Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Tonawanda Assessor

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Tonawanda Assessor

236 A.D.2d 783, 654 N.Y.S.2d 77, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1699

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 7, 1997

DocketAppeal No. 1

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 236 A.D.2d 783 (Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Tonawanda Assessor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Town of Tonawanda Assessor, 236 A.D.2d 783, 654 N.Y.S.2d 77, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1699 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order reversed on the law without costs and motion denied. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of respondents to disqualify counsel for petitioner in various tax certiorari proceedings. The party seeking to disqualify an attorney or law firm must'establish that there was a prior attorney-client relationship and that the former and current representations are both adverse and substantially related (Solow v Grace & Co., 83 NY2d 303, 308; Cardinale v Golinello, 43 NY2d 288, 295-296). Although respondents met the first prong of the test, they failed to establish that the former and current representations are substantially related. Attorney Brennan’s representation of respondents in a tax certiorari proceeding initiated by petitioner in 1975 was brief and limited in nature. Additionally, it is not disputed that the cur[784]*784rent litigation involves a different appraisal, appraiser, Town assessor and Town attorney. There is no proof that Brennan "acquired any confidential information during the prior representation” and, under the circumstances, "there is no realistic possibility that confidences were disclosed” that would be relevant to the current litigation (CNY Mech. Assocs. v Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 229 AD2d 950, 951; see also, Millar El. Indus, v 421 Port Assocs., 228 AD2d 272). Respondents have merely alleged that Brennan obtained confidential information, without specifying the nature of that information or how it would bear on the issues in the current litigation (see, Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. v 250 Church Assocs., 206 AD2d 259, 260; Lightning Park v Wise Lerman & Katz, 197 AD2d 52, 55).

All concur, Wesley, J., not participating. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Glownia, J.—Disqualify Counsel.) Present—Denman, P. J., Pine, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order reversed on the law without costs and motion denied. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of respondents to disqualify counsel for petitioner in various tax certiorari proceedings. The party seeking to disqualify an attorney or law firm must'establish that there was a prior attorney-client relationship and that the former and current representations are both adverse and substantially related (Solow v Grace & Co., 83 NY2d 303, 308; Cardinale v Golinello, 43 NY2d 288, 295-296). Although respondents met the first prong of the test, they failed to establish that the former and current representations are substantially related. Attorney Brennan’s representation of respondents in a tax certiorari proceeding initiated by petitioner in 1975 was brief and limited in nature. Additionally, it is not disputed that the cur[784]*784rent litigation involves a different appraisal, appraiser, Town assessor and Town attorney. There is no proof that Brennan "acquired any confidential information during the prior representation” and, under the circumstances, "there is no realistic possibility that confidences were disclosed” that would be relevant to the current litigation (CNY Mech. Assocs. v Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 229 AD2d 950, 951; see also, Millar El. Indus, v 421 Port Assocs., 228 AD2d 272). Respondents have merely alleged that Brennan obtained confidential information, without specifying the nature of that information or how it would bear on the issues in the current litigation (see, Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. v 250 Church Assocs., 206 AD2d 259, 260; Lightning Park v Wise Lerman & Katz, 197 AD2d 52, 55).

All concur, Wesley, J., not participating. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Glownia, J.—Disqualify Counsel.) Present—Denman, P. J., Pine, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

236 A.D.2d 783, 654 N.Y.S.2d 77, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1699, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/niagara-mohawk-power-corp-v-town-of-tonawanda-assessor-nyappdiv-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack