Nicholas Birmingham v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-10938
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10938 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

NICHOLAS BIRMINGHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00737-KFP ____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Nicholas Birmingham appeals the grant of summary judg- ment to his previous employer, Hyundai Motor Manufacturing USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 2 of 13

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Alabama, LLC, on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims. After careful review, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND From June 2018 through February 2023, Birmingham worked on the engine production line at the Hyundai manufactur- ing facility in Montgomery, Alabama. Birmingham suffers from chronic asthma and bronchitis, which resulted in him sometimes missing work. By the end of 2022, Birmingham had exhausted his annual Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave but continued to submit FMLA requests, which were denied. Birmingham faced dis- ciplinary action for his excessive absences and Hyundai ultimately terminated him when he continued to miss work. Shortly after his termination, Birmingham filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of dis- crimination that asserted, as relevant here, that he was terminated because he had taken medical time off “directly connected to” his disability “and because [Hyundai] believed that [his] condition was likely to continue to require [him] to miss additional work days.” Birmingham contended Hyundai forced him “to sign a commit- ment letter that subjected [him] to more restrictive scrutiny of” his FMLA leave, which was a basis for his termination. Hyundai re- sponded that it fired Birmingham solely for his excessive absentee- ism, and it had no knowledge of Birmingham’s disability, nor did Birmingham request accommodations for it. It elaborated that, de- spite the corrective opportunities presented, Birmingham failed to USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 3 of 13

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provide company-approved coverage for his absences and did not timely return his commitment letter. In December 2023, Birmingham, through counsel, filed the instant complaint against Hyundai, alleging one count of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and one count of retaliation, in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). The parties consented to a mag- istrate judge handling the proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and proceeded to discovery. Several months later, Hyundai moved for summary judg- ment. As relevant here, Hyundai argued that Birmingham could not show that he satisfied the essential functions of his job due to his attendance issues and did not demonstrate that Hyundai knew of his disability at the time of termination. It also contended that Birmingham failed to establish that any FMLA-related issues moti- vated his termination. Hyundai submitted several exhibits in sup- port of its motion, which revealed the following. Hyundai’s 2022 employee handbook required that employ- ees attend 99% of their scheduled workdays, excluding absences covered by approved leave or vacation. Violation of this attend- ance policy was grounds for disciplinary action. Hyundai also main- tained a “Serious Misconduct Policy,” that identified certain con- duct beyond the bounds of its regular “corrective action” policy and provided for more severe disciplinary action, including termi- nation, in such circumstances. One example of behavior falling un- der the serious misconduct policy was “[s]erious and/or excessive USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 4 of 13

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violations of [Hyundai’s] attendance policy.” When an employee violated the serious misconduct policy, but termination was not appropriate, they would receive a “Letter of Conditional Employ- ment” requiring that they return a commitment letter setting out a plan to improve their behavior. Ta’Lon Brown, Hyundai’s Assistant Manager of Investiga- tions, explained that five absences within a fourteen-day period merited issuance of a serious misconduct finding. Employees with a series of absences qualifying as serious misconduct could receive a warning letter, providing them a chance to show that their ab- sences were company-approved. If they failed to do so, employees could be placed on serious misconduct status, or terminated if they were already on such status. Hyundai could terminate an em- ployee on serious misconduct status if they were absent one more time and their attendance had not improved to 99% during a roll- ing twelve-month period. On December 9, 2022, Hyundai sent Birmingham a warning letter informing him that its third-party administrator, The Hart- ford, had denied him FMLA leave for fifteen absences, and it re- quested that Birmingham provide documentation showing that these absences were covered by company-approved leave. The let- ter informed him that if he failed to provide such documentation, these absences would count against his 99%-attendance calcula- tion, and it warned Birmingham of the serious misconduct policy and that excessive unexcused absences could result in his termina- tion. When Birmingham failed to timely provide documentation USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 5 of 13

