OPINION
ROBERT L. CARTER, District Judge.
The present motion is for certification of a class action in a challenge to defendants’ alleged administrative policy of using per se rules to deny and terminate Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability benefits to New York State residents who suffer disabling cardiovascular impairment and inability to work. The per se rules are allegedly used for determining (1) whether an individual’s heart impairment is sufficiently severe to meet or equal the Listing of Impairments for cardiovascular disease established by the Secretary and (2) whether an individual suffering from heart disease has the residual function capacity (RFC) to engage in substantial gainful activity. As such, plaintiffs maintain that the evaluations preclude an individualized assessment of relevant medical evidence or of RFC, in violation of the Social Security Act, its implementing regulations, and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs also charge that, because many of the challenged rules and procedures were not published in the Federal Register, they violate the Federal Register [121]*121Act,1 FrepHnrn of Information Act,2 and Administrative Procedures Act.3
The named plaintiffs are twelve individuals who are ioined by the State and Citv of [122]*122New York, Suffolk County, and the State and Suffolk County Departments of Social Services. Plaintiffs seek certification of a class action consisting of:
All New York State residents with cardiovascular impairments whose applications or eligibility for SSDI or SSI disability benefits have been or will be denied or terminated by the application of per se denial rules on or after June 1, 1980.
In addition, plaintiffs seek an order certifying as a subclass all members of the plaintiff class:
Who have ischemic heart disease, hypertensive vascular disease, myocardiopa-thies, or rheumatic or syphilitic heart disease and whose disability benefits have been or will be denied or terminated based on the application of per se denial rules pertaining to treadmill exercise tests.4
Defendants challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the class on whose behalf plaintiffs seek to bring this action, arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)5 mandates standards of exhaustion and time limitations not met by the plaintiff class.
The § 405(g) requirement of a “final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing” has been held to consist of two elements, a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement that a claim for benefits has been presented to the Secretary (“presentment”) and a waivable requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary have been exhausted (“exhaustion”). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328-330, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899-900, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1984).
As to the presentment requirement, the Second Circuit adheres to the view that a recipient subject to continuing eligibility review can not meet this requisite through inaction. However, the submission, prior to termination, of a completed Social Security questionnaire indicating in writing that the recipient remains disabled and desires continued benefits satisfies the presentment yardstick. City of New York v. Heckler, supra.
In the present case, all class members whose benefits were terminated either completed such a form or, as called for by the Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual System (POMS) §§ 00504 et seq., participated in its completion. Wheeler v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.1983). Further, the inclusion of class members who will be denied or terminated from benefits in the future presents no jurisdictional problem since such individuals will not actually be covered by any order or judgment entered in these cases until they make a claim for benefits in some form, thus satisfying the presentment requirement. Dixon v. Heck[123]*123ler, 589 F.Supp. 1494, 1512 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (Lasker, J.).
The need to exhaust administrative remedies may be waived by the court in appropriate circumstances. City of New York v. Heckler, supra, 742 F.2d at 736. This waiver may be exercised where plaintiffs’ legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits, where exhaustion would be futile, or where the harm suffered pending exhaustion would be irreparable. Id. No one factor is critical and “a general approach, balancing the competing considerations to arrive at a just result under the circumstances presented” has been adopted by this circuit. Id.
As in City of New York, issues of collaterally and futility make waiver appropriate here.
[T]he class here complains fundamentally of a procedural irregularity and not of the Secretary’s substantive standards of eligibility. The District Court was not asked to and did not rule on the merits of any of the underlying claims. In this regard cases such as Heckler v. Lopez, [463 U.S. 1328, 104 S.Ct. 10, 77 L.Ed.2d 1431]; Heckler v. Ringer, [— U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984)] and Smith v. Schweiker, [709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.1983) ], which involved challenges to the Secretary’s substantive standards, are distinguishable. We conclude, therefore, that although not ‘wholly’ collateral, plaintiffs’ claims are substantially collateral to their entitlement to disability benefits and consequently present an appropriate circumstance for waiver. [Citations omitted].
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Moreover, under the. circumstances of this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been futile____ [T]he administrative process can not vindicate the procedural rights asserted in this litigation. The class members complain of a procedural irregularity—the failure of the Secretary to base eligibility determinations on individualized assess-ments____ This procedural right, guaranteed by the Secretary’s regulations, cannot be vindicated by an ultimate determination of eligibility. For that reason further exhaustion may justifiably be waived.
Id. at 737.
A further obstacle to certification of the class is the sixty day limitation imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), supra at note 2. Under that statute, claimants must seek judicial review of final decisions of the Secretary “within sixty days after the mailing ...
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OPINION
ROBERT L. CARTER, District Judge.
The present motion is for certification of a class action in a challenge to defendants’ alleged administrative policy of using per se rules to deny and terminate Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability benefits to New York State residents who suffer disabling cardiovascular impairment and inability to work. The per se rules are allegedly used for determining (1) whether an individual’s heart impairment is sufficiently severe to meet or equal the Listing of Impairments for cardiovascular disease established by the Secretary and (2) whether an individual suffering from heart disease has the residual function capacity (RFC) to engage in substantial gainful activity. As such, plaintiffs maintain that the evaluations preclude an individualized assessment of relevant medical evidence or of RFC, in violation of the Social Security Act, its implementing regulations, and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs also charge that, because many of the challenged rules and procedures were not published in the Federal Register, they violate the Federal Register [121]*121Act,1 FrepHnrn of Information Act,2 and Administrative Procedures Act.3
The named plaintiffs are twelve individuals who are ioined by the State and Citv of [122]*122New York, Suffolk County, and the State and Suffolk County Departments of Social Services. Plaintiffs seek certification of a class action consisting of:
All New York State residents with cardiovascular impairments whose applications or eligibility for SSDI or SSI disability benefits have been or will be denied or terminated by the application of per se denial rules on or after June 1, 1980.
In addition, plaintiffs seek an order certifying as a subclass all members of the plaintiff class:
Who have ischemic heart disease, hypertensive vascular disease, myocardiopa-thies, or rheumatic or syphilitic heart disease and whose disability benefits have been or will be denied or terminated based on the application of per se denial rules pertaining to treadmill exercise tests.4
Defendants challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the class on whose behalf plaintiffs seek to bring this action, arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)5 mandates standards of exhaustion and time limitations not met by the plaintiff class.
The § 405(g) requirement of a “final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing” has been held to consist of two elements, a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement that a claim for benefits has been presented to the Secretary (“presentment”) and a waivable requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary have been exhausted (“exhaustion”). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328-330, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899-900, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1984).
As to the presentment requirement, the Second Circuit adheres to the view that a recipient subject to continuing eligibility review can not meet this requisite through inaction. However, the submission, prior to termination, of a completed Social Security questionnaire indicating in writing that the recipient remains disabled and desires continued benefits satisfies the presentment yardstick. City of New York v. Heckler, supra.
In the present case, all class members whose benefits were terminated either completed such a form or, as called for by the Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual System (POMS) §§ 00504 et seq., participated in its completion. Wheeler v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.1983). Further, the inclusion of class members who will be denied or terminated from benefits in the future presents no jurisdictional problem since such individuals will not actually be covered by any order or judgment entered in these cases until they make a claim for benefits in some form, thus satisfying the presentment requirement. Dixon v. Heck[123]*123ler, 589 F.Supp. 1494, 1512 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (Lasker, J.).
The need to exhaust administrative remedies may be waived by the court in appropriate circumstances. City of New York v. Heckler, supra, 742 F.2d at 736. This waiver may be exercised where plaintiffs’ legal claims are collateral to the demand for benefits, where exhaustion would be futile, or where the harm suffered pending exhaustion would be irreparable. Id. No one factor is critical and “a general approach, balancing the competing considerations to arrive at a just result under the circumstances presented” has been adopted by this circuit. Id.
As in City of New York, issues of collaterally and futility make waiver appropriate here.
[T]he class here complains fundamentally of a procedural irregularity and not of the Secretary’s substantive standards of eligibility. The District Court was not asked to and did not rule on the merits of any of the underlying claims. In this regard cases such as Heckler v. Lopez, [463 U.S. 1328, 104 S.Ct. 10, 77 L.Ed.2d 1431]; Heckler v. Ringer, [— U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984)] and Smith v. Schweiker, [709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.1983) ], which involved challenges to the Secretary’s substantive standards, are distinguishable. We conclude, therefore, that although not ‘wholly’ collateral, plaintiffs’ claims are substantially collateral to their entitlement to disability benefits and consequently present an appropriate circumstance for waiver. [Citations omitted].
