Nichols v. The Cadle Company

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Nichols v. The Cadle Company. Read the opinion of the Court — 101 F.3d 1448
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided December 19, 1996·No. 96-1777·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 96-1777

SARGENT D. NICHOLS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF

ANDOVER NORTHWAY REALTY TRUST, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

THE CADLE CO.,

Defendant, Appellee.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

_________________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

_________________________

Gilbert R. Hoy, Jr. for appellants. ___________________
Alvin S. Nathanson, with whom Shannon M. Fitzpatrick and ___________________ _______________________
Nathanson & Goldberg, PC were on brief, for appellee. ________________________

_________________________

December 19, 1996

_________________________

Per Curiam. This appeal illustrates once again that Per Curiam. __________

the overly generous use of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) by a well-

intentioned district judge can create a minefield for litigants

and appellate courts alike. Though the appeal itself amounts to

an exercise in futility, see infra, it should serve as a reminder ___ _____

that haste makes waste. There are often untoward consequences

when judges too readily acquiesce in the suggested entry of

"partial" final judgments.

The basic procedural facts are undisputed. The

plaintiffs owned valuable commercial real estate located in

Peabody, Massachusetts. After their original lender plummeted

into receivership, the defendant Cadle Co. (Cadle) acquired the

mortgage on the property from the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation. Inasmuch as the mortgage note was in arrears, Cadle

foreclosed on the property and took possession of it.

The plaintiffs sued, claiming inter alia breach of an _____ ____

agreement to forbear (count 1), wrongful interference with

economic relationships (count 2), fraud (count 3), and unfair

trade practices in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, 11

(count 5). The plaintiffs also sought specific performance of

the supposed forbearance agreement (count 4) and declaratory

relief (count 6). All six counts implicated the mortgage note,

the foreclosure, and Cadle's conduct in respect thereto. Cadle

denied the plaintiffs' allegations, pointed to the relatively low

price that the property had brought at auction, and

counterclaimed for the deficiency that it thought was due on the

2

mortgage note.

After discovery had been conducted, the district court

granted partial summary judgment in Cadle's favor. This ruling

dispatched counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the complaint, leaving

count 5 and Cadle's counterclaims unaffected. The court

thereafter certified the judgment as final under Rule 54(b).1

Although the court made a rote recitation that there was no just

reason to delay the entry of judgment, it failed to substantiate

that conclusion. Using the district court's Rule 54(b)

certificate as a springboard, the plaintiffs prosecuted this

appeal.

It is trite, but true, that piecemeal appellate review

invites mischief. Because the practice poses a host of

potential problems we have warned, time and again, that Rule

54(b) should be used sparingly. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail ___ ____ _________________

Corp. v. Fore River Ry. Co., 861 F.2d 322, 325 (1st Cir. 1988); _____ __________________

Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. _______ ________________________

1988); Santa Maria v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 854 (1st ___________ _________________

Cir. 1986). We have also admonished that a district court intent
____________________

1Ordinarily, a judgment is final (and, thus, appealable
under 28 U.S.C. 1291) only if it conclusively determines all
claims of all parties to the action. See generally Catlin v. ___ _________ ______
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (stating that a final _____________
decision generally is one which "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment"). Rule 54(b) limns an exception to this principle. It
provides in relevant part: "When more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action . . . the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties . . . upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of [such a] judgment. . . ."

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