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for many of these absences, the Employment Review Committee (“ERC”) made the decision to place him on serious misconduct sta- tus. Hyundai officially placed Birmingham on serious miscon- duct status on February 1, 2023. Hyundai also gave him a commit- ment letter to sign and return by the end of his next shift, which was on February 2, 2023, setting out his intent to prevent similar attendance issues. However, Birmingham did not report to work on February 2 due to his health and he was out on pre-approved vacation from February 3 through February 9. Birmingham there- fore did not return the signed commitment letter until February 10. This was too late. Once Birmingham missed work on Feb- ruary 2, Brown prepared an employment review summary for the ERC. And, at a February 16 meeting, the ERC decided to terminate Birmingham because he was on serious misconduct status due to his excessive absenteeism, his attendance rate was lower than 99%, and he accrued an additional unexcused absence. Brown indicated that she received no information regarding Birmingham’s disability or that he sought unpaid leave, FMLA leave or other accommoda- tions, and, to her knowledge, no disability or respiratory condition played any role in the decision to terminate Birmingham. Reginald Williams, Senior Human Resources Manager and sole decisionmaker for corrective actions and terminations for the ERC, reported the same information as Brown. Specifically, he stated that he “made the decision to discharge . . . Birmingham USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 6 of 13

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because [he], while on ‘serious misconduct’ for excessive absentee- ism and while having an attendance percentage below 99%, also had an additional unexcused absence on February 2, 2023.” While Williams indicated that it was “possible” he had access to Birming- ham’s commitment letter, which stated he missed work due to health issues and was denied FMLA leave, he explained that he did not have information regarding employee-specific health condi- tions during ERC meetings and did not know of Birmingham’s dis- ability. Birmingham received his termination letter on February 21, 2023. In a deposition, Birmingham testified that he was aware of Hyundai’s attendance policies and had online access to the em- ployee handbook, having accessed it at least four times. Birming- ham explained that he felt that Hyundai “threatened” his job by placing him on serious misconduct status and asking him to sign the commitment letter when he was suffering from his disability, and he did not know at that time that another unexcused absence within a twelve-month rolling period would cause his termination. However, he also acknowledged that regular onsite attendance was required for his job and confirmed that he did not ask for any other type of leave after exhausting his FMLA leave. He likewise testified that no one told him, nor was he led to believe by man- agement, that Hyundai terminated him due to his disability or his use of FMLA leave. Birmingham further conceded that Hyundai’s scrutiny of his attendance was based on absences he accrued after exhausting his FMLA leave, rather than absences covered by ap- proved leave. USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 7 of 13

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Birmingham responded in opposition to Hyundai’s request for summary judgment and submitted a document he labeled “Notes of the January 2023 Hyundai [ERC] meeting,” which indi- cated that he “was brought forth by the Medical Review Team” in January 2023 “as a result of excessive absenteeism,” submitted sev- eral FMLA claims in 2022 that were denied and was at the time “active and reporting to work.” Following Hyundai’s reply, the magistrate judge granted its motion for summary judgment. As relevant here, the magistrate judge assumed that Birmingham was disabled but concluded that he failed to establish that he was a “qualified individual” under the ADA. The magistrate judge reasoned that Birmingham’s absences showed that he did not satisfy Hyundai’s 99% attendance require- ment, an essential job function of which Birmingham was aware. The magistrate judge further determined that Birmingham’s FMLA retaliation claim failed because, even assuming “that Bir- mingham could establish that he engaged in a statutorily protected FMLA activity,” the record did not support a finding that Hyun- dai’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual. The mag- istrate judge reasoned that, although Hyundai’s EEOC statement mentioned the failure to timely return the commitment letter, it also reiterated that Birmingham’s termination was due to his at- tendance issues. The magistrate judge further found that the record did not show that Birmingham ever raised concerns about future use of FMLA leave nor did the record support a reasonable infer- ence that Birmingham’s delay in returning the commitment letter caused his termination. USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 8 of 13

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The magistrate judge entered final judgment in favor of Hyundai, and this appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and drawing all inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. Baker v. Up- son Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2024). “Sum- mary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine is- sues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1317; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Was Proper on Birmingham’s ADA Claim The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discrimi- nat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). ‘To es- tablish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plain- tiff must show: (1) [he] is disabled; (2) [he] is a qualified individual; and (3) [he] was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his] disability.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, the magistrate judge determined that summary judgment for Hyundai was appropriate primarily because Birming- ham failed at step two. We agree. A “qualified individual” under the ADA is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 9 of 13