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Moreover, under the. circumstances of this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been futile____ [T]he administrative process can not vindicate the procedural rights asserted in this litigation. The class members complain of a procedural irregularity—the failure of the Secretary to base eligibility determinations on individualized assess-ments____ This procedural right, guaranteed by the Secretary’s regulations, cannot be vindicated by an ultimate determination of eligibility. For that reason further exhaustion may justifiably be waived.
Id. at 737.
A further obstacle to certification of the class is the sixty day limitation imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), supra at note 2. Under that statute, claimants must seek judicial review of final decisions of the Secretary “within sixty days after the mailing ... of notice of such decisions or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.” This requirement is not jurisdictional and acts as a statute of limitations, waivable by the parties. Id. at 738. The Second Circuit found that the period was tolled during the time that the Social Security Administration’s policy of applying per se rules remained operative but undisclosed. Id. There, however, the government maintained a systematic clandestine policy of procedural irregularities that was not fully revealed until the litigation. That is not alleged here, and plaintiffs argue tolling based only upon the fact that the contested per se rules were not published in the Federal Register, in alleged violation of notice and comment requirements.
Generally, defendants will be es-topped from invoking a statute of limitations defense if they have previously, by deception or in violation of a duty toward plaintiffs, caused plaintiffs to subject the claim to the statutory bar. Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 448 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1984); see Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959); 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 25 (1948 and Supp.1984). Such estoppel may result from fraudulent concealment. Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F.Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (Cooper, J.). It appears that this is the basis for the Second Circuit’s tolling of the six month limitations period in City of New York.
There the court held:
Where the Government’s secretive conduct prevents plaintiffs from knowing of a violation of rights, statutes of limitations have been tolled until such time as plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to learn the facts concerning the cause of [124]*124action. See Lopez v. Heckler, supra, 725 F.2d at 1505-07 (disability claim); Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327-30 (2d Cir.1982) (claim under Federal Tort Claims Act), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 3111, 77 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1983); Chiappa v. Califano, 480 F.Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (disability of claim).
City of New York v. Heckler, supra, 742 F.2d at 738.
While the nonpublication of the per se rules in the Federal Register may not have been as egregious as the practice of unpublished internal memoranda and misstatements about the scope of their use documented in City of New York,6 the absence of formal publication of the cardiac impairment policy, if proved and proved to have been required, had the same effect on the present class for purposes of the limitations period as it had in City of New York. Plaintiffs would then have lacked the ability to know of the use of per se rules and, as the Second Circuit found, would therefore be “entitled to believe that their Government’s determination of ineligibility was the considered judgment of an agency faithfully executing the laws of the United States.” Id. Thus, jurisdiction over the proposed class and subclass is appropriate here.
Plaintiffs’ have met their burden of establishing that all requirements of class certification under Rule 23(a), F.R.Civ.P., have been met. See Warren v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (Sprizzo, J.). Plaintiffs maintain that the class numbers in the tens of thousands, thus fulfilling the numerosity component. Common questions of law and fact are presented in that the inquiry addressed by this litigation is not to a determination of the merits of individual claims, but to the legality of defendants’ policy of using per se rules to deny disability claims. The typicality requirement is met since the named plaintiffs are persons with alleged cardiovascular impairments whose initial applications for benefits were denied or whose eligibility was terminated based on the challenged rules. Further, the claims of the named plaintiffs present no material interests adverse to those of the class as a whole and all seek the same relief. Fair and adequate representation is assured by the qualifications of the attorneys and the unlikeliness of collusion among the litigants. The class also satisfies Rule 23(b)(2), F.R.Civ.P., in that defendants’ alleged use of per se rules is generally applicable to the class and injunctive relief is requested. See generally City of New York v. Heckler, supra.
Moreover, plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the subclass meets the Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P., requirements. Grogg v. General Motors, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 523, 530 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (Duffy, J.). Numerosity here is satisfied since the subclass is estimated to be half the size of the larger class and typicality is met since the named subclass plaintiffs share the same types of heart disease which require the challenged treadmill test. The common-question, fair and adequate representation, and absence of adverse interests within the subclass requirements are satisfied for the same reasons as the class in general. This is also true for the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement since the treadmill test is generally applicable to the subclass and injunctive [125]*125relief is requested. See generally City of New York v. Heckler, supra.
For the above reasons, the motion for class certification is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.