1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL NGUYEN, et al., Case No. 22-cv-06022-KAW
8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. COMPEL ARBITRATION
10 OKCOIN USA INC., Re: Dkt. No. 11 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiffs Michael Nguyen and Nader George filed the instant putative class action against 14 Defendants OKCoin USA, Inc., alleging that Defendant misrepresented the stability and financial 15 security of a cryptocurrency called TerraUSD (“UST”), resulting in financial loss to the class. 16 (Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 1-1.) Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. 17 (Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration, Dkt. No. 11.) 18 The Court previously deemed this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing 19 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). (Dkt. No. 20.) Having considered the parties’ filings and the 20 relevant legal authorities, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Defendant is a web-based cryptocurrency exchange, offering retail investors a marketplace 23 to buy and sell cryptocurrencies. (Compl. ¶ 4.) In 2020, Terraform Labs began issuing UST, a 24 cryptocurrency intended to maintain a one-to-one value with the U.S. dollar. (Compl. ¶ 6.) 25 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant promoted UST as “essentially a digital U.S. dollar which 26 eliminated the volatility risk inherent to more speculative cryptocurrencies.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) In 27 May 2022, however, UST lost 90% of its value in days, during which Defendant restricted users 1 Plaintiffs are Defendant’s customers, who made purchases of UST on Defendant’s 2 platform. (Compl. ¶¶ 71, 74.) Plaintiff Nguyen opened an account with Defendant in November 3 2021, and was required to agree to Defendant’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) to open his account. 4 (Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. No. 15; Chan Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 11-1.) Likewise, Plaintiff George 5 opened his account in March 2022, and was required to agree to Defendant’s TOS to open his 6 account. (George Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. No. 16; Chan Decl. ¶ 4.) At the time Plaintiffs opened their 7 accounts, the September 2021 TOS was in effect. (Chan Decl. ¶ 5.) The September 2021 TOS 8 included an arbitration clause, which required that arbitration be conducted by JAMS, and that 9 “[t]he JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures, as modified by this Agreement, shall 10 apply.” (Chan Decl., Exh. A (“Sept. 2021 TOS”) ¶ 17.1.) In the event that “arbitration before 11 JAMS is unavailable or impossible for any valid reason, the such [sic] arbitration will be 12 conducted by, and according to the rules and regulations then in effect of, the American 13 Arbitration Association (AAA).” (Id.) 14 On September 9, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant case, asserting claims for negligence, 15 negligent misrepresentation, and violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act 16 (“CLRA”) and Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). (See Compl. at 1.) On November 17, 2022, 17 Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration, seeking to compel an arbitration 18 agreement within Defendant’s September 2021 TOS. On December 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their 19 opposition. (Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 13.) On January 13, 2023, Defendant filed its reply. (Def.’s 20 Reply, Dkt. No. 19.) 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., arbitration agreements 23 “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity 24 for the revocation of a contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “Once the Court has determined that an arbitration 25 agreement relates to a transaction involving interstate commerce, thereby falling under the FAA, 26 the court’s only role is to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the 27 scope of the dispute falls within that agreement.” Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., No. C 04-00281 JSW, 1 v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Operative Arbitration Agreement 4 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the September 2021 TOS or July 2022 5 TOS applies. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3; Def.’s Reply at 2.) The September 2021 TOS provides that 6 Defendant may “change or modify the terms and conditions contained in these Terms . . . at any 7 time and at its sole discretion.” (Sept. 2021 TOS at 1.) Further, the September 2021 TOS states: 8 “Your non-termination or continued use of this Site or Service(s) after the effective date of any 9 changes or modifications of these Terms will constitute your acceptance of such changes or 10 modifications.” (Id.) Defendant subsequently modified the TOS in July 2022, and Plaintiffs state 11 that they used Defendant’s website thereafter. (See Nguyen Decl. ¶ 7; George Decl. ¶ 7.) Thus, 12 Plaintiffs argue that the July 2022 TOS applies to this case. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) 13 Defendant, however, responds that the September 2021 TOS still applies because 14 Defendant did not notify existing users by e-mail or other means about the July 2022 TOS. 15 (Def.’s Reply at 4; Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 19-1.) Rather, Defendant simply updated the 16 TOS on its website. (Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2.) 17 The Ninth Circuit has found that such unilateral changes without notice are not binding on 18 a website user. In Stover v. Experian Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff assented to a website’s terms 19 and conditions in 2014, which likewise “contained a change-of-terms provision stating that ‘each 20 time’ [the plaintiff] ‘accessed the Product Website,’ she would be manifesting assent to ‘the then 21 current’ terms of the agreement.” 