New v. United States

245 F. 710, 158 C.C.A. 112, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1536
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 15, 1917
DocketNo. 2948
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 245 F. 710 (New v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New v. United States, 245 F. 710, 158 C.C.A. 112, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1536 (9th Cir. 1917).

Opinion

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff in error was convicted under the second, third, and fourth counts of an indictment containing seven counts, charging him and one Marie T. Feo, alias Maria Tully, alias Marie Graham, with devising a scheme to defraud, to be executed by means of fhe post office establishment of the United States, and that they in fact did use the mails in such execution. The codefendant of the plaintiff in error was acquitted as to all of the counts, and he was acquitted as to counts 1, S, 6, and 7 under the instruction of the court; there having been no proof of the depositing in the mails of the letters respectively alleged in those counts to have been so placed.

In the court below the validity of the indictment was questioned, both by motion to quash and by demurrer, and here it is strenuously contended in behalf of the plaintiff in error that it is in legal effect based on the religious belief of the plaintiff in error, in contravention of that provision of the Constitution of the United States securing to every citizen the right of religious freedom.

[1] It alleges various pretensions and promises of the defendant, New, which are alleged to have been false and fraudulent, and to have [712]*712been made for the purpose of obtaining money and other things of value from others, and it alleges that in pursuance of that fraudulent scheme he deposited in the post office certain letters, one of which was set out in each count of the indictment. Those alleged facts are essential elements of the offense denounced by the statute upon which the indictment was based, but all that are essential. Stokes v. United States, 157 U. S. 188, 15 Sup. Ct. 617, 39 L. Ed. 667; United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 8 Sup. Ct. 571, 31 L. Ed. 516; Brooks v. United States, 146 Fed. 223, 76 C. C. A. 581; Miller v. United States, 133 Fed. 337, 66 C. C. A. 399; Stewart v. United States, 119 Fed. 89, 55 C. C. A. 641.

[2] The government in no way sought by the indictment to prevent the defendants from honestly and sincerely entertaining the views the indictment alleges they pretended to entertain, nor from honestly and sincerely endeavoring to persuade others, by any legitimate means, to embrace the same notions. But what the government did undertake to do, and what it had the statutory authority for doing, was to prevent by indictment the defendants thereto from pretending to entertain the views therein specifically alleged for the false and fraudulent purpose of procuring money of other things of value from third parties by use of its post office establishment, of which use the indictment alleges the defendants availed themselves for the said false, fraudulent, and illegal purpose. That is this case, and the whole of it, in so far as concerns the point already mentioned. In such cases, as held by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in the case of Post v. United States, 135 Fed. 1, 67 C. C. A. 569, 70 L. R. A. 989, the question of the defendant’s good faith is the cardinal question. See, also, United States v. White (D. C.) 150 Fed. 379, where the pretensions of the defendant to the indictment and the matter sent through the mails, while of the somewhat general nature of those here involved, were insignificant in comparison, and where the court instructed the jury that the point that .they were to consider and determine was, not whether it was possible that the things which the defendant promised to do could be possibly done by any one, but whether it had been proven that the defendant did not intend to do what he promised he could and would do. In determining that question, said the court:

“You are entitled to consider and weigh every fact and circumstance which you find to have been proved which in your judgment throws light upon his good faith. The question is: Did he honestly, in good faith, intend to do the things which he promised he could and would do, as the consideration for the money which he proposed to himself to obtain from those with whom he opened up communications through the post office as charged in the indictment?”

[3] That the letters alleged in the indictment to have been deposited in the mails in pursuance of the alleged scheme were admissible in evidence, of course, goes without saying, and that there was sufficient evidence given to justify the jury in finding that those specified in the counts on which the plaintiff in error was convicted were so deposited is, we think, equally clear. Their character is of no consequence. United States v. Young, 232 U. S. 155, 161, 34 Sup. Ct. 303, 58 L. Ed. [713]*713548; United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U. S. 440, 37 Sup. Ct. 438, 61 L. Ed. 836. '

[4] It is, however, further contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in error on the ground that there was no evidence tending to show that he formed any scheme or artifice to defraud, which point calls for a brief statement of what constituted the alleged scheme, and for some reference to some of the testimony introduced tending to show the commission by the plaintiff in error of the alleged offenses.

Except as to the letters alleged to have been deposited by the plaintiff in error in the mails, the three counts under which he was convicted are, in substance, the same, and alleged that he and his codefendant at a certain specified time and place, within the jurisdiction of the court below, devised a scheme and artifice to defraud various persons and the public generally, and particularly certain specifically named persons, termed in the indictment “victims,” and divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, which scheme and artifice was to be effected by means of the post office establishment of the United States, and was, in substance, as follows:

That the defendants would pretend that New was a human being who had attained the supernatural state of self-immortality in the body, by a course of righteous conduct consisting in abstinence from the use of meats of any kind as food; abstinence from the use of intoxicating liquors of any kind; abstinence from the use of indecent or profane language of any kind; abstinence from telling falsehoods and bearing false witness against his neighbors; and, lastly, by abstinence from the sin of committing adultery by acts committed, evil desires, or lustful eyes, or otherwise. That such supernatural power had enabled him to conquer disease, death, poverty, and misery.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis
108 F.2d 683 (Third Circuit, 1940)
Foshay v. United States
68 F.2d 205 (Eighth Circuit, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
245 F. 710, 158 C.C.A. 112, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-v-united-states-ca9-1917.