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individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “[E]ssential func- tions ‘are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individ- ual with a disability is actually required to perform.’” Holly v. Clair- son Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365). “If the individual is unable to perform an essential function of his job, even with an accommodation, he is, by defini- tion, not a qualified individual and, therefore, not covered under the ADA.” Id. at 1256 (citation modified). While the question of whether a duty is essential is a multifactor, case-by-case determina- tion, we give “substantial weight” to the employer’s “official posi- tion,” including written descriptions in employee handbooks, and the testimony of supervisors. Id. at 1257–58; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). We agree with the lower court that Birmingham failed to genuinely dispute that 99% attendance was an essential function of his job, and we are unpersuaded by Birmingham’s appellate argu- ments to the contrary. Birmingham first contends that Hyundai offered no evi- dence that his job description mentioned the 99%-attendance pol- icy, or that violation of the rule necessarily disqualifies an em- ployee, given that Hyundai first placed him on a corrective action plan instead of immediately terminating him. However, this argu- ment is belied by the record, as Hyundai’s employee handbook spe- cifically stated that employees were required to meet an attendance percentage of 99%. Birmingham confirmed in his deposition that he knew of this requirement and had viewed the employee manual USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 10 of 13

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explaining the attendance policy on multiple occasions. As such, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Birming- ham, his own testimony acknowledged that regular attendance was essential to his job. See Baker, 94 F.4th at 1316–17; Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256–57. Birmingham further contends there is no record evidence that he was categorically unable to achieve 99% attendance in Feb- ruary 2023, he had no major attendance issues in his first three years with Hyundai, and he followed the attendance policy for two months prior to his termination. But even if Birmingham is correct that his absences did not amount to a categorical failure to meet 99% attendance across these specific periods, this argument still fails to make him an ADA-qualified individual. An employee who fails to meet an attendance requirement is not a qualified individual even if that employee’s work is satisfac- tory when present. See Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278–79 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a housekeeping aide failed to show he was a qualified individual where he could not “satisfy the presence requirement of the job” despite being a satisfactory em- ployee when present). Moreover, Hyundai informed Birmingham of his attendance issues at least twice before proceeding with his termination, reinforcing the notion that attendance was an essen- tial function of his job that he failed to perform. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. Finally, Birmingham argues that violating the attendance policy did not necessarily disqualify him under the ADA and that USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 11 of 13

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Hyundai did not clarify which absences pushed him below the 99% threshold. But neither of these arguments point to record evidence from which a jury could conclude that attendance was not essential or that a reasonable accommodation would have solved Birming- ham’s attendance issues. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256–58; Jackson, 22 F.3d at 278–79; see Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365–66. Given that Birmingham could not demonstrate that he was an ADA-qualified individual, we cannot say granting summary judgment to Hyundai on this claim was in error. Because this pro- vides an independent basis for our Court to affirm, we need not address the magistrate judge’s alternative determinations regard- ing Hyundai’s lack of awareness of Birmingham’s disability and Birmingham’s failure to establish causation. B. Summary Judgment Was Proper on Birmingham’s FMLA Claim The FMLA entitles employees to take leave for certain fam- ily and medical reasons. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612. As relevant to this case, an employee may take up to 12 weeks of leave due to a serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform the functions of a position. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A covered employer may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny” the employee’s exercise or attempted exercise of their FMLA rights. Id. § 2615(a)(1). To suc- ceed on a claim of FMLA retaliation, an employee must demon- strate that the employer intentionally took an adverse employment action against the employee for exercising an FMLA right. Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2017). USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 12 of 13

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On appeal, Birmingham maintains that the language of his conditional employment notice supports an inference that Hyun- dai would penalize him for further FMLA denials and Hyundai’s EEOC statement indicates that his failure to timely return the com- mitment letter was a cause of his termination. He contends that a jury could find that his reluctance to sign the commitment letter was a reasonable effort to protect his FMLA leave and his termina- tion was therefore retaliatory. We are unpersuaded by these argu- ments and find that summary judgment was proper because Bir- mingham failed to show that Hyundai terminated him for any rea- son related to his FMLA rights. See Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879, 895 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 162 (2024). Although Birmingham exhausted his FMLA leave in 2022, he fails to meaningfully dispute that Hyundai did not base his ter- mination on use of FMLA leave or requests to take such leave. Ra- ther, the evidence at summary judgment, including Birmingham’s own deposition testimony and the statements of the relevant deci- sionmakers, shows that Hyundai based Birmingham’s termination on his excessive absences that were not FMLA-approved. Cf. Strick- land v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f an employer can show that it refused to reinstate the em- ployee for a reason wholly unrelated to the FMLA leave, the em- ployer is not liable.”). Therefore, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Birmingham, we conclude that Hyundai would have terminated him regardless of whether his absences were USCA11 Case: 25-10938 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 13 of 13

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FMLA-related, and we need not reach the reasonableness of Bir- mingham’s interpretation of Hyundai’s pre-termination actions. See Baker, 94 F.4th at 1316–17; see also Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that our Court “may affirm a judgment on any legal ground”). IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the judgment entered in favor of Hyundai.