Nickelson v. DeMarchena

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 20, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-03847
StatusUnknown

This text of Nickelson v. DeMarchena (Nickelson v. DeMarchena) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nickelson v. DeMarchena, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DARRELL WENDELL NICKELSON, Plaintiff, 25-CV-3847 (KMW) -against- ORDER TO AMEND ALBERTO DEMARCHENA; SCOTT CALLAHAN; DARCEL D. CLARK, Defendants. KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is currently detained on Rikers Island. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights during his arrest and subsequent prosecution.1 By Order dated May 15, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this Order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

1 Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. On May 8, 2025, that court transferred the action here. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” courts provide to pro se litigants, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint.3 On October 31, 2024, in the Bronx, Defendants Alberto DeMarchena and Scott Callahan, officers with the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), “illegally gained entry to a living domicile . . . [and] conducted a search

of the premises without permission or proper obtainment of the court’s allocution of a search warrant.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Presumably as a result of this search, DeMarchena and Callahan arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff names as defendants these two officers and Bronx District Attorney (“DA”) Darcel Clark. He seeks money damages as compensation for his arrest and subsequent detention.

3 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation appear as in the complaint, unless noted otherwise. Attached to the complaint are documents from Plaintiff’s criminal case, which appears to be ongoing.

DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD officers do not state a claim under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but it

need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678-79. After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Plaintiff does not provide enough information for the Court and the Defendants to determine whether the allegations plausibly suggest that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Specifically, the complaint does not plead facts describing what exactly occurred and why Plaintiff believes that each of the Defendants violated his rights. For example, Plaintiff asserts conclusions that officers illegally entered “a domicile” and arrested him without cause. However, Plaintiff does not state sufficient facts to support those conclusions beyond stating that

he did not given permission and that there was no search warrant. Plaintiff’s complaint does not make clear whose domicile the police entered or whether that domicile belonged to Plaintiff. Without more specific facts describing what occurred before, during, and after Plaintiff’s arrest, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff can state a claim that Defendants violated his rights.4 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to state facts demonstrating that he is entitled to relief from the Defendants. B. Plaintiff’s claims against DA Clark must be dismissed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a

“functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations, but are taken in preparation for and in the conduct of trial. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Bluebook (online)
Nickelson v. DeMarchena, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nickelson-v-demarchena-nysd-2025.