETCHER; et al., D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00803-SPG-JPR Plaintiffs - Appellants, Central District of California, Los Angeles v.

UNITED STATES SKI & SNOWBOARD; et al.,

Before: GILMAN, WARDLAW, and KOH, Circuit Judges.*

The memorandum disposition filed on November 3, 2025, is amended, and

the amended memorandum disposition is filed concurrently with this order. The

panel has unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing and to deny

* The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation. the petition for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition

for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the

matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 40. The petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc is denied.

No further petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc will be

entertained.

2 24-4674 NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LINDSEY NIKOLA, No. 24-4674 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00811-SPG-JPR v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM*

PETER FOLEY; UNITED STATES SKI & SNOWBOARD,

ROSEY FLETCHER; ERIN O’MALLEY; No. 24-4752 CALLAN CHYTHLOOK-SIFSOF, D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellants, 2:23-cv-00803-SPG-JPR

v.

UNITED STATES SKI & SNOWBOARD; PETER FOLEY; UNITED STATES OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Argued and Submitted October 7, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: GILMAN, WARDLAW, and KOH, Circuit Judges.**

Lindsey Nikola (No. 24-4674), Rosey Fletcher, Erin O’Malley, and Callan

Chythlook-Sifsof (No. 24-4752) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the district

court’s dismissal of their RICO and California state-law claims under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the

reasons below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

proceedings. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts.

1. The district court correctly found that it lacked general jurisdiction over

Appellees. “[A] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or

foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their

affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them

essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,

127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.

915, 919 (2011)). The “paradigm” fora in which a corporate defendant is “at

home” are its “place of incorporation and principal place of business.” Id. at 137.

By comparison, individuals are subject to general jurisdiction in their state of

** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation.

2 24-4674 domicile. Id. Although the exercise of general jurisdiction is not strictly limited to

those fora, it extends only to “an exceptional case” where a defendant’s operations

in another state are “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation

at home in that State.” Id. at 139 n.19.

The district court found that (1) Foley is domiciled in Oregon; (2) United

States Ski and Snowboard Association (“USSS”) is headquartered and has its

principal place of business in Park City, Utah; and (3) United States Olympic and

Paralympic Committee (“USOPC”) is headquartered and has its principal place of

business in Colorado Springs, Colorado.1 Accordingly, the district court correctly

concluded that it could not exercise general jurisdiction over Appellees, see

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137, unless Appellants presented “an exceptional case” to do

so, id. at 137 n.19. We agree with the district court that Appellants have not made

such a showing.

In Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., we held that a defendant-

corporation’s contacts with California fell “well short” of the “continuous and

systematic” contacts necessary to support general jurisdiction even though the

defendant had contracted with California entities, purchased California goods, and

maintained a website accessible in the state. 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004)

1 For purposes of this disposition, we collectively refer to Foley, USSS, and USPOC as (“Appellees”).

3 24-4674 (emphasis added) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 418 (1984)). Here, Appellants rely primarily on the fact that Appellees

have coached, organized training events, and held competitions in California.

Those activities are not “so substantial and of such a nature as to render

[Appellees] at home” in California. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19. Exercising

general jurisdiction on those bases alone would be “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at

138.

2. The district court correctly determined that it lacked specific jurisdiction

over Appellants’ contract claims. However, we conclude that the district court

erred in declining to exercise specific jurisdiction over several of Appellants’ tort

claims. We analyze specific personal jurisdiction under a three-part test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc).

In contract cases, we ask whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of

the forum’s privileges, focusing on activities “such as executing or performing a

contract there.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. In tort cases, we instead apply

4 24-4674 the Calder effects test, which asks whether the defendant “(1) commit[ed] an

intentional act, that is (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) which causes

harm that the defendant knows will be suffered in the forum state.” Shopify, 135

F.4th at 751; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).2 Notably,

Calder does not “require in purposeful direction cases that all (or even any)

jurisdictionally relevant effects have been caused by wrongful acts.” Yahoo! Inc.

v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc). Rather, “we must evaluate all of a defendant’s contacts with the

forum state, whether or not those contacts involve wrongful activity by the

defendant.” Id.; see also Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 157 F.4th 1103, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2025) (finding personal jurisdiction “[a]lthough the tortious conduct primarily

occurred” outside of the forum state).

Appellants bear the burden of satisfying the first two Shopify prongs. See

Shopify, 135 F.4th at 751. If they meet their burden, Appellees must “present a

compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render

jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477

(1985).

