Nifakos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedFebruary 12, 2019
Docket14-236
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nifakos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Nifakos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Nifakos v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2019).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: December 12, 2018

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * UNPUBLISHED * VICTORIA NIFAKOS, * * No. 14-236V Petitioner, * * v. * Special Master Oler * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Duplicative Billing; * Administrative Tasks; Expert Costs. Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Mark Theodore Sadaka, Mark T. Sadaka, LLC, Englewood, NJ, for Petitioner.

Lara Ann Englund, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Oler, Special Master:

On March 27, 2014, Victoria Nifakos (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“the Program”),2 alleging that she suffered non- Hodgkin’s lymphoma that was caused or significantly aggravated by her receipt of the Hepatitis A, Menactra, Varivax, and human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations on June 29, 2011. ECF No. 1 at 1. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, I scheduled an entitlement hearing in this case for June 18 and 19, 2019. See Pre-Hearing Order of July 24, 2018, ECF No. 75. Petitioner now requests an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), a party has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, I will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §300aa (2012). 1 I. The Instant Motion

On June 1, 2018, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs (“Interim Motion”), requesting $25,358.94 in attorneys’ fees for her counsel of record, Mark T. Sadaka of Mark T. Sadaka, LLC (“the Sadaka Firm”), and $12,926.37 in attorneys’ costs, for a total of $38,285.31. See Interim Motion (ECF No. 72) at 1; see also Ex. A at 20-22, attached as ECF No. 72-1.3 A review of the Interim Motion does not reflect that Petitioner herself has borne any out-of- pocket expenses up to this point in the litigation. See generally Interim Motion; Exs. A and B.

Respondent filed a response to Petitioner’s Interim Motion on June 12, 2018. Respondent’s Response (ECF No. 73). Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for [R]espondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that he is “satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. Additionally, he “respectfully recommends that [I] exercise [my] discretion and determine a reasonable award for interim attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 3.

Petitioner filed a reply on June 13, 2018, stating that Respondent “does not raise a challenge to good faith and reasonable basis of her claim,” and thus “requests that her [instant] application be granted.” Petitioner’s Reply at 1, ECF No. 74. This matter is now ripe for a decision.

For the reasons discussed below, I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s Interim Motion, awarding a total of $22,819.36 in attorneys’ fees, and costs in the amount of $6,926.37, while deferring ruling on one of Petitioner’s expert costs.

II. Legal Standard for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit has stated, “Congress made clear that denying interim attorneys' fees under the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” 515 F.3d at 1352. In Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. However, Avera did not exclusively define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special masters discretion. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-241V, 2013 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Even though

3 Petitioner filed Exhibits A and B with her application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs without proper pagination. See generally Ex. A (ECF No. 72-1) and Ex. B (ECF No. 72-2). Thus, for ease of reference, I will use the page numbers generated from the CM/ECF filing reflected at the top of the page. 2 it has been argued that a petitioner must meet the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony, and undue hardship -- special masters have instead treated these criteria as possible factors in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner; it also looks at any money expended by petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2013 WL 775396, at *2 (finding “the general principle underlying an award of interim fees was clear: avoid working a substantial financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.”). As her Interim Motion points out, by the time of the entitlement hearing scheduled in this case, Petitioner, and her counsel, will have been litigating this claim for more than eight years. ECF No. 72 at 1. I thus find it reasonable to award interim attorneys’ fees and costs at this juncture to avoid undue hardship for Petitioner’s counsel.

III. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

If interim fees are deemed appropriate, a petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the special master finds that a petitioner brought his/her petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis. §15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw v.

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