978 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal modifications 22 omitted). The plaintiff then accessed the website in 2018, by which point the terms and conditions 23 had changed. Id. Despite the change-of-terms provision, the Ninth Circuit found that the 2014 24 terms still applied because the plaintiff had not received notice of the change. Id. at 1086. Rather, 25 “in order for changes in terms to be binding pursuant to a change-of-terms provision in the 26 original contract, both parties to the contract—not just the drafting party—must have notice of the 27 changes in contract terms.” Id. In short, “notice—actual, inquiry, or constructive—is the 1 agreement.” Id. 2 Such is the case here. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiffs had notice of the 3 July 2022 TOS. Rather, the only evidence in the record is that Defendant did not notify its 4 existing users of the July 2022 TOS. (Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2.) Thus, as in Stover, the September 5 2021 TOS still applies. 6 B. Unconscionability 7 There does not appear to be any dispute as to whether the arbitration agreement at issue 8 involves interstate commerce. Indeed, the instant case concerns a putative class of all persons in 9 the United States who used Defendant to purchase UST, a cryptocurrency issued by a South 10 Korean company. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 81.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration clause is 11 unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4.) 12 The Court, however, finds that its review is limited to whether the delegation clause is 13 unconscionable. Generally, in deciding whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, 14 the Court also determines the gateway issues of “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists 15 and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron, 207 F.3d at 16 1130.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL NGUYEN, et al., Case No. 22-cv-06022-KAW
8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. COMPEL ARBITRATION
10 OKCOIN USA INC., Re: Dkt. No. 11 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiffs Michael Nguyen and Nader George filed the instant putative class action against 14 Defendants OKCoin USA, Inc., alleging that Defendant misrepresented the stability and financial 15 security of a cryptocurrency called TerraUSD (“UST”), resulting in financial loss to the class. 16 (Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 1-1.) Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. 17 (Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration, Dkt. No. 11.) 18 The Court previously deemed this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing 19 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). (Dkt. No. 20.) Having considered the parties’ filings and the 20 relevant legal authorities, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Defendant is a web-based cryptocurrency exchange, offering retail investors a marketplace 23 to buy and sell cryptocurrencies. (Compl. ¶ 4.) In 2020, Terraform Labs began issuing UST, a 24 cryptocurrency intended to maintain a one-to-one value with the U.S. dollar. (Compl. ¶ 6.) 25 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant promoted UST as “essentially a digital U.S. dollar which 26 eliminated the volatility risk inherent to more speculative cryptocurrencies.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) In 27 May 2022, however, UST lost 90% of its value in days, during which Defendant restricted users 1 Plaintiffs are Defendant’s customers, who made purchases of UST on Defendant’s 2 platform. (Compl. ¶¶ 71, 74.) Plaintiff Nguyen opened an account with Defendant in November 3 2021, and was required to agree to Defendant’s Terms of Service (“TOS”) to open his account. 4 (Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. No. 15; Chan Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 11-1.) Likewise, Plaintiff George 5 opened his account in March 2022, and was required to agree to Defendant’s TOS to open his 6 account. (George Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. No. 16; Chan Decl. ¶ 4.) At the time Plaintiffs opened their 7 accounts, the September 2021 TOS was in effect. (Chan Decl. ¶ 5.) The September 2021 TOS 8 included an arbitration clause, which required that arbitration be conducted by JAMS, and that 9 “[t]he JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures, as modified by this Agreement, shall 10 apply.” (Chan Decl., Exh. A (“Sept. 2021 TOS”) ¶ 17.1.) In the event that “arbitration before 11 JAMS is unavailable or impossible for any valid reason, the such [sic] arbitration will be 12 conducted by, and according to the rules and regulations then in effect of, the American 13 Arbitration Association (AAA).” (Id.) 14 On September 9, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant case, asserting claims for negligence, 15 negligent misrepresentation, and violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act 16 (“CLRA”) and Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). (See Compl. at 1.) On November 17, 2022, 17 Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration, seeking to compel an arbitration 18 agreement within Defendant’s September 2021 TOS. On December 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their 19 opposition. (Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 13.) On January 13, 2023, Defendant filed its reply. (Def.’s 20 Reply, Dkt. No. 19.) 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., arbitration agreements 23 “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity 24 for the revocation of a contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “Once the Court has determined that an arbitration 25 agreement relates to a transaction involving interstate commerce, thereby falling under the FAA, 26 the court’s only role is to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the 27 scope of the dispute falls within that agreement.” Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., No. C 04-00281 JSW, 1 v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Operative Arbitration Agreement 4 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the September 2021 TOS or July 2022 5 TOS applies. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3; Def.’s Reply at 2.) The September 2021 TOS provides that 6 Defendant may “change or modify the terms and conditions contained in these Terms . . . at any 7 time and at its sole discretion.” (Sept. 2021 TOS at 1.) Further, the September 2021 TOS states: 8 “Your non-termination or continued use of this Site or Service(s) after the effective date of any 9 changes or modifications of these Terms will constitute your acceptance of such changes or 10 modifications.” (Id.) Defendant subsequently modified the TOS in July 2022, and Plaintiffs state 11 that they used Defendant’s website thereafter. (See Nguyen Decl. ¶ 7; George Decl. ¶ 7.) Thus, 12 Plaintiffs argue that the July 2022 TOS applies to this case. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) 13 Defendant, however, responds that the September 2021 TOS still applies because 14 Defendant did not notify existing users by e-mail or other means about the July 2022 TOS. 15 (Def.’s Reply at 4; Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 19-1.) Rather, Defendant simply updated the 16 TOS on its website. (Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2.) 17 The Ninth Circuit has found that such unilateral changes without notice are not binding on 18 a website user. In Stover v. Experian Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff assented to a website’s terms 19 and conditions in 2014, which likewise “contained a change-of-terms provision stating that ‘each 20 time’ [the plaintiff] ‘accessed the Product Website,’ she would be manifesting assent to ‘the then 21 current’ terms of the agreement.” 978 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal modifications 22 omitted). The plaintiff then accessed the website in 2018, by which point the terms and conditions 23 had changed. Id. Despite the change-of-terms provision, the Ninth Circuit found that the 2014 24 terms still applied because the plaintiff had not received notice of the change. Id. at 1086. Rather, 25 “in order for changes in terms to be binding pursuant to a change-of-terms provision in the 26 original contract, both parties to the contract—not just the drafting party—must have notice of the 27 changes in contract terms.” Id. In short, “notice—actual, inquiry, or constructive—is the 1 agreement.” Id. 2 Such is the case here. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiffs had notice of the 3 July 2022 TOS. Rather, the only evidence in the record is that Defendant did not notify its 4 existing users of the July 2022 TOS. (Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 2.) Thus, as in Stover, the September 5 2021 TOS still applies. 6 B. Unconscionability 7 There does not appear to be any dispute as to whether the arbitration agreement at issue 8 involves interstate commerce. Indeed, the instant case concerns a putative class of all persons in 9 the United States who used Defendant to purchase UST, a cryptocurrency issued by a South 10 Korean company. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 81.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration clause is 11 unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4.) 12 The Court, however, finds that its review is limited to whether the delegation clause is 13 unconscionable. Generally, in deciding whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, 14 the Court also determines the gateway issues of “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists 15 and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron, 207 F.3d at 16 1130. These gateway issues, however, can be expressly delegated to the arbitrator where “the 17 parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of 18 Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 19 Here, there are effectively two delegation clauses: (1) a delegation clause to JAMS, and (2) 20 a delegation clause to AAA, in the event that arbitration before JAMS is impossible. (Sept. 2021 21 TOS ¶ 17.1.) The Court addresses each in turn. 22 i. Delegation to JAMS 23 The September 2021 TOS requires arbitration to be administered by JAMS, with the 24 JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures applying. (Id.) The JAMS Streamlined Rules 25 provide that “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, 26 existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought . . . 27 shall be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator.” JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & 1 2023). Courts have found that arbitration clauses incorporating the JAMS streamlined rules 2 demonstrate clear and unmistakable intent to delegate the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator. See 3 Chaine v. Tesla Energy Operations, No. CV 20-9082-JFW(GJSx), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4 206285, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021). 5 The Court, however, finds that the delegation clause to JAMS is unenforceable. As 6 Plaintiffs point out, JAMS follows a “Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute 7 Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 8.) Under this policy, 8 “JAMS will administrator arbitrations pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses 9 between companies and consumers only if the contract arbitration clause and specified applicable 10 rules comply with the following minimum standards of fairness.” See JAMS Policy on Consumer 11 Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, 12 JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-minimum-standards/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2023) 13 (emphasis added). Such minimum standards of fairness include requirements that: (1) a consumer 14 is not required to pay more than the $250 fee, (2) no party is precluded from seeking remedies in 15 small claims court, and (3) the consumer has a right to an in-person hearing in their hometown 16 area. (See id. ¶¶ 1(b), 5, 7.) Here, however, the September 2021 TOS makes no allowance for 17 claims to be brought in small claims court, instead requiring that all disputes (except those related 18 to intellectual property and debt collection) be arbitrated. (Sept. 2021 TOS ¶ 17.) The September 19 TOS also requires that the parties split the JAMS arbitrator fees and expenses equally, and indeed 20 warns that “the costs of arbitration could exceed the costs of litigation.” (Id. ¶ 17.1.) It further 21 requires that the arbitration be conducted in San Francisco, California, absent agreement by 22 Defendant to a different JAMS location. (Id. ¶ 17.1.) Thus, the September 2021 TOS does not 23 satisfy JAMS’s minimum standards. 