Nigerian Air Force v. Van Hise

443 So. 2d 273, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25242
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 20, 1983
DocketNo. 83-480
StatusPublished

This text of 443 So. 2d 273 (Nigerian Air Force v. Van Hise) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nigerian Air Force v. Van Hise, 443 So. 2d 273, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25242 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

BARKDULL, Judge.

Some 2¾⅞ years after an adverse final judgment entered following a default, the Nigerian Air Force (hereinafter referred to as NAF) a branch of the Nigerian government, filed a motion pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 1.540(b)(4) seeking relief from said final judgment. Upon denial of that motion, this appeal ensued.

From the record the following appears, James Van Hise (hereinafter referred to as JVH) while residing in the Federal Republic of Nigeria offered to purchase an airplane from the Nigerian Air Force. This offer was accepted, the purchase price of the airplane was paid and the plane was to be delivered in Nigeria. JVH moved to Florida and subsequently NAF, by letter dated April 14, 1977 informed JVH that because of certain improvements to the plane he would have to submit a new offer. No new offer was forthcoming and JVH instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida for breach of contract. Service was purportedly made on' the NAF pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1605.1

Thereafter the trial court granted a default for failure to plea and the matter was set for jury trial as demanded in the complaint. At the time it came on to be heard before a jury, the jury demand was withdrawn and the matter was placed on a nonjury calendar without notice to the NAF and subsequently at an ex parte hearing the trial court entered a final judgment in the total amount of $121,961.65 dated March 3, 1980. On December 3, 1982 NAF moved to vacate the final judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(4) Fla.R.Civ.P.2 This motion was denied and this appeal ensued.

[275]*275The section of Title 28 U.S.C. cited in the first footnote requires certain prerequisites before jurisdiction may be obtained over a foreign sovereign. NAF contends that the judgment was void for subject matter jurisdiction. JVH responds that even if it is a void judgment, no attack was made within a reasonable period of time and therefore the trial court should be sustained in its denial of relief, NAF having notice of the original proceeding. State v. Chillingworth, 126 Fla. 645, 171 So. 649 (1936); Voorhies v. Barnsley, 116 Fla. 191, 156 So. 234 (1934); Walker v. Carver, 93 Fla. 337, 112 So. 45 (1927); Craven v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 226 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).

The federal congress with the adoption of Section 1602 et seq, Title 28 U.S.C. code has established a uniform procedure for bringing actions against foreign sovereigns which are exceptions to general immunity from civil processes- that are enjoyed by foreign sovereigns in this country. Only when a domestic litigant can meet the conditions set forth in the federal statutes may he proceed with civil litigation in either the state or federal courts. Therefore, our first inquiry must be under the facts recited above, what acts of NAF would meet the conditions prescribed in the federal statutes which would constitute an exception to jurisdictional immunity and subject them to domestic jurisdiction in the courts of Florida.

JVH candidly admits that his sole claim against the foreign sovereign must rise or fall on the letter addressed to him in the State of Florida urging that this construed a breach of contract, which would be commercial activity having a direct effect in the United States. It is plain from the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) that due process notions of minimum contacts have been incorporated in the act. Wauhesha Engine Division, Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Nacional De Fomento Cooperative, 485 F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Wis.1980); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F.Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y.1978). The letter received by JVH requesting a new offer for purchase of the airplane sought new negotiations between the parties for purchase of the plane and as such it did not constitute an activity having a direct effect in the market place of the United States. East Europe [276]*276Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F.Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.1979); See Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F.Supp. 981 (N.D.Ill.1980). Furthermore, the fact that the purported injury took place in the United States only because the plaintiff is domiciled or doing business here does not constitute contact for due process purposes. East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra, supra.

Therefore, we hold that the letter relied upon herein failed to constitute a direct effect on the United States as required by Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1605 and that the plaintiff has failed to prove the minimum contacts necessary to constitute an exception to the NAF’s claim of sovereign immunity.

In passing we note that the waiver of jury trial did not conform to the rules of court or the authority interpreting them.3 However, we do not think that this failure to comply with the rules makés the judgment void, but we think it would be merely voidable and therefore is time barred because of the failure to raise it within one year in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1.540(b)(4) Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We also have serious doubt whether a claim against a foreign sovereign may be maintained in a trial court before a jury. There is good public policy for the Congress in establishing certain jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in civil proceedings to limiting these proceedings to matters that could be considered nonjury, it being obvious that as to certain foreign sovereigns, juries might be prejudiced in their responsibilities. We have been cited to no case that indicates that juries will be permitted in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1605 actions and believe that the reasonable interpretations of the federal code are as outlined above. Therefore no error occurred in trying this cause nonjury because a jury was not validly demanded in the first instance.

Based on the foregoing reasonings we must reverse the trial court and remand the cause for purposes of vacating the final judgment and for entry of an order dismissing the original complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of the claim of sovereign immunity.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

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Related

Craven v. FIELDS, INC.
226 So. 2d 407 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1969)
East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra
467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. New York, 1979)
Carey v. National Oil Corp.
453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. New York, 1978)
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran
506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Illinois, 1980)
Jayre Inc. v. WACHOVIA BANK & TR. CO.
420 So. 2d 937 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1982)
Air Unlimited Inc. v. Volare Air, Inc.
428 So. 2d 294 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1983)
Walker and Walker v. Carver
112 So. 45 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1927)
State Ex Rel. Gore v. Chillingworth
171 So. 649 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1936)
Voorhies Et Ux. v. Barnsley
156 So. 234 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1934)

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Bluebook (online)
443 So. 2d 273, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nigerian-air-force-v-van-hise-fladistctapp-1983.