Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission

462 S.E.2d 266, 319 S.C. 430, 1995 S.C. LEXIS 159

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedSeptember 18, 1995

Docket24312

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 462 S.E.2d 266 (Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 462 S.E.2d 266, 319 S.C. 430, 1995 S.C. LEXIS 159 (S.C. 1995).

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Opinions

Finney, Chief Justice:

This is a negligence case. The trial judge granted petitioner’s (Commission’s) Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, motion, finding respondent’s complaint failed to allege legal cause. Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 312 S.C. 107, 439 S.E. (2d) 285 (Ct. App. 1993). We granted certiorari, and reverse.

The Commission was responsible for the maintenance of a train crossing signal. The signal was out of order for several days, constantly signalling an imminent train. Respondent came upon the malfunctioning signal and stopped her automobile. While she was stopped, a car driven by Ross rear-ended respondent’s automobile, seriously injuring respondent. Ross was aware the signal was out of order, but respondent was [432]*432not. Respondent brought this negligence action against the Commission.

The circuit court held the complaint failed to allege legal cause, that is, foreseeability, and dismissed. In Bramlette v. Charter-Medical-Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 393 S.E. (2d) 914 (1990), we held

Although foreseeability of some injury from an act or omission is a prerequisite to establishing proximate cause, the plaintiff need not prove that the actor should have contemplated the particular event which occurred. The defendant may be held liable for anything which appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of his negligence. A plaintiff therefore proves legal cause by establishing the injury in question occurred as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.

Here, the accident occurred because of Ross’s failure to keep a proper lookout. Ross’s superseding negligence is not a natural and probable consequence of the Commission’s negligence in failing to repair the malfunctioning crossing signal. Although we agree with the dissent’s view of the factual inferences which may be drawn from respondent’s complaint, we find these facts, even if proven, would not create legal cause.

The Court of Appeals misread Bramlette as holding that so long as any accident is foreseeable, whether the defendant is liable for the one which occurred is always a question of fact. The court overlooked the requirement that before there can be legal cause, the accident which occurred must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. Here, it was foreseeable that an individual who, like Ross, knew of the malfunction, would ignore the signal, fail to stop, and be hit by a train while crossing the track. This type of accident is a natural and probable consequence of the Commission’s negligence. On the other hand, the negligence of Ross in failing to watch the roadway before the crossing is not chargeable against the Commission. Cf., Dunnivant v. Nafe, 206 Tenn. 458, 334 S.W. (2d) 717 (1960) (defendants who negligently blocked highway not liable to plaintiffs who stopped their car after observing obstruction, but were injured when their car brakes failed and car rolled backward off a bridge).

[433]*433For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court properly dismissed. this complaint. The opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing that decision is, itself,

Reversed.

Toal and Moore, JJ., concur. Waller, J., and A. Lee Chandler, Acting Associate Justice, dissent in separate opinion.

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Finney, Chief Justice:

This is a negligence case. The trial judge granted petitioner’s (Commission’s) Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, motion, finding respondent’s complaint failed to allege legal cause. Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Newton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 312 S.C. 107, 439 S.E. (2d) 285 (Ct. App. 1993). We granted certiorari, and reverse.

The Commission was responsible for the maintenance of a train crossing signal. The signal was out of order for several days, constantly signalling an imminent train. Respondent came upon the malfunctioning signal and stopped her automobile. While she was stopped, a car driven by Ross rear-ended respondent’s automobile, seriously injuring respondent. Ross was aware the signal was out of order, but respondent was [432]*432not. Respondent brought this negligence action against the Commission.

The circuit court held the complaint failed to allege legal cause, that is, foreseeability, and dismissed. In Bramlette v. Charter-Medical-Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 393 S.E. (2d) 914 (1990), we held

Although foreseeability of some injury from an act or omission is a prerequisite to establishing proximate cause, the plaintiff need not prove that the actor should have contemplated the particular event which occurred. The defendant may be held liable for anything which appears to have been a natural and probable consequence of his negligence. A plaintiff therefore proves legal cause by establishing the injury in question occurred as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.

Here, the accident occurred because of Ross’s failure to keep a proper lookout. Ross’s superseding negligence is not a natural and probable consequence of the Commission’s negligence in failing to repair the malfunctioning crossing signal. Although we agree with the dissent’s view of the factual inferences which may be drawn from respondent’s complaint, we find these facts, even if proven, would not create legal cause.

The Court of Appeals misread Bramlette as holding that so long as any accident is foreseeable, whether the defendant is liable for the one which occurred is always a question of fact. The court overlooked the requirement that before there can be legal cause, the accident which occurred must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. Here, it was foreseeable that an individual who, like Ross, knew of the malfunction, would ignore the signal, fail to stop, and be hit by a train while crossing the track. This type of accident is a natural and probable consequence of the Commission’s negligence. On the other hand, the negligence of Ross in failing to watch the roadway before the crossing is not chargeable against the Commission. Cf., Dunnivant v. Nafe, 206 Tenn. 458, 334 S.W. (2d) 717 (1960) (defendants who negligently blocked highway not liable to plaintiffs who stopped their car after observing obstruction, but were injured when their car brakes failed and car rolled backward off a bridge).

[433]*433For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court properly dismissed. this complaint. The opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing that decision is, itself,

Reversed.

Toal and Moore, JJ., concur. Waller, J., and A. Lee Chandler, Acting Associate Justice, dissent in separate opinion.

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462 S.E.2d 266, 319 S.C. 430, 1995 S.C. LEXIS 159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newton-v-south-carolina-public-railways-commission-sc-1995.

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