2 However, we note that “our cases do not impose a rigid dividing line between” purposeful direction and availment. Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols., Ltd., 71 F.4th 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5 24-4674 A. Contract Claims

The district court correctly determined that it lacked specific jurisdiction

over Appellants’ contract claims. Purposeful availment in contract cases requires

affirmative conduct within the forum, such as executing or performing a contract

there. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. But see Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942

F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While we concede that negotiations did take place

at that time, it should be borne in mind that temporary physical presence in the

forum does not suffice to confer personal jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Importantly, the mere existence of a contract with a forum resident is

insufficient; courts must consider the parties’ negotiations, contemplated future

consequences, and course of dealing. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79; Roth,

942 F.2d at 621–22. Here, Appellants allege no negotiations, contract terms, or

contemplated obligations tied specifically to California. Their theory that

jurisdiction follows simply because the alleged breach of contract occurred during

California-based events would collapse the analysis into the mere existence of a

contract, contrary to precedent. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 621–22; Schwarzenegger,

374 F.3d at 802.

B. Tort Claims

The district court erred, however, in concluding that it lacked specific

jurisdiction over several of Appellants’ tort claims—namely, their claims for

6 24-4674 sexual harassment, negligence, negligent supervision and retention, and negligent

and intentional infliction of emotion distress. The court found that Appellants

failed to allege California-based conduct by Appellees that gave rise to their

injuries. We disagree.

A “lawsuit arises out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum state if a

direct nexus exists between those contacts and the cause of action.” Fireman’s

Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). Here,

Appellants allege that Foley groomed them during training camps, events, and

competitions held in California and that USSS and USOPC, despite having

knowledge of Foley’s predatory behavior, collectively organized and facilitated

those events. Appellants contend that Foley’s access to the athletes (Fletcher,

O’Malley, and Chythlook-Sifsof) was made possible through those California-

based team activities and that at least one assault occurred immediately following a

California training camp. Similarly, Appellants argue that Nikola traveled with

Foley to team activities in California in her role as a USSS employee, which

allowed Foley to abuse her. Accepting those allegations as true, see Bancroft &

Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000), “but for”

the trainings, competitions, and related events hosted in California, Appellants

would not have suffered the alleged harms in that forum state. See Omeluk v.

Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995). These facts

7 24-4674 describe sufficient California contacts by each Appellee and establish a causal

nexus with Appellants’ tort claims. See Shopify, 135 F.4th at 762.

Accordingly, Appellants have satisfied the first two prongs of the specific-

jurisdiction test with respect to their claims for sexual harassment, negligence,

negligent supervision and retention, and negligent and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

3. Finally, Appellees have “not shown that litigation in California has been

or would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient as to render the court’s exercise

of personal jurisdiction unreasonable.” Fireman’s Fund, 103 F.3d at 895 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Appellees have frequently traveled to California for

official events, and much of that travel is directly related to the events giving rise

to this suit. See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, California has a substantial interest in providing a forum for its

residents who are victims of sexual abuse. See id. at 1115–16. Additionally, if

California were not a proper forum, Appellants would likely be forced to pursue

separate suits in multiple jurisdictions, as no single forum appears able to exercise

jurisdiction over all defendants. See id. at 1116.

Although “[t]he district court did not reach this part of the inquiry,” we may

address the reasonableness prong based on the record before the district court

because “the analysis here is straightforward” and Appellees “ha[ve] not shown

8 24-4674 that exercising specific jurisdiction over [them] in California would be

unreasonable, much less presented a ‘compelling case’ as to why that would be

so.” Impossible Foods Inc. v. Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 1099 (9th Cir.

2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2561 (2024). We therefore hold that the district

court erred in declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Appellees.

We note that “the district court may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction

over any remaining claims that arise out of the same common nucleus of operative

facts as the claim for which jurisdiction exists.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206,

1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because we

conclude that the district court has specific jurisdiction over some of Appellants’

claims, on remand the district court should consider exercising jurisdiction over

Appellants’ sexual assault, battery, and remaining claims to the extent that the

claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” Mpoyo v. Litton

Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Whether two events

[share a common nucleus of operative fact] depends on whether they are related to

the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be tried together.”

(emphasis added)).

We AFFIRM the district court’s determination that it could not exercise

general jurisdiction over Appellees. We REVERSE its determination that it

lacked specific jurisdiction over certain of Appellants’ tort claims. We REMAND

9 24-4674 for the district court to consider whether it may exercise pendent personal

jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Costs on appeal are taxed against the

appellees.

10 24-4674