Newman v. Iron Mountain

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 3, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-06115
StatusUnknown

This text of Newman v. Iron Mountain (Newman v. Iron Mountain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newman v. Iron Mountain, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MAURICE A. NEWMAN, Plaintiff, 20-CV-6115 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND IRON MOUNTAIN; MAKE SPACE; DAVE SEARLES; JOE DOE (FEMALE MANAGER), Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. By order dated December 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Using the Court’s general complaint form, Plaintiff alleges, by checking boxes on the form, that Defendants violated his constitutional rights and discriminated against him. Plaintiff alleges the following: I was terminated by discrimination from Iron Man (Make Space), due to criminal convictions. It was address upon hire that I had convictions. At roll call David Searles was giving us a lot of misinformation regarding contracted cov-19. I address some issues at roll call and was fired a few days later. My rights to Due process was completely violated because I was fired without explanation or appeal. I was harmed because my termination was at the beginning of NYC shut down and its apex. When I was terminated hRA cut me off everything and there office was shut down, so I was actually without food and under major hardships. (Compl. at ¶ V.) Plaintiff does not allege that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. He seeks 50 million dollars in monetary damages. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s complaint is short and plain, but it does not show that he is entitled to relief. Plaintiff does not identify his race or any other characteristics that are protected under federal

law. Plaintiff also does not allege facts showing that Defendants’ decision to terminate him was based on any federally protected characteristics. The Court is therefore unable to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief. A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against

an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Title VII prohibits discrimination because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin. It does not prohibit discrimination because of an individual’s criminal convictions, see, e.g., Williams v. City of New York, 916 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Title VII does not address discrimination based on a criminal record” (citing Tubbs v. N.Y.C. Parks Dep’t, No. 12-CV-3322, 2012 WL 4838439 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012))); Gillum v.

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Bluebook (online)
Newman v. Iron Mountain, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newman-v-iron-mountain-nysd-2021.