Newman v. Vance

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 20, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-01416·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MAURICE NEWMAN, Petitioner, 20-CV-1416 (LLS) -against- ORDER CYRUS VANCE JR., Respondent. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Petitioner, currently residing in a shelter “per parole,” (ECF No. 1 at 2) brings this pro se petition challenging his June 12, 2009 conviction in the New York Supreme Court, New York County. By order dated March 11, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file a declaration within sixty days of the date of this order showing cause why this application should not be denied as time-barred. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court has the authority to review and dismiss a § 2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading from the state “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4; see Acosta v. Nunez, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Tragath v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). DISCUSSION Applicable Statute of Limitations Petitioner’s application may be time-barred. A prisoner seeking habeas relief under § 2254 must generally file a petition within one year from the latest of four benchmark dates:

(1) when the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) when a government-created impediment to making such a motion is removed; (3) when the constitutional right asserted is initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if it has been made retroactively available to cases on collateral review; or (4) when the facts supporting the claim(s) could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2). Petitioner alleges that on June 12, 2009, he was convicted in the New York Supreme Court, New York County. Court records indicate that on April 17, 2012, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction, People v. Newman, 942 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st Dep’t Apr. 17, 2012), and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to

appeal on August 20, 2012, People v. Newman, 951 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2012). Petitioner’s conviction consequently became final on November 20, 2012, following “the expiration of [the] 90-day period of time to petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).1 The petition, executed by Petitioner on February 18, 2020, was received by the Court on February 19, 2020, more than seven years after the judgment of conviction became final.

1 Petitioner alleges that he filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court which was denied, but Petitioner does not provide the date he filed the petition and the date the petition was denied. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) Under the AEDPA, when postconviction motions are filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations, those motions and related state-court proceedings may toll the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Postconviction motions filed after the limitations period expires, however, do not start the limitations period anew. “[P]roper calculation of Section

2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision excludes time during which properly filed state relief applications are pending but does not reset the date from which the one-year statute of limitations begins to run.” Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 2244(d)(2) applies only if a petitioner’s postconviction motion was pending within the one-year limitations period. Here, Petitioner alleges that he filed several postconviction motions in the New York state courts. But Petitioner’s postconviction proceedings in the New York state courts do not appear to toll the limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Leave to Show Cause The Court directs Petitioner to file a declaration within sixty days of the date of this order stating why this application should not be dismissed as time-barred.1 Petitioner should allege any facts showing that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary

circumstance prevented him from timely submitting this petition. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (holding that one-year limitations period under § 2244(d) for habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases).

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Newman v. Vance, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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