24 Defendant does not dispute that this JAMS policy would apply to any arbitration between 25 Plaintiffs and Defendant. Instead, Defendant argues that users “agree to arbitrate with JAMS 26 under its Streamlined Rules ‘as modified by this agreement.’” (Def.’s Reply at 7.) Whether the 27 parties agreed to the modifications is beside the point; per JAMS’s explicit policy, it will conduct 1 Because the September 2021 TOS does not, arbitration before JAMS is not available, rendering 2 any delegation clause to JAMS effectively void. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. NNR Aircargo Serv. 3 (USA), Inc., 201 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A contract condition which is impossible to 4 fulfill is void.”). 5 ii. Delegation to AAA 6 While the Court finds that the delegation clause to JAMS is unenforceable, the Court 7 concludes that the delegation clause to AAA is valid. Again, the September 2021 TOS further 8 provides that “[i]f arbitration before JAMS is unavailable or impossible for any valid reason, the 9 such [sic] arbitration will be conducted by, and according to the rules and regulations then in 10 effect of, the American Arbitration Association (AAA).” The AAA’s Consumer Rules, in turn, 11 grant the arbitrator “the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with 12 respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any 13 claim or counterclaim.” Consumer Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 14 http://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Rules-Web_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2023). 15 Courts have found that arbitration clauses incorporating the AAA rules demonstrate clear and 16 unmistakable intent to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. See Maybaum v. Target Corp., No. 17 2:22-cv-00687-MCS-JEM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80466, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2022). 18 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that it is unclear which AAA rules apply, as AAA maintains 19 56 different sets of active rules. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 9.) A simple review of the names of these rules 20 makes clear that the vast majority of these rules would never apply; for example, there is no doubt 21 that the AAA Rules on Domain Names, Healthcare Payor Providers, Accounting, Olympic Sports 22 Disputes, and Canadian Dispute Resolution Procedures are obviously inapplicable. See AAA 23 Active Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/active-rules (last visited 24 Jan. 26, 2023). Rather, a reasonable consumer would understand that the Consumer Arbitration 25 Rules apply. See Wiseley v. Amazon.com, Inc., 709 Fed. Appx. 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Nor 26 does the incorporation by reference of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) rules create 27 procedural unconscionability. Although Wisely argues that it was unclear which rules would 1 apply in the context of his consumer purchases[.]”). 2 In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that like JAMS, the AAA has a Consumer Due Process 3 Protocol that make it “questionable whether AAA would even be available as an arbitral forum.” 4 (Pls.’ Opp’n at 9.) Unlike with JAMS, the Court cannot conclude that the AAA would refuse to 5 administer the arbitration. Rather, the AAA states that it “will exercise its authority to decline 6 administration of arbitration demands where an arbitration clause contains material violations of 7 the AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol.” Practice Areas -- Consumer, AMERICAN 8 ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/consumer (last visited Jan. 26, 2023). It is 9 unclear what would constitute a “material violation.” For example, the AAA’s Protocol states that 10 “Consumer ADR Agreements should make it clear that all parties retain the right to seek relief in a 11 small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction,” but does not appear 12 to explicitly require it. Consumer Arbitrator Rules Principle 5. Likewise, the AAA’s Protocol 13 states that face-to-face proceedings “should be conducted at a location which is reasonably 14 convenient to both parties,” but neither requires it nor sets a clear standard for what is reasonably 15 convenient to both parties. Id. Principle 7. Finally, unlike JAMS, the AAA does not set limits for 16 fee requirements. Id. Principle 6. Thus, arbitration before the AAA does not appear impossible. 17 Having found that there is a valid delegation clause to the AAA, the Court must determine 18 whether the delegation clause itself is unconscionable. The Court finds that it is not. While the 19 arbitration agreement as a whole -- including the delegation clause -- may be procedurally 20 unconscionable given that it is an adhesion contract, Plaintiffs make no argument that the 21 delegation clause itself is substantively unconscionable. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 22 Cal. 4th 899, 910 (2015) (“The prevailing view is that procedural and substantive 23 unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to 24 enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.”). Accordingly, the Court 25 finds that the case must be compelled to arbitration before the AAA, who will determine whether 26 the arbitration agreement is enforceable. Of course, should the AAA decline administration of the 27 arbitration, the parties would presumably be required to return to the Court to determine whether IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel 2 arbitration, and orders that arbitration be submitted to the AAA. The Court shall stay the 3 proceedings in the instant case pending resolution of the arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3. The parties 4 shall provide a status report within 30 days of the completion of the arbitration (or any declination 5 by the AAA to administer the arbitration) or within six months of the date of this order, whichever 6 is sooner. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: February 17, 2023 : 9 Reet ld ugTnae 10 K IS A. WESTMORE United States Magistrate Judge 11 12
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